Changes

Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the Joint Chiefs authorized operations north of the 38th parallel. Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1.<ref name="Chang">Chang, Jung; Halliday, Jon. Mao: ''The Unknown Story.'' Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. "Why Mao and Stalin Started the Korean War." Chang had access to the Russian archive, which is ignored by most writers on this subject.</ref>

Going to the "gates of Vladivostok" was likely to provoke a Soviet response, according to George Kennan, a leading Soviet specialist.<ref>Chi Young Pak, ''Korea and the United Nations''</ref> As an alternative, the French and British proposed a defensive line across the waist of Korea, located just north of Pyongyang. America's intention to advance north became public on September 29 when the Joint Chiefs authorized operations north of the 38th parallel. Stalin responded by secretly requesting Chinese intervention on October 1.<ref name="Chang">Chang, Jung; Halliday, Jon. Mao: ''The Unknown Story.'' Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. "Why Mao and Stalin Started the Korean War." Chang had access to the Russian archive, which is ignored by most writers on this subject.</ref>

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] woke Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar so they could have tea together in the wee hours of October 3. The position of premier has no authority in a communist system, but Zhou was Mao's closest associate. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] woke Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar so they could have tea together in the wee hours of October 3. Zhou was Mao's closest associate. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting is generally remembered as a example of American hubris, with Zhou's "warnings" airily brushed aside by arrogant American leaders. That may be valid as far as it goes. But the episode also led to misunderstanding concerning China's motives. The decision to intervene was triggered by Stalin's request. Mao had unveiled his plans to the Politburo on October 2, the following day. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing. That is to say, Zhou already knew that a Chinese invasion was a done deal when he met Panikkar.

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting is generally remembered as a example of American hubris, with Zhou's "warnings" airily brushed aside by arrogant American leaders. That may be valid as far as it goes. But the episode also led to misunderstanding concerning China's motives. The decision to intervene was triggered by Stalin's request. Mao had unveiled his plans to the Politburo the following day. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing. That is to say, Zhou knew that Chinese military intervention was a done deal when he met Panikkar.

When Stalin reneged on a promise of air support, he followed up with a bullying telegram to Mao on October 5 to ensure that Mao would still invade Korea. The UN General Assembly voted on October 7 and American forces crossed the parallel later that day.<ref name="Chang"/>

When Stalin reneged on a promise of air support, he followed up with a bullying telegram to Mao on October 5 to ensure that Mao would still invade Korea. The UN General Assembly voted on October 7 and American forces crossed the parallel later that day.<ref name="Chang"/>

Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers never violated that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. But this line was not necessarily the same as the legal partition line, which in both cases was drawn in a hasty and arbitrary way.

Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers were careful not to violate that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. Yet the legal partition line was drawn in an arbitrary way.

===Dismissal of MacArthur===

===Dismissal of MacArthur===