Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of bailing wire.<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref> | Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of bailing wire.<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref> |