Changes

His style of investigating with his own direct methods rather than following the commission schedule put him at odds with Rogers, who once commented, "Feynman is becoming a real pain." During a televised hearing, Feynman famously demonstrated how the O-rings became less resilient and subject to seal failures at ice-cold temperatures by immersing a sample of the material in a glass of ice water.<ref name=NYT_Feynman>{{cite web| url = http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/09/21/reviews/feynman-obit.html?_r=1&oref=slogin |title =  Richard Feynman Dead at 69; Leading Theoretical Physicist|accessdate = 2007-01-28|author = Gleick, James|date = 1988-02-17|work = New York Times}}</ref>

His style of investigating with his own direct methods rather than following the commission schedule put him at odds with Rogers, who once commented, "Feynman is becoming a real pain." During a televised hearing, Feynman famously demonstrated how the O-rings became less resilient and subject to seal failures at ice-cold temperatures by immersing a sample of the material in a glass of ice water.<ref name=NYT_Feynman>{{cite web| url = http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/09/21/reviews/feynman-obit.html?_r=1&oref=slogin |title =  Richard Feynman Dead at 69; Leading Theoretical Physicist|accessdate = 2007-01-28|author = Gleick, James|date = 1988-02-17|work = New York Times}}</ref>

Feynman was so critical of flaws in NASA's "safety culture" that he threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle. He argued that the estimates of reliability offered by [[NASA]] management were wildly unrealistic, differing as much as a thousandfold from the estimates of working engineers. "For a successful technology," he concluded, "reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."<ref>Feynman, Richard P. (1986) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appf.htm Appendix F - Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle]</ref>

Feynman was so critical of flaws in NASA's "safety culture" that he threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle. He argued that the estimates of reliability offered by [[NASA]] management were wildly unrealistic, differing as much as a thousandfold from the estimates of working engineers. "For a successful technology," he concluded, "reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."<ref name = appendixF>Feynman, Richard P. (1986) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appf.htm Appendix F - Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle]</ref>

*NASA officials argue that ... since the Shuttle is a manned vehicle "the probability of mission success is necessarily very close to 1.0." It is not very clear what this phrase means. Does it mean it is close to 1 or that it ought to be close to 1? [ibid]

*NASA officials argue that ... since the Shuttle is a manned vehicle "the probability of mission success is necessarily very close to 1.0." It is not very clear what this phrase means. Does it mean it is close to 1 or that it ought to be close to 1? <ref name = "appendixF"/>

==Books==

==Books==