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{{Japanese characters}}

'''Hirohito''' or the '''Emperor Shōwa''' (昭和天皇 ''Shōwa Tennō'') (29 April 1901 – 7 January 1989) was the 124^th [[Emperor]] of [[Japan]] in the [[List of japanese emperors|traditional count]] of order of succession, who reigned for 62 years from 25 December 1926, until his death, making his reign, the Shōwa era (昭和), the longest of any [[Japanese]] Emperor. During his era, (Shōwa era), he was the symbolic leader of his nation through prosperity (1926-29), the Great Depression (1929-41), victory and defeat in [[World War II, Pacific|World War II]] (1941-45), the American Occupation (1945-50), and the rapid recovery of Japan to become an economic superpower (1950-86).  He had significant decision-making power only in 1944-45, and made the decision to surrender in August 1945.

'''Hirohito''' or the '''Emperor Shōwa''' (昭和天皇 ''Shōwa Tennō'') (29 April 1901 – 7 January 1989) was the 124^th [[Emperor]] of [[Japan]] in the [[List of japanese emperors|traditional count]] of order of succession, who reigned for 62 years from 25 December 1926, until his death, making his reign, the Shōwa era (昭和), the longest of any [[Japanese]] Emperor. During his era, (Shōwa era), he was the symbolic leader of his nation through prosperity (1926-29), the Great Depression (1929-41), victory and defeat in [[World War 2#Far Eastern Theatre|World War II]] (1941-45), the American Occupation (1945-50), and the rapid recovery of Japan to become an economic superpower (1950-86).  He had significant decision-making power only in 1944-45, and made the decision to surrender in August 1945.

==The Emperor's Name==

==The Emperor's Name==

Prince Hirohito became heir apparent upon the death of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, on 30 July 1912. At the same time his father became the 123^rd Emperor, Taishō Tennō (大正天皇), thus ushering in the Taishō (大正) era. Prince Hirohito was invested as Crown Prince on 2 November 1916.  He was appointed as Regent of Japan on 29 November 1921, ruling in place of his father, who was suffering from a debilitating mental illness, as a result of childhood meningitis and rumoured lead poisoning.

Prince Hirohito became heir apparent upon the death of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, on 30 July 1912. At the same time his father became the 123^rd Emperor, Taishō Tennō (大正天皇), thus ushering in the Taishō (大正) era. Prince Hirohito was invested as Crown Prince on 2 November 1916.  He was appointed as Regent of Japan on 29 November 1921, ruling in place of his father, who was suffering from a debilitating mental illness, as a result of childhood meningitis and rumoured lead poisoning.

On 25 December 1926, Crown Prince Hirohito assumed the throne upon the death of his father. The Taishō era ceased immediately and the new Shōwa era (昭和 "Enlightened Peace"), was proclaimed, with the deceased Emperor being posthumously renamed Emperor Taishō several days later.  He was formally enthroned in November 1928. Upon becoming emperor he adopted the reign name of '''Shōwa''', meaning "Radiant Peace," an increasingly ironic term as the increasing military dominations of Japan's government led the country into war, first with China and then with the Western powers.  

On 25 December 1926, Crown Prince Hirohito assumed the throne upon the death of his father. The Taishō era ceased immediately and the new Shōwa era (昭和 "Enlightened Peace"), was proclaimed, with the deceased Emperor being posthumously renamed Emperor Taishō several days later.  He was formally enthroned in November 1928. Upon becoming emperor he adopted the reign name of '''Shōwa''', meaning "Radiant Peace," an increasingly ironic term as the increasing military dominations of Japan's government led the country into war, first with China and then with the Western powers.  

===World War II===

===World War II===

By  the late 1930s, Hirohito moved squarely into the camp of the 'renovationist' group who were tending toward an ever expanding war in China.  However, he opposed going to war with the United States in 1941, not out of pacifist tendencies but because he had a realistic concern about a probable Japanese defeat. He pressed for talks with Washington and welcomed the neutrality agreement with Moscow in April 1941 as a means of avoiding a recurrence of dangerous border clashes with the Soviet Union. He strongly opposed joining Germany in its war against the Soviets in June 1941, and helped replace the hawkish foreign minister.<ref> Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) p. 103-8.</ref> Yet because his power was so circumscribed by the decision-making structure of the government, and he had no answer to the American oil embargo, by late summer 1941 he became fatalistic about going to war.  He had little role in the replacement of Prime Minister Konoe by the war cabinet of General [[Hideki Tōjō]] (1884-1948), who demanded war. Hirohito continued to oppose going to war until the last minute, but pressure from his military bureaucracy forced his hand and Tōjō had his way and the attack was made on Pearl Harbor.<ref>Noriko Kawamura, "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States: Reexamined." ''Diplomatic History'' 2007 31(1): 51-79.  </ref>

