Changes

Promotions continued after the plan began, and emphasized its success in contrast to the economic failures under Communism. As the aim of the Marshall Plan was to restore the [[confidence]] of the Europeans after the devastation of the war, the ideological and psychological aspects of the plan were as important as the economic ones. Propaganda and publicity campaigns were therefore crucial to the success of the plan and varied little from country to country, as the purpose was to spread the American way of life throughout Europe. For example, American and Danish authorities cooperated with considerable success in 1948–50 to present the Marshall Plan as a program of reciprocal benefit to both nations. Press releases, journalists' tours, and three large exhibitions presented Denmark and the United States as closely related lands with shared values of democracy and freedom. America was depicted as rich and highly developed economically and technologically, while Denmark had superior systems of agriculture and social welfare. Politics was kept in the background in building this image of shared values and interests.<ref>Marianne Rostgaard, "Kampen Om Sjaelene: Dansk Marshallplan Publicity 1948-50" [The Battle for Souls: Publicity for the Marshall Plan in Denmark, 1948-50]. ''Historie'' 2002 (2): 257-291. Issn: 0107-4725</ref>

Promotions continued after the plan began, and emphasized its success in contrast to the economic failures under Communism. As the aim of the Marshall Plan was to restore the [[confidence]] of the Europeans after the devastation of the war, the ideological and psychological aspects of the plan were as important as the economic ones. Propaganda and publicity campaigns were therefore crucial to the success of the plan and varied little from country to country, as the purpose was to spread the American way of life throughout Europe. For example, American and Danish authorities cooperated with considerable success in 1948–50 to present the Marshall Plan as a program of reciprocal benefit to both nations. Press releases, journalists' tours, and three large exhibitions presented Denmark and the United States as closely related lands with shared values of democracy and freedom. America was depicted as rich and highly developed economically and technologically, while Denmark had superior systems of agriculture and social welfare. Politics was kept in the background in building this image of shared values and interests.<ref>Marianne Rostgaard, "Kampen Om Sjaelene: Dansk Marshallplan Publicity 1948-50" [The Battle for Souls: Publicity for the Marshall Plan in Denmark, 1948-50]. ''Historie'' 2002 (2): 257-291. Issn: 0107-4725</ref>

[[Image:M-plan-1.jpg|thumb|250px|graphic from 1949 leaflet for Dutch audiences, artwork by Jo Spier (1900-1978)]]  

[[Image:M-plan-1.jpg|thumb|250px|graphic from 1949 leaflet for Dutch audiences, artwork by Jo Spier (1900–1978)]]  

The US State Department used household exhibitions in West Berlin as a propaganda tool to promote the benefits of the ERP, democratic freedom, and individual consumption. Prominent designers and architects designed the exhibitions, which often opened on socialist holidays, thereby ensuring that large numbers of visitors would come from East Berlin. The exhibitions presented a stark contrast between the broad-based consumerism of the West and the tight restrictions and scarcity of Communist Eastern Europe. In addition, the products on display served to undermine the widespread European belief that there was an inherent contradiction between high culture and American mass consumption. The effectiveness of this campaign led the Soviet Union to launch its own program of "consumer socialism," or citizen enfranchisement through consumer rewards, which was modeled on the West.<ref>Greg Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 261-288. Issn: 0022-0094 in [[Ebsco]]</ref>

The US State Department used household exhibitions in West Berlin as a propaganda tool to promote the benefits of the ERP, democratic freedom, and individual consumption. Prominent designers and architects designed the exhibitions, which often opened on socialist holidays, thereby ensuring that large numbers of visitors would come from East Berlin. The exhibitions presented a stark contrast between the broad-based consumerism of the West and the tight restrictions and scarcity of Communist Eastern Europe. In addition, the products on display served to undermine the widespread European belief that there was an inherent contradiction between high culture and American mass consumption. The effectiveness of this campaign led the Soviet Union to launch its own program of "consumer socialism," or citizen enfranchisement through consumer rewards, which was modeled on the West.<ref>Greg Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 2005 40(2): 261-288. Issn: 0022-0094 in [[Ebsco]]</ref>

==Operation of ERP==

==Operation of ERP==

The ERP was run by the '''Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)''', an American State Department division headed 1948-50 by Paul Hoffman (1891-1974), an automobile executive with the skills of a master salesman.  The ECA demanded that recipients devise plans to put their financial houses in order with taxes, monetary policies and spending policies geared primarily to recovery, rather than partisan politics. The plans had to be integrated with one another and be so specific that Americans experts could examine and approve the details.  Europe did so, asking $29 billion over four years. The United States finally gave $13.4 billion over four years; each year it was about 1 percent of the American Gross Domestic Product.  It was the equivalent of $600 billion in 2005 dollars, but the money went much farther because Europe did not start from scratch—it had enormous reservoirs of human talent and organizational skills, and a large but broken infrastructure that could be fixed.  

