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| | William Blackstone famously observed, “in order to have a crime, there must be a vicious will.”<ref>William Blackstone, Commentaries 21.</ref> However, in the modern regulatory state there are increasing attempts, particularly at the federal level, to create crimes that do not require proof of ''mens rea'' (often referred to as strict liability offences). | | William Blackstone famously observed, “in order to have a crime, there must be a vicious will.”<ref>William Blackstone, Commentaries 21.</ref> However, in the modern regulatory state there are increasing attempts, particularly at the federal level, to create crimes that do not require proof of ''mens rea'' (often referred to as strict liability offences). |
| | == Supreme Court teaching == | | == Supreme Court teaching == |
| − | The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] explained in ''Ruan v. United States'' (June 27, 2022) that: | + | The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] explained in ''[[Ruan v. United States]]'' (June 27, 2022) that: |
| | {{cquote|our criminal law seeks to punish the “‘vicious will.’” ''Morissette v. United States'', 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); ''see also id.'', at 250, n. 4 (quoting F. Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, p. xxxvi (R. Pound ed. 1927)). With few exceptions, “‘wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.’” ''Elonis v. United States'', 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (quoting ''Morissette'', 342 U.S., at 252). Indeed, we have said that consciousness of wrongdoing is a principle “as universal and persistent in mature systems of [criminal] law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” ''Id.'', at 250. | | {{cquote|our criminal law seeks to punish the “‘vicious will.’” ''Morissette v. United States'', 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); ''see also id.'', at 250, n. 4 (quoting F. Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law, p. xxxvi (R. Pound ed. 1927)). With few exceptions, “‘wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.’” ''Elonis v. United States'', 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (quoting ''Morissette'', 342 U.S., at 252). Indeed, we have said that consciousness of wrongdoing is a principle “as universal and persistent in mature systems of [criminal] law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” ''Id.'', at 250. |
| | Consequently, when we interpret criminal statutes, we normally “start from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state.” ''Rehaif v. United States'', 588 U.S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 3). We have referred to this culpable mental state as “scienter,” which means the degree of knowledge necessary to make a person criminally responsible for his or her acts. ''See ibid''.; Black’s Law Dictionary 1613 (11th ed. 2019); ''Morissette'', 342 U.S., at 250–252.}} | | Consequently, when we interpret criminal statutes, we normally “start from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state.” ''Rehaif v. United States'', 588 U.S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 3). We have referred to this culpable mental state as “scienter,” which means the degree of knowledge necessary to make a person criminally responsible for his or her acts. ''See ibid''.; Black’s Law Dictionary 1613 (11th ed. 2019); ''Morissette'', 342 U.S., at 250–252.}} |