 

By  the late 1930s, Hirohito moved squarely into the camp of the 'renovationist' group who were tending toward an ever expanding war in China.  However, he opposed going to war with the United States in 1941, not out of pacifist tendencies but because he had a realistic concern about a probable Japanese defeat. He pressed for talks with Washington and welcomed the neutrality agreement with Moscow in April 1941 as a means of avoiding a recurrence of dangerous border clashes with the Soviet Union. He strongly opposed joining Germany in its war against the Soviets in June 1941, and helped replace the hawkish foreign minister.<ref> Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) p. 103-8.</ref> Yet because his power was so circumscribed by the decision-making structure of the government, and he had no answer to the American oil embargo, by late summer 1941 he became fatalistic about going to war.  He had little role in the replacement of Prime Minister Konoe by the war cabinet of General [[Hideki Tojo|Hideki Tōjō]] (1884-1948), who demanded war. Hirohito continued to oppose going to war until the last minute, but pressure from his military bureaucracy forced his hand and Tōjō had his way and the attack was made on Pearl Harbor.<ref>Noriko Kawamura, "Emperor Hirohito and Japan's Decision to Go to War with the United States: Reexamined." ''Diplomatic History'' 2007 31(1): 51-79.  </ref>

The emperor played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the Philippines in 1941-42, including the fortified [[Bataan]] peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the [[Guadalcanal]] campaign. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a new offensive in New Guinea, which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central Solomon Islands and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of Saipan and, later, for an offensive in the battle of Okinawa.<ref>  Herbert Bix, "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12</ref>  

The emperor played an increasingly influential role in the war; in eleven major episodes he was deeply involved in supervising the actual conduct of war operations. Hirohito pressured the High Command to order an early attack on the Philippines in 1941-42, including the fortified [[Bataan]] peninsula. He secured the deployment of army air power in the [[Guadalcanal]] campaign. Following Japan's withdrawal from Guadalcanal he demanded a new offensive in New Guinea, which was duly carried out but failed badly. Unhappy with the navy's conduct of the war, he criticized its withdrawal from the central Solomon Islands and demanded naval battles against the Americans for the losses they had inflicted in the Aleutians. The battles were disasters. Finally, it was at his insistence that plans were drafted for the recapture of Saipan and, later, for an offensive in the battle of Okinawa.<ref>  Herbert Bix, "Emperor Hirohito's war," ''History Today,'' (Dec 1991), Vol. 41, Issue 12</ref>  

He became publicly visible trying to maintain military and civilian morale as the  islands came under heavy air attack in 1944-45 and food shortages mounted. With the Army and Navy bitterly feuding, he settled disputes over the allocation of resources. He helped plan military offenses.<ref> Herbert P. Bix "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225. in [[Ebsco]]</ref>  

He became publicly visible trying to maintain military and civilian morale as the  islands came under heavy air attack in 1944-45 and food shortages mounted. With the Army and Navy bitterly feuding, he settled disputes over the allocation of resources. He helped plan military offenses.<ref> Herbert P. Bix "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225. in [[Ebsco]]</ref>  

====Surrender====

====Surrender====

Hirohito's main adviser was Kido Koichi (1889-1977), who as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was the manager who controlled the information flow between the emperor and other officials, thereby helping to overthrow the Tōjō cabinet in 1944 and convincing the emperor to sue for peace.  In April 1945 he helped bring in an elderly new prime minister Kantarō Suzuki (1868-1948), who was told to hold the armed services in line while peace initiatives were set in motion.  Germany surrendered on May 8 and the imperial palace was burned down during an air raid on 25 May, underscoring the urgency, but Hirohito supported a quixotic effort to have the Soviet Union mediate a peace, unaware that it planned to declare war on Japan. The issue of an American guarantee of Hirohito's continuation as emperor prevented the prompt acceptance of the Allies' Potsdam terms, and led to two atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war in early August. The extreme national emergency now made it possible for the emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender; he told foreign minister Tōgō that  "since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should not let slip the opportunity [for peace] by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions." Hirohito unexpectedly spoke out at a deadlocked conference on August 9, saying "the time has come when we must bear the unbearable....[so I] give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied Proclamation." The military continued to stall even as their military position in Manchuria collapsed, The emperor lined up more supporters and on August 14 he forced the government to agree to surrender. His radio broadcast on August 15 calling on all Japanese to surrender was immediately  accepted by the people and the military (though a few die hards tried and failed to stop the broadcast, and many senior army officers committed suicide.) Hirohito had ended the war, rescued his throne, and saved the lives of millions of Japanese.  The "Greater East Asia War," as the Japanese called it, resulted in 1,675,000 Japanese army deaths, 429,000 navy deaths, and more than 300,000 civilian deaths in Japan, not to mention millions of enemy soldiers and civilians killed.<ref>Herbert P. Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225; Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) pp. 121-30.</ref>   

