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| | ==Royal Marine reinforcements== | | ==Royal Marine reinforcements== |
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| − | The job of seizing the 1,300ft mountain fell to Captain Peter Babbington's ''Kilo'' Company of 42 CDO, who would be flown in by helicopters. Major Cedric Delves' D Squadron was told to locate and secure a suitable landing zone below the Mount Kent summit, but the lack of helicopters, coupled with blizzard conditions, meant it took five nights to airlift in the 120 Royal Marines of Babbington. | + | The job of seizing the 1,300ft mountain fell to Captain Peter Babbington's 'Kilo' Company from 42 COMMANDO, who would be flown in by helicopters. Major Cedric Delves' D Squadron was told to locate and secure a suitable landing zone below the Mount Kent summit, but the lack of helicopters, coupled with blizzard conditions and sudden firefights, meant it took five nights to airlift in the rifle company of Captain Babbington. |
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| | The British High Command 8,000 miles away in Northwood, impatient for victories, questioned the need to use up valuable time on reconnaissance. Fortunately the British commander in the Falklands ignored their orders, because when the Royal Marines did land on the lower slopes of Mount Kent they discovered that strong enemy special forces patrols were still trying to penetrate the British lines. | | The British High Command 8,000 miles away in Northwood, impatient for victories, questioned the need to use up valuable time on reconnaissance. Fortunately the British commander in the Falklands ignored their orders, because when the Royal Marines did land on the lower slopes of Mount Kent they discovered that strong enemy special forces patrols were still trying to penetrate the British lines. |
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| − | Brigadier [[Julian Thompson]], who commanded 3 Commando Brigade, wrote later that without the SAS presence on Mount Kent, the Argentine patrols ''"would have had a turkey shoot on the vulnerable helicopters and the troops as they jumped out, temporarily disorientated in the darkness; the operation would have been a disaster."''<ref>[http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/heritage/key-battles-at-top-malo-and-mount-kent-1-1272106 Key battles at Top Malo and Mount Kent]</ref> | + | Brigadier [[Julian Thompson]], who commanded 3 Commando Brigade, wrote later that without the SAS presence on Mount Kent, the Argentinian Special Forces patrols ''"would have had a turkey shoot on the vulnerable helicopters and the troops as they jumped out, temporarily disorientated in the darkness; the operation would have been a disaster."''<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20170324022411/http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/heritage/key-battles-at-top-malo-and-mount-kent-1-1272106 Key battles at Top Malo and Mount Kent]</ref> |
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| − | When the 42 CDO spearhead flew in on the night of May 30/31 they witnessed the SAS ambush Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd Assault Section near the landing site. Fortunately for the Royal Marine reinforcements, though, the Argentinian patrol withdrew after having earlier lost two killed on Bluff Cove Peak. | + | When the 42 CDO spearhead flew in on the night of May 30/31 they witnessed the SAS engage Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd Assault Section near the landing site. Fortunately for the Royal Marine reinforcements, though, the Argentinian patrol withdrew after having earlier lost two killed on Bluff Cove Peak with the SAS patrol under the command of Captain Timothy Burls. |
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| − | Also heavily involved in this action was the Task Force’s only surviving Chinook helicopter, ''Bravo November''. Flight-Lieutenant Andy Lawless, co-pilot of the Chinook took part in the mission to deliver artillery guns and ammunition to the SAS and describes the crash of the helicopter (possibly as a result of small-arms fire) soon after:{{cquote|We knew the SAS were outgunned. Our job was to land 105-mm howitzers] of 29 Regiment Royal Artillery. Rose (Loadmaster) told me the landing site was flat and secure. The mission was to be flown all at night with night-vision goggles. We had three 105—mm guns inside and ammunition pallets under-slung. Then the fog of war intervened. The ground was not flat and covered in boulders. We could not find anywhere to land and we spent time manoeuvring to drop off the under-slung loads. We had to put them exactly where the gunners wanted because they could not roll the guns very far across the terrible terrain. I can distinctly remember troops moving under the rotor disking firing their guns – this was not part of the plan. There were incoming artillery rounds. Once we dropped off the guns we went straight back to San Carlos to bring in more guns and ammo. Then we hit water. We were lucky because if we had hit solid ground we would have been dead. We hit at 100 knots. The bow wave came over the cockpit window as we settled and the engines partially flamed out. I knew we had ditched but I was not sure if we had been hit. Dick (Pilot) said he thought we had been hit by ground fire. As the helicopter settled the bow wave reduced. We had the collective still up and the engine wound up as we came out of the water like a cork out of a bottle. We were climbing.<ref>16 Air Assault Brigade: The History of Britain's Rapid Reaction Force, Tim Ripley, pp. 45-46, Casemate Publishers, 2008</ref>}} | + | Also heavily involved in this action was the Task Force’s only surviving Chinook helicopter, 'Bravo November'. Flight-Lieutenant Andy Lawless, co-pilot of the Chinook took part in the mission to deliver artillery guns and ammunition to the SAS and describes the crash of the helicopter (possibly as a result of small-arms or mortar fire) soon after:{{cquote|We knew the SAS were outgunned. Our job was to land 105-mm howitzers] of 29 Regiment Royal Artillery. Rose (Loadmaster) told me the landing site was flat and secure. The mission was to be flown all at night with night-vision goggles. We had three 105—mm guns inside and ammunition pallets under-slung. Then the fog of war intervened. The ground was not flat and covered in boulders. We could not find anywhere to land and we spent time manoeuvering to drop off the under-slung loads. We had to put them exactly where the gunners wanted because they could not roll the guns very far across the terrible terrain. I can distinctly remember troops moving under the rotor disking firing their guns – this was not part of the plan. There were incoming artillery rounds. Once we dropped off the guns we went straight back to San Carlos to bring in more guns and ammo. Then we hit water. We were lucky because if we had hit solid ground we would have been dead. We hit at 100 knots. The bow wave came over the cockpit window as we settled and the engines partially flamed out. I knew we had ditched but I was not sure if we had been hit. Dick (Pilot) said he thought we had been hit by ground fire. As the helicopter settled the bow wave reduced. We had the collective still up and the engine wound up as we came out of the water like a cork out of a bottle. We were climbing.<ref>16 Air Assault Brigade: The History of Britain's Rapid Reaction Force, Tim Ripley, pp. 45-46, Casemate Publishers, 2008</ref>}} |
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| | ==Top Malo House== | | ==Top Malo House== |