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  Issac Walton League, Fond du Lac (July 30, 1950), Wisconsin)</ref>  
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  Isaac Walton League, Fond du Lac (July 30, 1950), Wisconsin)
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{{cite book
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| last = FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director,
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| year = April 22, 1946
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| title = [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster042.pdf Vol. 42, pg. 100] pdf
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| publisher = U. S. Government}}
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{{cite book
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| last = FBI Silvermaster file
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| year = October 10, 1946
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| title = http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster076.pdf [Vol. 76, pgs. 9 and 126] pdf
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| publisher = U. S. Government}}; (heavily redacted). Memorandum discuss inquiry from the U.S. Statement as to the participation of [[Alger Hiss]], Gustavo Duran and others in the [[Amerasia]] case. Fitch recommends replying to the State Dept. by referring to the detailed memoranda on Hiss and Duran which was previously submitted and a summary memo transmitted to General Holmes, to Fred Lyon's attention on May 29, 1945 in connection with [[Philip Jaffe]] and the Amerasia case (pg. 9).  Statement that memos on Alger Hiss and Gustavo Duran will follow. Hiss memo is included, but that on Duran is not (pg. 126).</ref>  
 +
 
 
* [[Arpad Erdos]], U.S. State Department;<ref>
 
* [[Arpad Erdos]], U.S. State Department;<ref>
 
Just like [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], and [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Erdos as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Erdos, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Erdos remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Erdos, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.
 
Just like [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], and [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Erdos as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Erdos, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Erdos remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Erdos, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.
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  | year = August 9, 1951
 
  | year = August 9, 1951
 
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  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster064.pdf Vol. 64, pg. 240] pdf. Brief background on Herbert Fierst.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pg. 202] pdf, Septermber 1946.</ref>
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  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster064.pdf Vol. 64, pg. 240] pdf. Brief background on Herbert Fierst.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pg. 202] pdf, September 1946.</ref>
 
* [[John Tipton Fishburn]], U.S. State Department; Lee list #106;<ref>Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Fishburn as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Fishburn, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Fishburn remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Fishburn, like Cameron, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.
 
* [[John Tipton Fishburn]], U.S. State Department; Lee list #106;<ref>Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Esther Less Kopelewich]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Robert Ross]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Fishburn as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Fishburn, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Fishburn remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Fishburn, like Cameron, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Kopelewich, Ross, Schimmel, Tuchser, and Neumann, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.
 
({{cite book
 
({{cite book
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Dorothy Kenyon is considered one of McCarthy's "Nine Public Cases" that was presented to the [[Tydings Committee]]. Kenyon was McCarthy's first case and it took two days in order for McCarthy to present the evidence due to the constant interruptions by members of the Tyding's Committee. This prompted Senator Lodge to state that, "I think to interrupt the witness [McCarthy] every time and break up his continuity and destroy the flow of his argument, the way we are doing, is not the right procedure....For some reason that has not been made clear to me, whether it is to rattle or whether it is to confuse, I don't know, we have an entirely different procedure today...I am objecting to the constant interruption of the witness so that he never gets a fair shake."<br>
 
Dorothy Kenyon is considered one of McCarthy's "Nine Public Cases" that was presented to the [[Tydings Committee]]. Kenyon was McCarthy's first case and it took two days in order for McCarthy to present the evidence due to the constant interruptions by members of the Tyding's Committee. This prompted Senator Lodge to state that, "I think to interrupt the witness [McCarthy] every time and break up his continuity and destroy the flow of his argument, the way we are doing, is not the right procedure....For some reason that has not been made clear to me, whether it is to rattle or whether it is to confuse, I don't know, we have an entirely different procedure today...I am objecting to the constant interruption of the witness so that he never gets a fair shake."<br>
 
Despite the constant harassment, McCarthy's evidence included showing that Kenyon belonged to at least 24 Communist front organizations labeled as such in part by the [[United States Attorney General]], the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]], and other governmental committees. The documents presented by McCarthy included, official organization letterheads that listed Kenyon as a sponsor or as a member, official programs of organization sponsored dinners, and newspaper reports of open letters that Kenyon had signed that connected her with the organizations. Certainly, these were all documents that were easily accessible to the State Department should they have cared to look into Kenyon's political background.<br>
 