Hirohito's main adviser was Kido Koichi (1889-1977), who as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was the manager who controlled the information flow between the emperor and other officials, thereby helping to overthrow the Tōjō cabinet in 1944 and convincing the emperor to sue for peace.  In April 1945 he helped bring in an elderly new prime minister Kantarō Suzuki (1868-1948), who was told to hold the armed services in line while peace initiatives were set in motion.  Germany surrendered on May 8 and the imperial palace was burned down during an air raid on 25 May, underscoring the urgency, but Hirohito supported a quixotic effort to have the Soviet Union mediate a peace, unaware that it planned to declare war on Japan. The issue of an American guarantee of Hirohito's continuation as emperor prevented the prompt acceptance of the Allies' Potsdam terms, and led to two atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war in early August. The extreme national emergency now made it possible for the emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender; he told foreign minister Tōgō that  "since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should not let slip the opportunity [for peace] by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions." Hirohito unexpectedly spoke out at a deadlocked conference on August 9, saying "the time has come when we must bear the unbearable....[so I] give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied Proclamation." The military continued to stall even as their military position in Manchuria collapsed, The emperor lined up more supporters and on August 14 he forced the government to agree to surrender. His radio broadcast on August 15 calling on all Japanese to surrender was immediately  accepted by the people and the military (though a few die hards tried and failed to stop the broadcast, and many senior army officers committed suicide.) Hirohito had ended the war, rescued his throne, and saved the lives of millions of Japanese.  The "Greater East Asia War," as the Japanese called it, resulted in 1,675,000 Japanese army deaths, 429,000 navy deaths, and more than 300,000 civilian deaths in Japan, not to mention millions of enemy soldiers and civilians killed.<ref>Herbert P. Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: a Reinterpretation." ''Diplomatic History'' 1995 19(2): 197-225; Stephen S. Large, ''Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan'' (1992) pp. 121-30.</ref>   

===Weakness===

===Weakness===

Even though the Emperor was regarded as divine by many Japanese, in reality he had little power. The Japanese constitution allowed the Emperor only to act on the advice of his ministers and chiefs of staff. However, when a group of officers in the Japanese Army staged a military coup against the political leaders in February 1936, the emperor went against the wishes of his senior advisers, ordering them to suppress the rebellion. As a direct result of his action, the ringleaders were later executed.

Even though the Emperor was regarded as divine by many Japanese, in reality he had little power. The Japanese constitution allowed the Emperor only to act on the advice of his ministers and chiefs of staff. However, when a group of officers in the Japanese Army staged a military coup against the political leaders in February 1936, the emperor went against the wishes of his senior advisers, ordering them to suppress the rebellion. As a direct result of his action, the ringleaders were later executed.

===American Occupation and new status===

===American Occupation and new status===

The State Department in Washington, not General [[Douglas MacArthur]] made the decision to retain Hirohito and the imperial institution; the decision evolved by 1944 out of a wartime assumption that the emperor was not personally guilty but was essential for American plans for postwar Japan.<ref> American planning for the postwar world began in 1939. Joseph Ballantine and George H. Blakeslee, directors of the State Department's Far East unit, were influential planners along with historian Hugh Borton and especially [[Joseph Grew]], who had been the US ambassador in Tokyo for ten years. </ref> Rather than a flash of inspiration from the supreme commander, American policy toward the emperor represented a confluence of motivations that crystallized in the early days of the occupation.<ref> MacArthur in early 1946 warned Washington that a war crimes indictment of Hirohito "will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate." Guerrillas would take to the hills and "a minimum of a million troops would be required . . . for an indefinite number of years" to stop the rebellion. Tōjō was put on trial instead and hung. Quoted in Tetsuya Kataoka, [http://books.google.com/books?id=iuUynl48h4EC&pg=PA37&dq=%22destroy+him+and+the+nation+will+disintegrate%22&sig=uLW4WXjpM4fAZioeVx7C0eNDk34 ''The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics'' (1991) p.  37 online]</ref>  MacArthur agreed with the policy and orchestrated dramatic public displays, as well as real changes, that made it clear a new era had arrived and that militarism and emperor worship had ended.<ref> Hal Brands, "Who Saved the Emperor? The Macarthur Myth and U.S. Policy Toward Hirohito and the Japanese Imperial Institution, 1942-1946." ''Pacific Historical Review'' 2006 75(2): 271-305. Issn: 0030-8684 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

