| Line 23: |
Line 23: |
| | See also Pacific States T&T v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, holding that the provisions of Article IV, Section 4 of the constitution do not authorize the judiciary to substitute its judgment as to a matter purely politica.}} | | See also Pacific States T&T v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, holding that the provisions of Article IV, Section 4 of the constitution do not authorize the judiciary to substitute its judgment as to a matter purely politica.}} |
| | ''Huenergardt -vs- Canton'', No. CA-6066, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13094, at *10-11 (Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1983). | | ''Huenergardt -vs- Canton'', No. CA-6066, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13094, at *10-11 (Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1983). |
| | + | |
| | + | {{cquote|3. To the extent that the contention urges that to include the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment is repugnant to § 4 of Article I of the Constitution, and hence void even if sanctioned by Congress because beyond the constitutional authority of that body, and hence that it is the duty of the judicial power so to declare, we again think the contention is plainly without substance for the following reasons: It must rest upon the assumption that to include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which destroys that power, which in effect annihilates representative government and causes a State where such condition exists to be not republican in form in violation of the guarantee of the Constitution. Const., § 4, Art. IV. But the proposition and the argument disregard the settled rule that the question of whether that guarantee of the Constitution has been disregarded presents no justiciable controversy but involves the exercise by Congress of the authority vested in it by the Constitution. Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118. In so far as the proposition challenges the power of Congress as manifested by the clause in the act of 1911 treating the referendum as a part of the legislative power for the purpose of apportionment where so ordained by the state constitutions and laws, the argument but asserts, on the one hand, that Congress had no power to do that which from the point of view of § 4 of Article I, previously considered, the Constitution expressly gave the right to do. In so far as the proposition may be considered as asserting, on the other hand, that any attempt by Congress to recognize the referendum as a part of the legislative authority of a State is obnoxious to a republican form of government as provided by § 4 of Article IV, the contention necessarily but reasserts the proposition on that subject previously adversely disposed of. And that this is the inevitable result of the contention is plainly manifest, since at best the proposition comes to the assertion that because Congress, upon whom the Constitution has conferred the exclusive authority to uphold the guarantee of a republican form of government, has done something which it is deemed is repugnant to that guarantee, therefore there was automatically created judicial authority to go beyond the limits of judicial power and in doing so to usurp congressional power on the ground that Congress had mistakenly dealt with a subject which was within its exclusive control free from judicial interference.}} |
| | + | ''Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant'', 241 U.S. 565, 569-70, 36 S. Ct. 708, 710 (1916) |
| | | | |
| | == Common misconceptions == | | == Common misconceptions == |