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| | [[Image:H50930.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Photograph taken from a Japanese plane during the torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island. The geyser of water in the center marks a torpedo hit on USS ''West Virginia'']] | | [[Image:H50930.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Photograph taken from a Japanese plane during the torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island. The geyser of water in the center marks a torpedo hit on USS ''West Virginia'']] |
| − | '''The Attack on Pearl Harbor''' was a major battle that immediately led to U.S. entry into World War II. The battle comprised a series of naval air strikes by the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] on the morning of December 7, 1941 against U.S. air and naval forces at its main Pacific base at pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The strike was designed to cripple the U.S. battleships fleet, giving Japan naval dominance in the Pacific and thus giving Japan to have easy access to much of the western [[Pacific Ocean]] and Southeast [[Asia]]. The Japanese or disabled all the battleships but missed the aircraft carriers (which were not present), allowing the U.S. to fight back using naval air power. The United States Congress declared war against Japan the next day. The attack was seen by Americans as a "Day of Infamy" that silenced the isolationists and united the people in a demand for vivctory in the Pacific. | + | '''The Attack on Pearl Harbor''' was a major battle that immediately led to U.S. entry into World War II. The battle comprised a series of naval air strikes by the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] on the morning of December 7, 1941 against U.S. air and naval forces at its main Pacific base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The strike was designed to cripple the U.S. battleships fleet, giving Japan naval dominance in the Pacific and thus giving Japan to have easy access to much of the western [[Pacific Ocean]] and Southeast [[Asia]]. The Japanese or disabled all the battleships but missed the aircraft carriers (which were not present), allowing the U.S. to fight back using naval air power. The United States Congress declared war against Japan the next day. The attack was seen by Americans as a "Day of Infamy" that silenced the isolationists and united the people in a demand for victory in the Pacific. |
| | ==Prelude== | | ==Prelude== |
| − | The road to war between Japan and the United States began in the 1930s when differences over [[China]] drove the two nations apart. In 1931 Japan conquered [[Manchuria]], which until then had been part of China. In 1937 Japan began a long and ultimately unsuccessful campaign to conquer the rest of China. In 1940, the Japanese government allied their country with [[Nazi Germany]] in the [[Axis]] Alliance, and, in the following year, occupied all of Indochina. | + | The road to war between Japan and the United States began in the 1930s when differences over [[China]] drove the two nations apart. In 1931 Japan conquered [[Manchuria]], which until then had been part of China. In 1937 Japan began a long and ultimately unsuccessful was to conquer the rest of China. In 1940, the Japanese government allied their country with [[Nazi Germany]] in the [[Axis]] Alliance, and, in the following year, occupied all of Indochina. |
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| − | The U.S. increased military and financial aid to China, and embarked on a program of strengthening its military power in the Pacific. Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] sought to make America's economic policy ambiguous so that Japan might be deterred by fear of sanctions not yet imposed and won by hopes of concessions not yet granted. Such a policy obtained Roosevelt's explicit approval while at the same time it more aggressive elements in Japan to take control. | + | The U.S. increased military and financial aid to China, and embarked on a program of strengthening its military power in the Pacific. In 1941 the U.S., in alliance with Britain and the Netherlands, eneded off oil shipments to Japan, thus cutting off 90% of Japan's oil supply. The American policy was that Japan's aggression had to end and would no longer be facilitated by American and oil. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, unless it either made peace or went to war and conquered the oil supplies in Sumatra (controlled by the Dutch) and Burma (controlled by the British). The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was war, by going south to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia. Knocking out the American fleet was critical to the success of the strategy, hence the attack was ordered on |
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| − | Roosevelt accepted a plan for economic sanctions presented by Treasury Assistant [[Harry Dexter White]]. On July 26, 1941, a full scale economic blockade was implemented, all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. were frozen and trade virtually ended between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>
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| − | Because Japan was poor in natural resources, its government viewed these steps, especially the embargo on oil, as a threat to the nation's survival. Japan's leaders responded by resolving to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia, even though that move would certainly result in war with the United States. A proposal by Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] for a personal meeting with Roosevelt was rejected. Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape an ultimatum. Hull's use of harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme. <ref>''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time'', Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pgs. 735 - 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>
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| − | On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.</ref> Secretary Hull solved the problem the next day. This was the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board when it reported that the Hull note "touched the button that started the war." <ref>Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 137. [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/army/chap_3c.html]</ref>
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| − | It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by [[Harry Dexter White]]. In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959, pg. 19. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''. The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953. The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103] Dr. Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]<br>
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| − | Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "cold war," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>
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| | + | Roosevelt meanwhile though that Japanese movements south would be deterred by the threat of large scale air bombing of the main cities of Japan. He ordered raids undertaken (in the name of China) by American forces in China, but they never got close enough. Washington then ordered new B-17 long-range bombers to the Philippines, expecting to have enough air power by spring 1942 to seriously threaten Japan. It was too little too late. |
| | ==Japanese plan== | | ==Japanese plan== |
| − | The problem with the plan was the danger posed by the U.S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], commander of the Japanese fleet, devised a plan to immobilize the U.S. fleet at the outset of the war with a surprise attack. | + | The main immediate threat to Japan was the U.S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], commander of the Japanese fleet, devised a plan to immobilize the U.S. fleet at the outset of the war with a surprise attack. |
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| | The key elements in Yamamoto's plans were meticulous preparation, the achievement of surprise, and the use of aircraft carriers and naval aviation on an unprecedented scale. In the spring of 1941, Japanese carrier pilots began training in the special tactics called for by the Pearl Harbor attack plan. | | The key elements in Yamamoto's plans were meticulous preparation, the achievement of surprise, and the use of aircraft carriers and naval aviation on an unprecedented scale. In the spring of 1941, Japanese carrier pilots began training in the special tactics called for by the Pearl Harbor attack plan. |