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Tried to do this as a summary page, but most of this probably belongs on theory sub pages. If anyone can think of a better replacement for 'stuff', feel free to swap it out
Substance dualism is the belief that [[reality]] is composed of two fundamentally different types of 'stuff'- [[material]] 'stuff', and [[immaterial]] 'stuff'. [[Science]] is concerned only with the study of material 'stuff', whereas [[theology]] and [[mysticism]] lays claim to a study of any immaterial 'stuff'.
Substance dualism was at the core of [[Plato]]'s [[philosophy]]. He argued that the constantly changing, imperfect material world was merely an shadowy reflection of the immutable, perfect immaterial realm of the Forms. This immaterial realm could only be accessed by [[human]] reason.
[[Descartes]] also advanced a specific form of substance dualism known as [[Cartesian Dualism]]. He argued that there was only one thing which was immaterial- the human [[mind]]. When a person has a thought, such as 'I am hungry', it results in the immaterial mind affecting the [[brain]]'s [[pineal gland]] in such a way that the brain sends electronic signals to simulate various muscles to contract so the body eats. This in turn results in changes in the pineal gland, which make the mind feel less hungry and sated.
However, in the [[1960s]], [[Ryle]] famously argued that substance dualism, particularly cartesian dualism, was nothing more than '[[the ghost in the machine]]'- a bizarre, ineffectual, unnecessary force that contributed nothing to our understanding. He argued that concepts such as the [[soul]]- long held as the classic example of an immaterial thing- result from a specific misuse of language called a [[category mistake]]. He further argued that, if there was an immaterial realm, either it would have to be wholly separate from our own material realm (leading to theories of [[non-interactionism]] such as [[epiphenomenalism]] and [[parallelism]]) or that [[God]] is deliberatly deceiving our senses whenever such [[interaction]] occurs, as there is no [[empirical]] [[evidence]] of dualist interaction in the material world.
This has led many modern theologians, such as [[Hick]], to abandon the [[ontological]] position of substance dualism in favour of [[materialism]]. This, however, theoretically renders religious [[hypotheses]], such as Hick's [[replica theory]], scientifically testable, and it remains to be seen what results this avenue of thought will produce in the future.
Substance dualism was at the core of [[Plato]]'s [[philosophy]]. He argued that the constantly changing, imperfect material world was merely an shadowy reflection of the immutable, perfect immaterial realm of the Forms. This immaterial realm could only be accessed by [[human]] reason.
[[Descartes]] also advanced a specific form of substance dualism known as [[Cartesian Dualism]]. He argued that there was only one thing which was immaterial- the human [[mind]]. When a person has a thought, such as 'I am hungry', it results in the immaterial mind affecting the [[brain]]'s [[pineal gland]] in such a way that the brain sends electronic signals to simulate various muscles to contract so the body eats. This in turn results in changes in the pineal gland, which make the mind feel less hungry and sated.
However, in the [[1960s]], [[Ryle]] famously argued that substance dualism, particularly cartesian dualism, was nothing more than '[[the ghost in the machine]]'- a bizarre, ineffectual, unnecessary force that contributed nothing to our understanding. He argued that concepts such as the [[soul]]- long held as the classic example of an immaterial thing- result from a specific misuse of language called a [[category mistake]]. He further argued that, if there was an immaterial realm, either it would have to be wholly separate from our own material realm (leading to theories of [[non-interactionism]] such as [[epiphenomenalism]] and [[parallelism]]) or that [[God]] is deliberatly deceiving our senses whenever such [[interaction]] occurs, as there is no [[empirical]] [[evidence]] of dualist interaction in the material world.
This has led many modern theologians, such as [[Hick]], to abandon the [[ontological]] position of substance dualism in favour of [[materialism]]. This, however, theoretically renders religious [[hypotheses]], such as Hick's [[replica theory]], scientifically testable, and it remains to be seen what results this avenue of thought will produce in the future.