| | Washington's so-called maritime strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to operation during the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration in the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow's strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war.<ref>Christopher A. Ford and Rosenberg, David A. "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2005 28(2): 379-409. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> | | Washington's so-called maritime strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to operation during the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration in the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow's strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war.<ref>Christopher A. Ford and Rosenberg, David A. "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2005 28(2): 379-409. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> |
| − | [[File:Flying fortresses.jpg|thumbnail|225px|right|[[B-17 Flying Fortresses]] from the 398th Bombardment Group flying a bombing run to Neumunster, Germany, on April 13, 1945.]] | + | [[File:Flying fortresses.jpg|thumbnail|225px|right|[[B-17 Flying Fortress|B-17 Flying Fortresses]] from the 398th Bombardment Group flying a bombing run to Neumunster, Germany, on April 13, 1945.]] |
| | Air power theory was developed during and shortly after [[World War I]] by Italian [[Giulio Douhet]], American [[Billy Mitchell]], and Briton Sir [[Hugh Trenchard]]. Douhet was quite influential, arguing that bombing of cities could destroy an enemy's willingness to continue fighting. Strategic bombing, therefore, could win a war without the horrible stalemate of the Western Front. Britain and the United States bought into strategic airpower, and developed long-range bombers. Germany, Japan and Russia did not accept the theory, and focused their air forces on tactical support for the ground soldiers. The major navies used aircraft as long-range spotters for battleships, not realizing until 1940-41 their independent power to win naval battles.<ref>Meilinger (2000); Meilinger (1997); Futrell (1989)</ref> | | Air power theory was developed during and shortly after [[World War I]] by Italian [[Giulio Douhet]], American [[Billy Mitchell]], and Briton Sir [[Hugh Trenchard]]. Douhet was quite influential, arguing that bombing of cities could destroy an enemy's willingness to continue fighting. Strategic bombing, therefore, could win a war without the horrible stalemate of the Western Front. Britain and the United States bought into strategic airpower, and developed long-range bombers. Germany, Japan and Russia did not accept the theory, and focused their air forces on tactical support for the ground soldiers. The major navies used aircraft as long-range spotters for battleships, not realizing until 1940-41 their independent power to win naval battles.<ref>Meilinger (2000); Meilinger (1997); Futrell (1989)</ref> |