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An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]], wrote in his memoirs,  

An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]], wrote in his memoirs,  

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]], [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us....The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at Los Alamos, New Mexico - Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard. ...Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on nuclear weapons with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of Hitler; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist [[Niels Bohr]] helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased. }}

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]], [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us.<ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster'', Little brown and Company, London, 1994, pg. 3. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|[[Gregory Kheifetz]], our operative who had been successful in atomic espionage...described Oppenheimer as a man who thought of problems on a global scale. Oppenheimer saw the threat and promise of the atomic age and understood the ramifications for both military and peaceful applications. We always stressed that contacts with him should be carefully planned to maintain security, and should not be used for acquiring routine information. We knew that Oppenheimer would remain an influential person in America after the war and therefore our relations with him should not take the form of running a controlled agent. We understood that he and other members of the scientific community were best approached as friends, not as agents. Since Oppenheimer, Bohr, and Fermi were fierce opponents of violence, they would seek to prevent a nuclear war, creating a balance of power through sharing the secrets of atomic energy. This would be a crucial factor in establishing the new world order after the war, and we took advantage of this. ... }}

 

{{Cquote|[[Gregory Kheifetz]], our operative who had been successful in atomic espionage...described Oppenheimer as a man who thought of problems on a global scale. Oppenheimer saw the threat and promise of the atomic age and understood the ramifications for both military and peaceful applications. We always stressed that contacts with him should be carefully planned to maintain security, and should not be used for acquiring routine information. We knew that Oppenheimer would remain an influential person in America after the war and therefore our relations with him should not take the form of running a controlled agent. We understood that he and other members of the scientific community were best approached as friends, not as agents. Since Oppenheimer, Bohr, and Fermi were fierce opponents of violence, they would seek to prevent a nuclear war, creating a balance of power through sharing the secrets of atomic energy. This would be a crucial factor in establishing the new world order after the war, and we took advantage of this. <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 195. </ref> }}

{{Cquote|In developing Oppenheimer as a source, [[Vassili Zarubin]]'s wife, Elizabeth, was essential. ...In 1941 [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] was a captain in the KGB. After her husband's posting to Washington, she traveled to California frequently to cultivate the Oppenheimer family through social contacts arranged by Kheifets. Kheifets then introduced Elizabeth to Oppenheimer's wife, Katherine, who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Communist ideals, and the two worked out a system for future meetings." <ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster, Little brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 190. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|In developing Oppenheimer as a source, [[Vassili Zarubin]]'s wife, Elizabeth, was essential. ...In 1941 [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] was a captain in the KGB. After her husband's posting to Washington, she traveled to California frequently to cultivate the Oppenheimer family through social contacts arranged by Kheifets. Kheifets then introduced Elizabeth to Oppenheimer's wife, Katherine, who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Communist ideals, and the two worked out a system for future meetings." <ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster, Little brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 190. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|By 1943 it was agreed at the Center that all contacts with Oppenheimer would be through illegals only. [[Lev Vasilevsky]], our rezident in Mexico City, was put in charge of running the illegal network after Zarubin left. But Vasilevsky was directed to control the network from Mexico City, not to move to Washington, where the FBI could more easily monitor our activities. Our facilities in Washington were to be used as little as possible. ...Vasilevsky told me that on one occasion in 1944 he visited Washington in order to pass to the Center materials received from Fermi. To his dismay, the embassy radio operator, who was supposed to encode his message, was missing. The next day the clerk was brought to the embassy by the American police, who had picked him up dead drunk in a nearby bar. Vasilevsky decided on the spot not to use the Washington embassy to transmit any of his sensitive messages; he would rely on Mexico City. ...In 1945, for his work in handling the Fermi line in the United States, Vasilevsky was appointed deputy director of Department S. For a short period in 1947 he was the director of the department of scientific and technological intelligence in the Committee of Information, which was the central intelligence-gathering agency from 1947 to 1951.}}

{{Cquote|By 1943 it was agreed at the Center that all contacts with Oppenheimer would be through illegals only. [[Lev Vasilevsky]], our rezident in Mexico City, was put in charge of running the illegal network after Zarubin left. But Vasilevsky was directed to control the network from Mexico City, not to move to Washington, where the FBI could more easily monitor our activities. Our facilities in Washington were to be used as little as possible. ...Vasilevsky told me that on one occasion in 1944 he visited Washington in order to pass to the Center materials received from Fermi. To his dismay, the embassy radio operator, who was supposed to encode his message, was missing. The next day the clerk was brought to the embassy by the American police, who had picked him up dead drunk in a nearby bar. Vasilevsky decided on the spot not to use the Washington embassy to transmit any of his sensitive messages; he would rely on Mexico City. ...In 1945, for his work in handling the Fermi line in the United States, Vasilevsky was appointed deputy director of Department S. For a short period in 1947 he was the director of the department of scientific and technological intelligence in the Committee of Information, which was the central intelligence-gathering agency from 1947 to 1951.<ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 197. </ref>}}

==China and subversion of the Four Policeman==

==China and subversion of the Four Policeman==