Despite the constant harassment, McCarthy's evidence included showing that Kenyon belonged to at least 24 Communist front organizations labeled as such in part by the [[United States Attorney General]], the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]], and other governmental committees. The documents presented by McCarthy included, official organization letterheads that listed Kenyon as a sponsor or as a member, official programs of organization sponsored dinners, and newspaper reports of open letters that Kenyon had signed that connected her with the organizations. Certainly, these were all documents that were easily accessible to the State Department should they have cared to look into Kenyon's political background.<br>
−
When Kenyon was asked by the Tydings Committee whether she had ever been interviewed by the State Department as to her affiliation to any Communist front organizations, she responded that she had never been asked. According to the security evaluation procedure of the State Department, Kenyon should have been asked about these affiliations but failed to do so. McCarthy had easily demonstrated from this first case that the screening process of the State Department was certainly lax and quite possibly purposefully ignoring easily identifiable security risks. However, the Tydings Committee instead ignored this evidence and set the precident for the hearings that anyone that came before the committee was going to be given a positive evaluation no matter how strongly the evidence indicated the witness was a security risk.
+
When Kenyon was asked by the Tydings Committee whether she had ever been interviewed by the State Department as to her affiliation to any Communist front organizations, she responded that she had never been asked. According to the security evaluation procedure of the State Department, Kenyon should have been asked about these affiliations but failed to do so. McCarthy had easily demonstrated from this first case that the screening process of the State Department was certainly lax and quite possibly purposefully ignoring easily identifiable security risks. However, the Tydings Committee instead ignored this evidence and set the precedent for the hearings that anyone that came before the committee was going to be given a positive evaluation no matter how strongly the evidence indicated the witness was a security risk.
 
({{cite book
 
({{cite book
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
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  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>  
 
  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>  
 
* [[Peveril Meigs]], U.S. State Department; Department of the Army; McCarthy's Case #3 and Lee list #2;<ref>
 
* [[Peveril Meigs]], U.S. State Department; Department of the Army; McCarthy's Case #3 and Lee list #2;<ref>
−
Meigs became employed with the State Department in September, 1945, and was allowed to resign from the State department in 1948 even though there were concerns regarding his security/loyalty. McCarthy related to the Senate the fact that Meigs was under investigation by the State Department's security/loyalty board yet was allowed to resign without noting his file as having been under investigation. Subsequently, Meigs went to work for the Department of the Army and after McCarthy communicated to the Army that Meigs should be investigated, the Army then looked into Meigs' background and found him to be a clear loyalty/security risk. In January 12, 1952 and again on May 26, 1952, McCarthy stated to the Senate that, "On February 20, I believe, I laid before the Senate the case of Perveril Meigs. The State Department held a hearing. They knew that they could not conceivably clear Perveril Meigs, even with the type of board which they have. What did they do? They notified him that he would not be cleared, so he then resigned, went over to the Army and got a job in the Army, with no notification to the Army that this man was an extremely bad security risk because of close association with espionage agents. It was only after we called the Army's attention to the case that the Army Loyalty Board took the case up, and of course, they promptly ordered him discharged." Meigs' case is a perfect example of the State Department covering up either its' imcompetence in hiring individuals that are security/loyalty risks and/or in being able to properly filter out such individuals once they are employees of the State Deparmtent. The tactic of informing a suspected security/loyalty risk and allowing him or her to resign was a strategy implemented in order for the State Department to avoid appearing imcompetent or as though they they did not make any effort to avoid hiring loyalty/security risks.  
+
Meigs became employed with the State Department in September, 1945, and was allowed to resign from the State department in 1948 even though there were concerns regarding his security/loyalty. McCarthy related to the Senate the fact that Meigs was under investigation by the State Department's security/loyalty board yet was allowed to resign without noting his file as having been under investigation. Subsequently, Meigs went to work for the Department of the Army and after McCarthy communicated to the Army that Meigs should be investigated, the Army then looked into Meigs' background and found him to be a clear loyalty/security risk. In January 12, 1952 and again on May 26, 1952, McCarthy stated to the Senate that, "On February 20, I believe, I laid before the Senate the case of Perveril Meigs. The State Department held a hearing. They knew that they could not conceivably clear Perveril Meigs, even with the type of board which they have. What did they do? They notified him that he would not be cleared, so he then resigned, went over to the Army and got a job in the Army, with no notification to the Army that this man was an extremely bad security risk because of close association with espionage agents. It was only after we called the Army's attention to the case that the Army Loyalty Board took the case up, and of course, they promptly ordered him discharged." Meigs' case is a perfect example of the State Department covering up either its' incompetence in hiring individuals that are security/loyalty risks and/or in being able to properly filter out such individuals once they are employees of the State Department. The tactic of informing a suspected security/loyalty risk and allowing him or her to resign was a strategy implemented in order for the State Department to avoid appearing incompetent or as though they did not make any effort to avoid hiring loyalty/security risks.  
 