The State Department in Washington, not General [[Douglas MacArthur]] made the decision to retain Hirohito and the imperial institution; the decision evolved by 1944 out of a wartime assumption that the emperor was not personally guilty but was essential for American plans for postwar Japan.<ref> American planning for the postwar world began in 1939. Joseph Ballantine and George H. Blakeslee, directors of the State Department's Far East unit, were influential planners along with historian Hugh Borton and especially [[Joseph Grew]], who had been the US ambassador in Tokyo for ten years. </ref> Rather than a flash of inspiration from the supreme commander, American policy toward the emperor represented a confluence of motivations that crystallized in the early days of the occupation.<ref> MacArthur in early 1946 warned Washington that a war crimes indictment of Hirohito "will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate." Guerrillas would take to the hills and "a minimum of a million troops would be required . . . for an indefinite number of years" to stop the rebellion. Tōjō was put on trial instead and hung. Quoted in Tetsuya Kataoka, [http://books.google.com/books?id=iuUynl48h4EC&pg=PA37&dq=%22destroy+him+and+the+nation+will+disintegrate%22&sig=uLW4WXjpM4fAZioeVx7C0eNDk34 ''The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics'' (1991) p.  37 online]</ref>  MacArthur agreed with the policy and orchestrated dramatic public displays, as well as real changes, that made it clear a new era had arrived and that militarism and emperor worship had ended.<ref> Hal Brands, "Who Saved the Emperor? The Macarthur Myth and U.S. Policy Toward Hirohito and the Japanese Imperial Institution, 1942-1946." ''Pacific Historical Review'' 2006 75(2): 271-305. Issn: 0030-8684 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

On January 1, 1946, just ten years after his imperial title had been changed to "Dai Nippon Teikoku Tenno," meaning "Imperial Son of Heaven in Mighty Japan," Hirohito reversed course and disclaimed his divinity in a statement to his people. The Japanese saw it as a turning point in their history.  American newspapers hailed him as the leader of reform in Japan--a gross exaggeration that worked well for him and GHQ.  Hirohito got across to the Japanese people another message as well: that the monarchy had always been compatible with democracy and the current democratiaation of Japanese society marked a continuation of ideals inscribed in the Five Article 'Charter Oath' of the Meiji Restoration.

On January 1, 1946, just ten years after his imperial title had been changed to "Dai Nippon Teikoku Tenno," meaning "Imperial Son of Heaven in Mighty Japan," Hirohito reversed course and disclaimed his divinity in a statement to his people. The Japanese saw it as a turning point in their history.  American newspapers hailed him as the leader of reform in Japan--a gross exaggeration that worked well for him and GHQ.  Hirohito got across to the Japanese people another message as well: that the monarchy had always been compatible with democracy and the current democratiaation of Japanese society marked a continuation of ideals inscribed in the Five Article 'Charter Oath' of the Meiji Restoration.

After the war, he sought out popularity among the Japanese people, travelling extensively throughout Japan in order to monitor the progress of post-war reconstruction. After 1946, Hirohito played a minor role in decision-making, However his symbolic role was continued and Hirohito moved the imperial closer to the people. In 1958 this change in attitude was reflected in the choice for to be bride for his son, the Crown Prince.  the emperor selected Shōda Michiko, the daughter of the former president and chairman of Nisshin Flour Milling Company. This broke a 1,500-year tradition requiring future empresses to be from noble families; Hirohito's wife, the empress Nagako, repeatedly lamented Akihito's marriage as a disgrace to the imperial family, but Hirohito's approval was widely hailed in Japan. In 1962 Hirohito published the first of several books on marine biology, a subject in which he did considerable research. In 1971 Hirohito visited Europe, the first visit abroad by a reigning Japanese emperor, and one that showed Europeans had long memories of wartime atrocities. In 1975 Hirohito paid an official state visit to the United States, where the wartime hatreds had dissipated.

