Changes

The United States military leaders, according to the ''Washington Post'', based many of their assumptions about the outcome of a Ukrainian attack on their prior “experience” in [[Iraq]] and [[Afghanistan]]: "American military officers had seen casualties come in far lower than estimated in the major battles of Iraq and Afghanistan. They considered the estimates a starting point for planning medical care and battlefield evacuation so that losses never reached the projected levels." At no point in either Iraq or Afghanistan did the United States fight an entrenched foe who had a decided advantage with fixed wing, rotary wing, mines and artillery. Not once. The report acknowledges that at least one Ukrainian officer realized the U.S. “war games” were balderdash:

The United States military leaders, according to the ''Washington Post'', based many of their assumptions about the outcome of a Ukrainian attack on their prior “experience” in [[Iraq]] and [[Afghanistan]]: "American military officers had seen casualties come in far lower than estimated in the major battles of Iraq and Afghanistan. They considered the estimates a starting point for planning medical care and battlefield evacuation so that losses never reached the projected levels." At no point in either Iraq or Afghanistan did the United States fight an entrenched foe who had a decided advantage with fixed wing, rotary wing, mines and artillery. Not once. The report acknowledges that at least one Ukrainian officer realized the U.S. “war games” were balderdash:

{{quotebox-float|". . . a senior Ukrainian military official agreed. War-gaming “doesn’t work,” the official said in retrospect, in part because of the new [[technology]] that was transforming the battlefield. Ukrainian soldiers were fighting a war unlike anything NATO forces had experienced: a large conventional conflict, with [[World War I]]-style trenches overlaid by omnipresent drones and other futuristic tools — and without the air superiority the U.S. military has had in every modern conflict it has fought."}}

{{quotebox-float|". . . a senior Ukrainian military official agreed. War-gaming “doesn’t work,” the official said in retrospect, in part because of the new [[technology]] that was transforming the battlefield. Ukrainian soldiers were fighting a war unlike anything NATO forces had experienced: a large conventional conflict, with [[World War I]]-style trenches overlaid by omnipresent drones and other futuristic tools — and without the air superiority the U.S. military has had in every modern conflict it has fought."}}

The reporters admitted that the United States could not supply the artillery shells Ukraine required: "A far bigger problem was the supply of 155mm shells, which would enable Ukraine to compete with Russia’s vast artillery arsenal. The Pentagon calculated that Kyiv needed 90,000 or more a month. While U.S. production was increasing, it was barely more than a tenth of that."

The reporters admitted that the United States could not supply the artillery shells Ukraine required: "A far bigger problem was the supply of 155mm shells, which would enable Ukraine to compete with Russia’s vast artillery arsenal. The Pentagon calculated that Kyiv needed 90,000 or more a month. While U.S. production was increasing, it was barely more than a tenth of that." Former [[CIA]] analyst [[Larry Johnson]] summarized:

 

{{quotebox-float|"the U.S. took the lead in coming up with a battle plan that it had ZERO experience in executing. It agreed to provide limited, inadequate training to Ukraine. It could not supply artillery shells or fixed wing aircraft required to pull off such an operation, and U.S. leaders were “surprised” that Ukraine’s counter offensive failed."<ref>[https://sonar21.com/dissecting-the-washington-posts-analysis-of-ukraines-failed-counter-offensive-part-1/ DISSECTING THE WASHINGTON POST’S “ANALYSIS” OF UKRAINE’S FAILED COUNTER OFFENSIVE — PART 1], [[Larry Johnson]], 7 December 2023. sonar21.com</ref>}}

Former [[CIA]] analyst [[Larry Johnson]] summarized:

{{quotebox-float|"the U.S. took the lead in coming up with a battle plan that it had ZERO experience in executing. It agreed to provide limited, inadequate training to Ukraine. It could not supply artillery shells or fixed wing aircraft required to pull off such an operation, and U.S. leaders were “surprised” that Ukraine’s counter offensive failed."}}

And from the second part, ''In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls'':

And from the second part, ''In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls'':