({{cite book
 
({{cite book
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
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  | year = August 9, 1951
 
  | year = August 9, 1951
 
  | title = Page 9708
 
  | title = Page 9708
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  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272 pdf, February 21, 1946. Includes alphabetical index at end.  In the later part of February 1946, the [[FBI]] transmitted to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]l a 194 page Report based upon Soviet defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s deposition three months earlier entitled, "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government."  Preliminary investigations and other information in Bureau files gave support and credence to the providential value of Bentley's serious allegations. Bentley had been assigned a covername by the FBI, "Gregory," and the highly secret investigation was referred to by investigators as "the Gregory Case."  State Department internal investigators provided a list of questions to the FBI for the confidtential informant to answer. The Statement requested information about Philip and Alice Raine.  Bentley, who worked out of New York, responded the names were entirely unfamiliar (pg. Vol. 96, pg. 87).  Philip and Alicia Raine subsequnetly were delevoped as leads by FBI investigators in the Washington field office while surveilling the many contacts of [[Mary Jane Keeney]]. </ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Hoover letter to Secretary of State George Marshall, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pgs. 85 -90] pdf, March 10, 1946.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pgs. 133, 135, 201] pdf, Septermber 1946.</ref>
+
  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272 pdf, February 21, 1946. Includes alphabetical index at end.  In the later part of February 1946, the [[FBI]] transmitted to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]]l a 194 page Report based upon Soviet defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s deposition three months earlier entitled, "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government."  Preliminary investigations and other information in Bureau files gave support and credence to the providential value of Bentley's serious allegations. Bentley had been assigned a covername by the FBI, "Gregory," and the highly secret investigation was referred to by investigators as "the Gregory Case."  State Department internal investigators provided a list of questions to the FBI for the confidential informant to answer. The Statement requested information about Philip and Alice Raine.  Bentley, who worked out of New York, responded the names were entirely unfamiliar (pg. Vol. 96, pg. 87).  Philip and Alicia Raine subsequently were developed as leads by FBI investigators in the Washington field office while surveilling the many contacts of [[Mary Jane Keeney]]. </ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Hoover letter to Secretary of State George Marshall, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pgs. 85 -90] pdf, March 10, 1946.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster077.pdf Vol. 77, pgs. 133, 135, 201] pdf, September 1946.</ref>
 
* [[Robert Ross]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #32 and Lee list #30;<ref>
 
* [[Robert Ross]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #32 and Lee list #30;<ref>
 
Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Ross as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Ross, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Ross remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Ross, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Neumann, Schimmel, and Tuchser, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.
 
Just like [[Arpad Erdos]], [[Gertrude Cameron]], [[Nelson Chipchin]], [[John Tipton Fishburn]], [[Stella Gordon]], [[Myron Victor Hunt]], [[Franz Leopold Neumann]], [[Sylvia Schimmel]], [[Frances M. Tuchser]] on August 9, 1951, Senator McCarthy listed Ross as being one of the individuals that he had given to the [[Tydings Committee]] a year earlier. McCarthy submitted to the Senate, Ross, as yet another example of a clear security risk who was currently in the loyalty-security channels in the State Department. There was no explanation from the State Department as to why Ross remained in loyalty-security channels for such a lengthy period of time. In the meantime, Ross, like Cameron, Fishburn, Chipchin, Erdos, Gordon, Hunt, Neumann, Schimmel, and Tuchser, was able to carry on his activities despite concerns about his loyalty and security clearance.
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  | year = August 9, 1951
 