The ERP was run by the '''Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)''', an American State Department division headed 1948–50 by Paul Hoffman (1891–1974), an automobile executive with the skills of a master salesman.  The ECA demanded that recipients devise plans to put their financial houses in order with taxes, monetary policies and spending policies geared primarily to recovery, rather than partisan politics. The plans had to be integrated with one another and be so specific that Americans experts could examine and approve the details.  Europe did so, asking $29 billion over four years. The United States finally gave $13.4 billion over four years; each year it was about 1 percent of the American Gross Domestic Product.  It was the equivalent of $600 billion in 2005 dollars, but the money went much farther because Europe did not start from scratch—it had enormous reservoirs of human talent and organizational skills, and a large but broken infrastructure that could be fixed.  

 

 

The American grants included currency for loans, but went primarily (70%) towards the purchase of commodities from U.S. and Canadian suppliers: $3.5 billion was spent on raw materials; $3.2 billion on food, feed and fertilizer; $1.9 billion on machinery and vehicles; $1.6 billion on fuel.  

The American grants included currency for loans, but went primarily (70%) towards the purchase of commodities from U.S. and Canadian suppliers: $3.5 billion was spent on raw materials; $3.2 billion on food, feed and fertilizer; $1.9 billion on machinery and vehicles; $1.6 billion on fuel.  

ERP projects increased agricultural and mining output, repaired the shattered railroad network, and modernized factories (usually with new machines purchased from American companies).  Each country increased its exports so its prosperity would be self-sustaining, and they all joined together to reduce tariffs and trade barriers.  Europeans came to admire and eventually copy American managerial techniques, oriented toward efficiency rather than traditionalism. Traditionalists grumbled that their old culture would be steamrollered by the Yankees.  The results were quickly apparent as each economy began to soar.  Germans, the most grateful recipients, still speak of their “economic miracle.”  Most important, Europeans recovered the self-confidence that they could create peaceful and prosperous economies, closely aligned with the United States.   

ERP projects increased agricultural and mining output, repaired the shattered railroad network, and modernized factories (usually with new machines purchased from American companies).  Each country increased its exports so its prosperity would be self-sustaining, and they all joined together to reduce tariffs and trade barriers.  Europeans came to admire and eventually copy American managerial techniques, oriented toward efficiency rather than traditionalism. Traditionalists grumbled that their old culture would be steamrollered by the Yankees.  The results were quickly apparent as each economy began to soar.  Germans, the most grateful recipients, still speak of their “economic miracle.”  Most important, Europeans recovered the self-confidence that they could create peaceful and prosperous economies, closely aligned with the United States.   

The Marshall Plan marked a fundamental shift in American culture, from isolationism to internationalism, and from a minor role in world affairs to world leadership. The Marshall Plan made a significant contribution to victory of democracy over totalitarianism in the Cold War (1947-1991).  The European Union (EU) can trace its origins to the policy and philosophy of the Marshall Plan.     

The Marshall Plan marked a fundamental shift in American culture, from isolationism to internationalism, and from a minor role in world affairs to world leadership. The Marshall Plan made a significant contribution to victory of democracy over totalitarianism in the Cold War (1947–1991).  The European Union (EU) can trace its origins to the policy and philosophy of the Marshall Plan.     

==Labor issues==

==Labor issues==

The "politics of productivity," an attempt to raise levels of industrial productivity in Europe by transcending [[class conflict]] and creating a consensus in society for economic growth, was a prominent element in Marshall Plan thinking. It constituted a central focus of the ERP's labor program administered by American trade union officials who staffed the ERP's labor division. This program was supported by the American [[CIO]] until hostility to collective bargaining at the local level, combined with the unwillingness of senior Marshall Plan administrators to insist on collective bargaining as the price of receiving American assistance, blighted the project. By contrast to the CIO the rival American Federation of Labor's ([[AFL]]) used a more direct strategy of combating communism at the level of organization and propaganda. The competing claims of these two American labor organizations for US government funding became a significant factor in American labor's conduct of Cold War politics.<ref>Anthony Carew, "The Politics of Productivity and the Politics of Anti-communism: American and European Labour in the Cold War." ''Intelligence and National Security'' 2003 18(2): 73-91. Issn: 0268-4527</ref>

The "politics of productivity," an attempt to raise levels of industrial productivity in Europe by transcending [[class conflict]] and creating a consensus in society for economic growth, was a prominent element in Marshall Plan thinking. It constituted a central focus of the ERP's labor program administered by American trade union officials who staffed the ERP's labor division. This program was supported by the American [[CIO]] until hostility to collective bargaining at the local level, combined with the unwillingness of senior Marshall Plan administrators to insist on collective bargaining as the price of receiving American assistance, blighted the project. By contrast to the CIO the rival American Federation of Labor's ([[AFL]]) used a more direct strategy of combating communism at the level of organization and propaganda. The competing claims of these two American labor organizations for US government funding became a significant factor in American labor's conduct of Cold War politics.<ref>Anthony Carew, "The Politics of Productivity and the Politics of Anti-communism: American and European Labour in the Cold War." ''Intelligence and National Security'' 2003 18(2): 73-91. Issn: 0268-4527</ref>