After the war, he sought out popularity among the Japanese people, travelling extensively throughout Japan in order to monitor the progress of post-war reconstruction. After 1946, Hirohito played a minor role in decision-making, However his symbolic role was continued and Hirohito moved the imperial closer to the people. In 1958 this change in attitude was reflected in the choice for to be bride for his son, the Crown Prince.  the emperor selected Shōda Michiko, the daughter of the former president and chairman of Nisshin Flour Milling Company. This broke a 1,500-year tradition requiring future empresses to be from noble families; Hirohito's wife, the empress Nagako, repeatedly lamented Akihito's marriage as a disgrace to the imperial family, but Hirohito's approval was widely hailed in Japan. In 1962 Hirohito published the first of several books on marine biology, a subject in which he did considerable research. In 1971 Hirohito visited Europe, the first visit abroad by a reigning Japanese emperor, and one that showed Europeans had long memories of wartime atrocities. In 1975 Hirohito paid an official state visit to the United States, where the wartime hatreds had dissipated.

==Image and memory==

==Image and memory==

Following longstanding tradition, on his death everyone in Japan immediately stopped using the name Hirohito and referred to him as the Shōwa Emperor, and his reign as the Shōwa Period. Outside Japan, he is still usually known as Hirohito.

Following longstanding tradition, on his death everyone in Japan immediately stopped using the name Hirohito and referred to him as the Shōwa Emperor, and his reign as the Shōwa Period. Outside Japan, he is still usually known as Hirohito.

== See also ==

== See also ==

*[[Japan]]

*[[Japan]]

*[[Douglas MacArthur]]

*[[Douglas MacArthur]]

* Harootunian, Harry. "Hirohito Redux." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2001 33(4): 609-636. Issn: 1467-2715 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]], focused on Bix (2000)

* Harootunian, Harry. "Hirohito Redux." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2001 33(4): 609-636. Issn: 1467-2715 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]], focused on Bix (2000)

* Large, Stephen S. "Emperor Hirohito and Early Showa Japan." ''Nipponica'' 1991 46(3): 349-368. Issn: 0027-0741 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2385212 in Jstor]

* Large, Stephen S. "Emperor Hirohito and Early Showa Japan." ''Nipponica'' 1991 46(3): 349-368. Issn: 0027-0741 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2385212 in Jstor]

===Primary sources in English===

===Primary sources in English===

* Honjo, Shigeru.  ''Emperor Hirohito and His Chief Aide-de-Camp: The Honjo Diary, 1933-36.'' (1983). 263 pp.   

* Honjo, Shigeru.  ''Emperor Hirohito and His Chief Aide-de-Camp: The Honjo Diary, 1933-36.'' (1983). 263 pp.   

===Not recommended===

===Not recommended===

*  Bergamini, David. '''Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. '' (1971) contends that Hirohito led his nation into WW2 and intimidated opponents by conniving in religious frauds, blackmails, and assassinations. This book has very negative reviews from scholars who say Bergamini falsified his evidence. See [[http://www.jstor.org/pss/311667 for the consensus]

*  Bergamini, David. '''Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. '' (1971) contends that Hirohito led his nation into WW2 and intimidated opponents by conniving in religious frauds, blackmails, and assassinations. This book has very negative reviews from scholars who say Bergamini falsified his evidence. See [[http://www.jstor.org/pss/311667 for the consensus]

===Japanese books===

===Japanese books===

* Fujiwara Akira, ''Shōwa Tennō no Jū-go Nen Sensō'' (Shōwa Emperor's Fifteen-year War), Aoki Shoten, 1991.  

* Fujiwara Akira, ''Shōwa Tennō no Jū-go Nen Sensō'' (Shōwa Emperor's Fifteen-year War), Aoki Shoten, 1991.  

* Yamada Akira, ''Daigensui Shōwa Tennō'' (Shōwa Emperor as Commander in Chief), Shin-Nihon Shuppansha, 1994.  

* Yamada Akira, ''Daigensui Shōwa Tennō'' (Shōwa Emperor as Commander in Chief), Shin-Nihon Shuppansha, 1994.  

==References==

==References==

[[category:Japanese Emperors]]

[[category:Japanese Emperors]]

[[category:World War II]]

[[category:World War II]]