  | year = August 9, 1951
 
  | title = Page 9708
 
  | title = Page 9708
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  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster061.pdf Vol. 61, pgs. 74 -79] pdg; Hottel to the Director, "Just Lunning," July 18, 1947.  Discussion between [[Mary Jane Keeney]] and Sylvia Schimmel about Just Lunning, who would become Schimmel’s supervisor at the State Department. Sylvia Schimmel complained to Just Lunning she was not being given meaningful work at the State Dept. due to Schimmel's work for the Poltical Action Committee. Just Lunning had links to William T. Stone, [[V. Frank Coe]], Philip Dunaway, David Wahl, [[Donald Wheeler]], [[Allan Rosenberg]], Bowen Smith, and [[Edward Fitzgerald]]. Mary Jane Keeney had innumerable contacts in the [[CPUSA]] underground espionage apparatus which included [[Greg Silvermaster]], [[Helen Silvermaster]], [[Sergey Kurnakov]], [[Joseph Bernstein]], [[Frederick Field]], [[Maurice Halperin]], [[Haakon Chevalier]], [[Richard Bransten]], [[Laurence Todd]], [[William Ullman]], and [[Robert Miller]]. Much of the Silvermaster file is devoted to surveillance reports on them.  Mary Jane Keeney had served in the occupation of Berlin while at this time her husband, [[Philip Keeney]] was serving in Japan. Mary Jane Keeney was seeking to join him there. The FBI and State Department officials were moving to prevent this, and to have Philip recalled from his position with the occupation forces.  Mary Jane Keeney had turned to Sylvia Schimmel for assistance with her passport problems.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster065.pdf Vol. 65, pg. 51] pdf.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pg. 78] pdf.</ref>
+
  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster061.pdf Vol. 61, pgs. 74 -79] pdf; Hottel to the Director, "Just Lunning," July 18, 1947.  Discussion between [[Mary Jane Keeney]] and Sylvia Schimmel about Just Lunning, who would become Schimmel’s supervisor at the State Department. Sylvia Schimmel complained to Just Lunning she was not being given meaningful work at the State Dept. due to Schimmel's work for the Political Action Committee. Just Lunning had links to William T. Stone, [[V. Frank Coe]], Philip Dunaway, David Wahl, [[Donald Wheeler]], [[Allan Rosenberg]], Bowen Smith, and [[Edward Fitzgerald]]. Mary Jane Keeney had innumerable contacts in the [[CPUSA]] underground espionage apparatus which included [[Greg Silvermaster]], [[Helen Silvermaster]], [[Sergey Kurnakov]], [[Joseph Bernstein]], [[Frederick Field]], [[Maurice Halperin]], [[Haakon Chevalier]], [[Richard Bransten]], [[Laurence Todd]], [[William Ullman]], and [[Robert Miller]]. Much of the Silvermaster file is devoted to surveillance reports on them.  Mary Jane Keeney had served in the occupation of Berlin while at this time her husband, [[Philip Keeney]] was serving in Japan. Mary Jane Keeney was seeking to join him there. The FBI and State Department officials were moving to prevent this, and to have Philip recalled from his position with the occupation forces.  Mary Jane Keeney had turned to Sylvia Schimmel for assistance with her passport problems.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster065.pdf Vol. 65, pg. 51] pdf.</ref><ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster096.pdf Vol. 96, pg. 78] pdf.</ref>
 
* [[Frederick Schumann]], contracted by U.S. State Department as lecturer; Professor at Williams College; not on Lee list;<ref>
 
* [[Frederick Schumann]], contracted by U.S. State Department as lecturer; Professor at Williams College; not on Lee list;<ref>
 
Schumann was a consultant for the State Department but not as an employee. His job was to lecture and train State Department employees who were subsequently to be placed in sensitive posts. In this capacity, out of 57 instructors, only three, Schumann, Edward Acheson (Dean's brother), and Communist [[Owen Lattimore]] were not government officials. According to the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]], Schumann was a member of over 50 Communist front organizations. In 1932, Schuman supported the Communist Party ticket for President. Schumann wrote a pro-Soviet book titled, ''Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad'' that appeared just before the State Department enlisted him for his help in helping out orient the Foreign Service officers. While Schumann declined an invitation to the [[Tydings Committee]] in order to address charges against him, the Committee, as with other cases, showed no interest in determining why pro-Soviet lecturers were being utilized by the State Department and who was doing the hiring.
 
