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| | ==Investigation== | | ==Investigation== |
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| − | In November 1945 [[Elizabeth Bentley]], the courier from group based in [[Washington, D.C.]] to KGB headquarters in [[New York]] defected to the [[FBI]]. The [[KGB]] had removed Bentley from overseeing at least 80 members of the CPUSA Underground Apparatus in 1944. When she realized she no longer of use to the KGB, knew too much and her life was in danger, she told her story to the FBI in a deposition. | + | In November 1945 [[Elizabeth Bentley]], the courier from group based in [[Washington, D.C.]] to KGB headquarters in [[New York]] defected to the [[FBI]]. The [[KGB]] had removed Bentley from overseeing at least 80 members of the CPUSA Underground Apparatus in 1944. Realizing she knew too much, was longer of use to the KGB, and her life was in danger, she told her story to the FBI in a deposition. |
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| − | The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents throughout the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of which were still employed in the US government at that time. Her story at first was incredible, but the FBI soon determined Bentley’s allegations were born out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer that 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref> | + | The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents throughout the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of which were still employed in the US government at that time. Her story at first was incredible and embarassing to the FBI, but her allegations soon were bore out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer that 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref> |
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| − | For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from Canada <ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> and the [[Army Signals Intelligence]]. By December 1946 leaks began to develop, <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf. In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official. Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref> copies of an FBI memorandum entitled "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government" had been disseminated to several government departments and agencies, including the [[White House]], and some were unaccounted for. In late December, a Justice Department prosecutor in the Criminal Division requested of a New York Special Agent in Charge (SAC) field investigator a copy of the Bentley deposition. The SAC telephoned FBI headquarters in Washington to request a copy of the signed affidavit in the presence of the prosecutor sitting at his desk. In a stinging rebuke to the field investigator, FBI Agent Edward Tamm noted in a memo to Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] that the Bureau had gone to great lengths to protect the identity of the informant who was codenamed "Gregory" in the files, and the call in the presence of the attorney was an "an atrocious exhibition of a complete lack of judgment." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster083.pdf Vol. 83, pgs. 72, 73] pdf.</ref>
| + | The suspects were surveilled througout much of 1946 in hopes of learning more about the organization and building a prosecutable case. Meanwhile, other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]] <ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> , a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada, and the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] which began secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow. |
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| | + | By December 1946 leaks began to develop, <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf. In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official. Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref> copies of an FBI memorandum entitled "Underground Soviet Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government" <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272, February 21, 1946.</ref> had been disseminated to several government departments and agencies, including the [[White House]], and some were unaccounted for. In late December, a Justice Department prosecutor in the Criminal Division requested of a New York Special Agent in Charge (SAC) field investigator a copy of the Bentley deposition. The SAC telephoned FBI headquarters in Washington to request a copy of the signed affidavit in the presence of the prosecutor sitting at his desk. In a stinging rebuke to the field investigator, FBI Agent Edward Tamm noted in a memo to Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] that the Bureau had gone to great lengths to protect the identity of the informant who was codenamed "Gregory" in the files, and the call in the presence of the attorney was an "an atrocious exhibition of a complete lack of judgment." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster083.pdf Vol. 83, pgs. 72, 73] pdf.</ref> |
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| | A copy of the Bentley deposition was furnished to the Criminal Division and they then pressed for a personal interview with Bentley to evaluate her ability to testify. Tamm wrote to the Director how he informed the prosecutors that “the Bureau was apprehensive for the life of informant since the informant would probably be killed if [her] identity were inadvertently disclosed” <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 6, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster083.pdf Vol. 83, pg. 56 - 57] pdf.</ref> An Executive Conference was formed consisting of the Attorney General, Department of Justice Prosecutors, and the FBI to discuss the Silvermaster subjects and how to proceed with prosecution. The United Press began running stories on the case with information coming directly out of the Conference meeting. In a hand written note in the margin of a memo from January 23, 1947, Hoover writes, "in view of all the 'gabbing" done by the Dept to the Press there is little which can be expected from <u>any</u> action now." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 23, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf Vol. 93, pgs. 20 -22] pdf.</ref> | | A copy of the Bentley deposition was furnished to the Criminal Division and they then pressed for a personal interview with Bentley to evaluate her ability to testify. Tamm wrote to the Director how he informed the prosecutors that “the Bureau was apprehensive for the life of informant since the informant would probably be killed if [her] identity were inadvertently disclosed” <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 6, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster083.pdf Vol. 83, pg. 56 - 57] pdf.</ref> An Executive Conference was formed consisting of the Attorney General, Department of Justice Prosecutors, and the FBI to discuss the Silvermaster subjects and how to proceed with prosecution. The United Press began running stories on the case with information coming directly out of the Conference meeting. In a hand written note in the margin of a memo from January 23, 1947, Hoover writes, "in view of all the 'gabbing" done by the Dept to the Press there is little which can be expected from <u>any</u> action now." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 23, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf Vol. 93, pgs. 20 -22] pdf.</ref> |