The Russians made progress in no small part due to the Russian [[policy]] of avoiding casualties and not committing reserves simply in order to hold ground that can be readily retaken—but have not opened the crossings. A Ukrainian advance was permitted but at great expense—there have been reports of foreign [[mercenary]] casualties, including [[American]]s from [[special forces]] units. This was similar to the scenario that played out in the [[NATO invasion of Kursk]], earlier in 2025, where the Russians refused to take heavy casualties to quickly retake Russian territory and instead allowed the Ukrainians to feed more and more troops and equipment into what had become a [[cauldron]]. Nor are the Russians shifting forces from other fronts where they're made rapid progress. On the other fronts, the Ukrainian forces were starved of reserves which have been fed into Kupyansk, where they were destroyed. | The Russians made progress in no small part due to the Russian [[policy]] of avoiding casualties and not committing reserves simply in order to hold ground that can be readily retaken—but have not opened the crossings. A Ukrainian advance was permitted but at great expense—there have been reports of foreign [[mercenary]] casualties, including [[American]]s from [[special forces]] units. This was similar to the scenario that played out in the [[NATO invasion of Kursk]], earlier in 2025, where the Russians refused to take heavy casualties to quickly retake Russian territory and instead allowed the Ukrainians to feed more and more troops and equipment into what had become a [[cauldron]]. Nor are the Russians shifting forces from other fronts where they're made rapid progress. On the other fronts, the Ukrainian forces were starved of reserves which have been fed into Kupyansk, where they were destroyed. |