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| − | [[Image:Lopez scaling seawall.jpg|right|thumb|United States marines landing at [[Inchon]], 15 September 1950.]] | + | [[Image:Lopez scaling seawall.jpg|right|thumb|United States marines at [[Inchon]], 15 September 1950.]] |
| − | The '''Korean War''' was a conflict of the [[Cold War]] that lasted from June 1950 to July 1953. Korea was a Japanese colony until August 1945, when it was divided into American and Soviet spheres of influence at the 38th parallel. In the South, Syngman Rhee became president as a result of elections supervised by the United Nations in May 1948. The Soviets installed a communist government in North Korea in September 1948. | + | The '''Korean War''' was a conflict between communist and anti-communist states fought in Korea during the [[Cold War]] era. It that lasted from June 1950 to July 1953. Korea was a Japanese colony until August 1945, when it was divided into American and Soviet spheres of influence at the 38th parallel. In the South, Syngman Rhee became president as a result of elections supervised by the United Nations in May 1948. The Soviets installed a communist government under [[Kim Il-sung]] in North Korea in September 1948. |
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| − | The war began in June 1950 when communist forces crossed the 38th parallel to enter South Korea. Anti-communist forces retreated to a perimeter around the southern city of Busan. The U.S. staged a landing behind communist lines at Inchon, near Seoul, on September 15, 1950. This tactic routed the North Koreans. In a controversial move, Truman ordered US forces to pursue the North Koreans across the 38th parallel. | + | The war began on 25 June 1950 when the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel to enter South Korea. Anti-communist forces retreated to a perimeter around the southern city of Busan. The U.S. staged a landing behind communist lines at Inchon, near Seoul, on September 15, 1950. This tactic routed the North Koreans. In a controversial move, Truman ordered US forces to pursue the North Koreans across the 38th parallel. |
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| − | Facing imminent defeat, Stalin asked China to intervene on October 1. US troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7. They briefly reached the Yalu River on November 21 before they were turned back by the Chinese. By June 1951, the military line had stabilized at approximately the 38th parallel, the pre-war dividing line. | + | Facing imminent defeat, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin asked China to intervene on October 1. US troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7. They briefly reached the Yalu River on November 21 before they were turned back by the Chinese. By June 1951, the military line had stabilized at approximately the 38th parallel, the pre-war dividing line. |
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| | + | The Korean War is often called the "forgotten war." But lessons learned and misunderstandings of Korea played a major roll in shaping later conflicts, notably the [[Vietnam War]]. |
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| | == Lessons of war == | | == Lessons of war == |
| − | The saying that "generals fight the last war" was quite popular at this time, so it is ironic that the Korean War itself is a good illustration of it. The otherwise "forgotten war" is remembered for several episodes. | + | The saying that "generals fight the last war" was quite popular at this time, so it is ironic that the Korean War itself is a good illustration of it. The otherwise forgotten war is remembered for several episodes. |
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| | ===Crossing the 38th=== | | ===Crossing the 38th=== |
| − | One of these episodes is Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel in October 1950. Truman made this decision in secret on September 11, 1950 on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just before the Inchon landing. The staff of the National Security Council advised against it. Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the Joint Chiefs authorized operations north of the 38th parallel. Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1. | + | One of the best-remembered episodes of the war is President Harry Truman's decision to cross the 38th parallel in October 1950. Truman made this decision in secret on September 11, 1950 on the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just before the Inchon landing. The staff of the National Security Council advised against it.<ref>Stueck, William W, "[https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/asia-and-africa/korean-history/korean-war Korean War]," ''Dictionary of American History''.</ref> |
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| | + | Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the Joint Chiefs authorized operations north of the 38th parallel. Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1.<ref name="Chang">Chang, Jung; Halliday, Jon. Mao: ''The Unknown Story.'' Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. "Why Mao and Stalin Started the Korean War." Chang had access to the Russian archive, which is ignored by most writers on this subject.</ref> |
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| | + | In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] had tea with Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar in Beijing on October 2. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added. This episode has led to a great deal of misunderstanding concerning China's motives. The request received from Stalin the day before meant that China did not have much choice in this matter. Mao had announced his decision to intervene to the Politburo earlier that day. To make sure that Mao followed through, Stalin sent a bullying telegram on 5 October. Yet American forces did not cross the parallel until October 7.<ref name="Chang"/> |
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| − | This episode is remembered as an illustration of American hubris, resulting in a Chinese counterattack. Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. But this line was not necessarily the same as the legal partition line, which in both cases was drawn in a hasty and arbitrary way.
| + | Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. But this line was not necessarily the same as the legal partition line, which in both cases was drawn in a hasty and arbitrary way. |
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| | ===Dismissal of MacArthur=== | | ===Dismissal of MacArthur=== |
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| | === China attacks === | | === China attacks === |
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| − | Led by Mao Zedong, the communists captured Nanjing, then the capital of China, from the Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT, in April 1949. Mao's army was enormous, but he was dependent on money and weapons from Russia. During a trip to Moscow in early May, Mao concluded that only war with America would convince Stalin to continue funding his army.<ref name="Chang">Chang, Jung; Halliday, Jon. Mao: ''The Unknown Story.'' Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. "Why Mao and Stalin Started the Korean War." Chang had access to the Russian archive, which is ignored by most writers on this subject.</ref> | + | Led by Mao Zedong, the communists captured Nanjing, then the capital of China, from the Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT, in April 1949. Mao's army was enormous, but he was dependent on money and weapons from Russia. During a trip to Moscow in early May, Mao concluded that only war with America would convince Stalin to continue funding his army.<ref name="Chang"/> |
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| | Until October, Mao was distracted by remnants of the KMT in southern China. His next target was the French in northern Vietnam. North Korean leader Kim Il-sung kept the date of his initial offensive in June secret from China to discourage Mao from intervening. In late August 1950, Mao began to move forces north toward Korea. U.S. forces landed at Inchon near Seoul on September 15, 1950. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized operations north of 38th parallel on September 29. Soviet specialist George Kennan warned that an American conquest of North Korea would put U.S. soldiers "at the gates of Vladivostok," a Russian naval base. Stalin approved Chinese intervention on October 1.<ref name="Chang"/> | | Until October, Mao was distracted by remnants of the KMT in southern China. His next target was the French in northern Vietnam. North Korean leader Kim Il-sung kept the date of his initial offensive in June secret from China to discourage Mao from intervening. In late August 1950, Mao began to move forces north toward Korea. U.S. forces landed at Inchon near Seoul on September 15, 1950. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized operations north of 38th parallel on September 29. Soviet specialist George Kennan warned that an American conquest of North Korea would put U.S. soldiers "at the gates of Vladivostok," a Russian naval base. Stalin approved Chinese intervention on October 1.<ref name="Chang"/> |
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| | In March 1951, a UN operation recaptured Seoul. In April, General MacArthur asked for permission to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria and to use KMT forces from Taiwan. When President Truman rejected both of these proposals, MacArthur went public with his criticisms. Truman then replaced MacArthur with Gen. Matthew Ridgeway. | | In March 1951, a UN operation recaptured Seoul. In April, General MacArthur asked for permission to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria and to use KMT forces from Taiwan. When President Truman rejected both of these proposals, MacArthur went public with his criticisms. Truman then replaced MacArthur with Gen. Matthew Ridgeway. |
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| − | The dispute was not about nuclear weapons, although it is remembered this way in popular history. The popular history amounts to a form of blame shifting by pro-Truman historians. In reality, Truman's attitude toward nuclear weapons was, if anything, less responsible than MacArthur's. When asked by a reporter about the use of nuclear weapons in Korea on November 30, 1950, Truman responded, "I'm not a military authority that passes on those things....The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of weapons, as he always has."<ref>Patterson, James T., Oxford History of the United States, vol. 10, chapter 8 "Korea."</ref> | + | The dispute was not about nuclear weapons, although it is remembered this way in popular history. The popular history amounts to a form of blame shifting by pro-Truman historians. In reality, Truman's attitude toward nuclear weapons was, if anything, less responsible than MacArthur's. When asked by a reporter about the use of nuclear weapons in Korea on November 30, 1950, Truman responded, "I'm not a military authority that passes on those things....The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of weapons, as he always has."<ref name="Patterson"/>Patterson, James T., Oxford History of the United States, vol. 10, chapter 8 "Korea."</ref> |
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| | At their meeting at Wake Island on 15 October 1950, MacArthur had assured Truman that the chance of China intervening was "very little." The Eighth Army would be out of Korea by Christmas, he said. The basis for his confidence was not so much intelligence from the field as his understanding of "the Oriental mind." This was egotism posing as strategy. It took only ten days for the Chinese to prove MacArthur wrong at Unsan. In short, Truman had good reason to dismiss MacArthur prior to their dispute about using KMT soldiers.<ref name=Patterson/> | | At their meeting at Wake Island on 15 October 1950, MacArthur had assured Truman that the chance of China intervening was "very little." The Eighth Army would be out of Korea by Christmas, he said. The basis for his confidence was not so much intelligence from the field as his understanding of "the Oriental mind." This was egotism posing as strategy. It took only ten days for the Chinese to prove MacArthur wrong at Unsan. In short, Truman had good reason to dismiss MacArthur prior to their dispute about using KMT soldiers.<ref name=Patterson/> |