| | + | [[Europe]]'s [[artillery]] [[ammunition]] capacity has risen from about 300,000 rounds a year in 2022 to roughly two million, and Rheinmetall's sales rose almost 70% in the second quarter of 2026. But certifying a new production line takes four to five years, skilled technicians are scarce, and Rheinmetall has already cut its 2026 sales forecast. Meanwhile [[German]] [[industry]] is contracting: [[Volkswagen]] is closing plants, [[BASF]] is shifting production to [[China]], and the same high [[energy]] [[cost]]s driving that decline weigh on energy-intensive propellant and explosives production. |
| | + | Set against [[Russia]], the gap is stark. In [[artillery]], the core of an [[attrition war]], [[Estonia]]n [[intelligence]] estimates that Russian factories produced about seven million [[artillery]], [[mortar]], [[tank]] and [[rocket]] rounds in 2025, against a European capacity for 155mm shells of about two million a year. Even adding [[U.S.]] production, which is targeting 100,000 rounds a month in 2026, [[the West]] is not matching Russian output. In long-range strike [[drone]]s, Russia was producing about 5,500 a month in March 2026 by [[CSIS]]'s count, and [[GUR|Ukrainian intelligence]] says the Alabuga plant alone now turns out about 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month. Europe makes nothing comparable in volume; its answer to a drone costing tens of thousands of [[euro]]s is an interceptor costing €2-5 million. Russia also produces more than 200 [[cruise missile]]s and [[ballistic missile]]s a month, according to Ukrainian intelligence. In armor, Bruegel estimated that Russia raised tank output from 40 a month in late 2022 to more than 130 by mid-2024, much of it modernized from [[Soviet]] stocks, while titling its comparison with Germany “sluggish German rearmament versus surging Russian defence production.” Europe's advantages lie in [[aircraft]] and [[naval]] forces, not in the munitions and drones this war consumes. |