Schumann was a consultant for the State Department but not as an employee. His job was to lecture and train State Department employees who were subsequently to be placed in sensitive posts. In this capacity, out of 57 instructors, only three, Schumann, Edward Acheson (Dean's brother), and Communist [[Owen Lattimore]] were not government officials. According to the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]], Schumann was a member of over 50 Communist front organizations. In 1932, Schuman supported the Communist Party ticket for President. Schumann wrote a pro-Soviet book titled, ''Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad'' that appeared just before the State Department enlisted him for his help in helping out orient the Foreign Service officers. While Schumann declined an invitation to the [[Tydings Committee]] in order to address charges against him, the Committee, as with other cases, showed no interest in determining why pro-Soviet lecturers were being utilized by the State Department and who was doing the hiring.
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  | id = ASIN B0007DRBZ2}})</ref>
 
  | id = ASIN B0007DRBZ2}})</ref>
 
* [[John S. Service]], U.S. State Department;<ref>
 
* [[John S. Service]], U.S. State Department;<ref>
−
Accused by McCarthy of being a security and loyalty risk. Between the years of 1942 and 1945, Service submitted memos to the U.S. State Department supporting the Chinese Communists and Mao and advocated that the U.S. destroy [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. According to Senator McCarthy, "Service was named by the U.S. Ambassador to China as one of the men who was serving the cause of Communism in China. He asked the President to remove Service. He said that this man's actions are not good for the United States, they are good for Russia. While in China, Service, in secret recommendations to the State Department, urged that the Communists were the only hope for China. On June 6, 1945, Service was arrested by the F.B.I. for, "having transmitted, without authority, classified documents to the editors of ''Ameriasia'', a Communist magazine". Service had in effect turned over to a known Communist, not only State Department documents, but also secret military information. In December of 1951, Service was fired from the U.S. State Department, "as a result of an adverse finding as to his security qualifications by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission."
+
Accused by McCarthy of being a security and loyalty risk. Between the years of 1942 and 1945, Service submitted memos to the U.S. State Department supporting the Chinese Communists and Mao and advocated that the U.S. destroy [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. According to Senator McCarthy, "Service was named by the U.S. Ambassador to China as one of the men who was serving the cause of Communism in China. He asked the President to remove Service. He said that this man's actions are not good for the United States, they are good for Russia. While in China, Service, in secret recommendations to the State Department, urged that the Communists were the only hope for China. On June 6, 1945, Service was arrested by the F.B.I. for, "having transmitted, without authority, classified documents to the editors of ''Amerasia'', a Communist magazine". Service had in effect turned over to a known Communist, not only State Department documents, but also secret military information. In December of 1951, Service was fired from the U.S. State Department, "as a result of an adverse finding as to his security qualifications by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission."
 
({{cite book
 
({{cite book
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
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  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>
 
  | publisher = U. S. Government Printing Office}})</ref>
 
* [[William T. Stone]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #46 and Lee list #54;<ref>
 
* [[William T. Stone]], U.S. State Department; McCarthy's Case #46 and Lee list #54;<ref>
−
Accused by McCarthy as a security/loyalty risk, Stone is McCarthy's Case Number 46. As early as 1946, the Bannerman Security Screening Board of the State Department concluded that Stone should be "terminated", that Stone's "continued presence in the Department is embarrassing...that he be given an opportunity to resign" and failing to do so should result in his forced termination "under Civil Service Rule 3." The State Department failed to act on this recommendation and Stone continued working in the State Department. Stone was on the Communist controlled editorial board of ''Amerasia'' magazine, recommended fellow ''Amerasia'' members to jobs with the U.S. State Department, informed Venona identifed Communist and espionage operative, [[Greg Silvermaster|Nathan Gregory Silvermaster]] of an adverse security report concerning Silvermaster, was constantly under investigation as a security/loyalty risk, and was eventually given the opportunity to resign, which he did in 1952.
+
Accused by McCarthy as a security/loyalty risk, Stone is McCarthy's Case Number 46. As early as 1946, the Bannerman Security Screening Board of the State Department concluded that Stone should be "terminated", that Stone's "continued presence in the Department is embarrassing...that he be given an opportunity to resign" and failing to do so should result in his forced termination "under Civil Service Rule 3." The State Department failed to act on this recommendation and Stone continued working in the State Department. Stone was on the Communist controlled editorial board of ''Amerasia'' magazine, recommended fellow ''Amerasia'' members to jobs with the U.S. State Department, informed Venona identified Communist and espionage operative, [[Greg Silvermaster|Nathan Gregory Silvermaster]] of an adverse security report concerning Silvermaster, was constantly under investigation as a security/loyalty risk, and was eventually given the opportunity to resign, which he did in 1952.
 
({{cite book
 
({{cite book
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
 
  | last = Buckley, Jr., William F. and Bozell, L. Brent
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