| − | Through 1961 and 1962 civil rights leaders pressured the [[John F. Kennedy]] administration to support a tough civil rights bill, seekinf a sort of second Emancipation Proclamation that would employ federal power to wipe out segregation just as Lincoln's 1863 decree had abolished slavery. Kennedy, basically conservative and unwilling to offend his base of Southern white voters, refused to act. Civil rights groups thereupon launched multiple mass demonstrations throughout the South. King and the SCLC staff would single out some notoriously segregated city with officials who tolerated violence; mobilize the local blacks with songs, Bible readings, and rousing oratory; and then lead them on protest marches conspicuous for their nonviolent spirit and moral purpose. Then the marchers escalated their demands--even fill up the jails--until they brought about a moment of "creative tension," when white authorities would either agree to negotiate or resort to violence. If violence broke out it would humiliate the moderate whites and redouble national pressures from church and activists for federal intervention. So far there was no violence on the part of blacks, but they were growing more and more frustrated and angry, with militants like [[Malcolm X]] calling for more extreme measures.<ref> Robert Terrill, "Protest, Prophecy, and Prudence in the Rhetoric of Malcolm X," ''Rhetoric & Public Affairs'' 4#1 Spring 2001, pp. 25-53 in [[Project Muse]]; Akinyele O. Umoja, "The Ballot and the Bullet," ''Journal of Black Studies'' 29 (1999): 558-79; Sean Dennis Cashman, ''African-Americans and the Quest for Civil Rights, 1900-1990'' (1991), 184-215. </ref> | + | Through 1961 and 1962 civil rights leaders pressured the [[John F. Kennedy]] administration to support a tough civil rights bill, seeking a sort of second Emancipation Proclamation that would employ federal power to wipe out segregation just as Lincoln's 1863 decree had abolished slavery. Kennedy, basically conservative and unwilling to offend his base of Southern white voters, refused to act. Civil rights groups thereupon launched multiple mass demonstrations throughout the South. King and the SCLC staff would single out some notoriously segregated city with officials who tolerated violence; mobilize the local blacks with songs, Bible readings, and rousing oratory; and then lead them on protest marches conspicuous for their nonviolent spirit and moral purpose. Then the marchers escalated their demands--even fill up the jails--until they brought about a moment of "creative tension," when white authorities would either agree to negotiate or resort to violence. If violence broke out it would humiliate the moderate whites and redouble national pressures from church and activists for federal intervention. So far there was no violence on the part of blacks, but they were growing more and more frustrated and angry, with militants like [[Malcolm X]] calling for more extreme measures.<ref> Robert Terrill, "Protest, Prophecy, and Prudence in the Rhetoric of Malcolm X," ''Rhetoric & Public Affairs'' 4#1 Spring 2001, pp. 25-53 in [[Project Muse]]; Akinyele O. Umoja, "The Ballot and the Bullet," ''Journal of Black Studies'' 29 (1999): 558-79; Sean Dennis Cashman, ''African-Americans and the Quest for Civil Rights, 1900-1990'' (1991), 184-215. </ref> |
| | Nonviolent confrontation failed politically in Albany, Georgia, in 1962, where white authorites were equally nonviolent. In 1963 it succeeded in Birmingham, Alabama, where Police Commissioner Eugene ("Bull") Connor turned | | Nonviolent confrontation failed politically in Albany, Georgia, in 1962, where white authorites were equally nonviolent. In 1963 it succeeded in Birmingham, Alabama, where Police Commissioner Eugene ("Bull") Connor turned |
| | However, within days of the passage of the powerful new law, rioting broke out in black ghettoes, as the civil rights leadership discovered it could not control the angry masses. Nor could it control the radical students in SNCC and like-minded groups who were moving rapidly to the left, rejecting alliances with whites, discarding the goal of integration and demanding instead black separatism and "Black Power."<ref> Akinyele O. Umoja, "1964: The Beginning of the End of Nonviolence in the Mississippi Freedom Movement," ''Radical History Review'', Jan 2003; 2003: 201 - 226. online in [[Duke journals]]</ref> | | However, within days of the passage of the powerful new law, rioting broke out in black ghettoes, as the civil rights leadership discovered it could not control the angry masses. Nor could it control the radical students in SNCC and like-minded groups who were moving rapidly to the left, rejecting alliances with whites, discarding the goal of integration and demanding instead black separatism and "Black Power."<ref> Akinyele O. Umoja, "1964: The Beginning of the End of Nonviolence in the Mississippi Freedom Movement," ''Radical History Review'', Jan 2003; 2003: 201 - 226. online in [[Duke journals]]</ref> |
| | In recent years blacks have made major gains in sports, entertainment and politics. George W. Bush appointed the first two blacks to head the cabinet, secretaries of state [[Colin Powell]] and [[Condoleezza Rice]]. In a stunning upset, [[Barack Obama]] defeated [[Hillary Clinton]] for the Democratic nomination for president in 2008. | | In recent years blacks have made major gains in sports, entertainment and politics. George W. Bush appointed the first two blacks to head the cabinet, secretaries of state [[Colin Powell]] and [[Condoleezza Rice]]. In a stunning upset, [[Barack Obama]] defeated [[Hillary Clinton]] for the Democratic nomination for president in 2008. |