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The saying that "generals fight the last war" was quite popular at this time, so it is ironic that the Korean War itself is a good illustration of it. The otherwise "forgotten war" is remembered for two episodes.

The saying that "generals fight the last war" was quite popular at this time, so it is ironic that the Korean War itself is a good illustration of it. The otherwise "forgotten war" is remembered for two episodes.

One of these is Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel in October 1950. Truman made this decision in secret on September 11, 1950 on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just before the Inchon landing. The staff of the National Security Council advised against it. Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized operations north of 38th parallel. The Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1.

One of these is Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel in October 1950. Truman made this decision in secret on September 11, 1950 on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just before the Inchon landing. The staff of the National Security Council advised against it. Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized operations north of 38th parallel. Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1.

This episode is remembered as an illustration of American hubris, resulting in a Chinese counterattack. Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. But this line was not necessarily the same as the legal partition line, which in both cases was drawn in a hasty and arbitrary way.  

This episode is remembered as an illustration of American hubris, resulting in a Chinese counterattack. Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. But this line was not necessarily the same as the legal partition line, which in both cases was drawn in a hasty and arbitrary way.