Changes

Unfortunately his battle plans fell into Union hands, and the Army of the Potomac, again under McClellan, met him at Sharpsburg, Maryland on September 17 in the Battle of Antietam, which became, with well over 19,000 casualties, the single bloodiest day in American history.  Lee lost this battle, and was able to retreat back into Virginia, reorganize his army, and by December he seized back the initiative with a decisive victory over the Union army (under Ambrose Burnside) at Fredericksburg.  The following May, 1863, the battle of Chancellorsville took place, and although outnumbered by at least two to one, he divided his forces twice and circled the Federals under "Fighting Joe" Joseph Hooker in one of the most audacious maneuvers in military history.  He also suffered the irreparable loss of Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded while reconnoitering the left flank (Smith, pp. 158-162).  

Unfortunately his battle plans fell into Union hands, and the Army of the Potomac, again under McClellan, met him at Sharpsburg, Maryland on September 17 in the Battle of Antietam, which became, with well over 19,000 casualties, the single bloodiest day in American history.  Lee lost this battle, and was able to retreat back into Virginia, reorganize his army, and by December he seized back the initiative with a decisive victory over the Union army (under Ambrose Burnside) at Fredericksburg.  The following May, 1863, the battle of Chancellorsville took place, and although outnumbered by at least two to one, he divided his forces twice and circled the Federals under "Fighting Joe" Joseph Hooker in one of the most audacious maneuvers in military history.  He also suffered the irreparable loss of Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded while reconnoitering the left flank (Smith, pp. 158-162).  

Again, Lee tried to draw the enemy out of Virginia; this time he crossed the Potomac and headed north into Pennsylvania, where he hoped to re-supply his men.  He was met and stopped during the first week of July, in a massive, three-day engagement at Gettysburg.  The battle would become the storied "high tide" of the Confederacy, and after the war Southern historians would strive to find ways to excuse Lee for the battle, blaming the devastating loss on many of Lee's subordinates (especially James Longstreet, who opposed Lee's strategy for the battle). Although there were major failures by subordinates, most notably General A.P. Hill allowing a general engagement to occur in opposition to Lee's orders and General Dick Ewell keeping his corp deployed North of the battlefield, limiting its effectiveness, much of the blame lies with Lee himself. General Lee gave very discretionary orders that were often misinterpreted, and during the battle was often conspicuosly absent from the action. He was also not yet comfortable with using Longstreet as a strategic advisor as Jackson had been, not agreeing with Longstreet's general defensive mindset. Although the loss was a combination of many factors, Lee showed his usual grace in accepting full responsibility for hte battle. (Smith, pp. 164-167).

Again, Lee tried to draw the enemy out of Virginia; this time he crossed the Potomac and headed north into Pennsylvania, where he hoped to re-supply his men.  He was met and stopped during the first week of July, in a massive, three-day engagement at Gettysburg.  The battle would become the storied "high tide" of the Confederacy, and after the war Southern historians would strive to find ways to excuse Lee for the battle, blaming the devastating loss on many of Lee's subordinates (especially James Longstreet, who opposed Lee's strategy for the battle). Although there were major failures by subordinates, most notably General A.P. Hill allowing a general engagement to occur in opposition to Lee's orders and General Dick Ewell keeping his corp deployed North of the battlefield, limiting its effectiveness, much of the blame lies with Lee himself. General Lee gave very discretionary orders that were often misinterpreted, and during the battle was often conspicuosly absent from the action. He was also not yet comfortable with using Longstreet as a strategic advisor as Jackson had been, not agreeing with Longstreet's general defensive mindset. Although the loss was a combination of many factors, Lee showed his usual grace in accepting full responsibility for the battle. (Smith, pp. 164-167).

====Final year of the war====

====Final year of the war====