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| | ''For the Soviet invasion and war, 1979-89, see [[Soviet-Afghan War]]. For politics and society, see [[Afghanistan]]. | | ''For the Soviet invasion and war, 1979-89, see [[Soviet-Afghan War]]. For politics and society, see [[Afghanistan]]. |
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| − | "Operation Enduring Freedom" easily defeated the Taliban in late 2001 and it seemed the war was over quickly. But the Taliban regrouped, especially in the southern provinces, with sanctuaries inside neighboring Pakistan in remote areas where the government of Pakistan had little authority. By 2003 the insurgency in the south was in operation, funded by opium production. Important factors for the return of insurgency include the initial mistakes made in 2001; radical Islamic support from Pakistan; weaknesses of the [[Hamad Karzai]] government, especially its feeble and corrupt national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offenses to traditional tribal and Islamic values and beliefs; and, finally, the extent to which NATO forces became part of the problem by angering the tribes. | + | "Operation Enduring Freedom" easily defeated the Taliban in late 2001 and it seemed the war was over quickly. But the Taliban regrouped, especially in the southern provinces, with sanctuaries inside neighboring Pakistan in remote areas where the government of Pakistan had little authority. By 2003 the insurgency in the south was in operation, funded by opium production. Important factors for the return of insurgency include the initial mistakes made in 2001; radical Islamic support from Pakistan; weaknesses of the [[Hamad Karzai]] government, especially its feeble and corrupt national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offenses to traditional tribal and Islamic values and beliefs; and, finally, the extent to which NATO forces became part of the problem by angering the tribes. The insurgency controlled numerous areas and engaged in terror attacks on ciivlians and guerrilla warfare against American and NATO forces. |
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| | [[File:Mcchrystal.jpg|thumb|250px|General McChrystal]] | | [[File:Mcchrystal.jpg|thumb|250px|General McChrystal]] |
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| | ==New government== | | ==New government== |
| | Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban met at a United Nations-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 and agreed to restore stability and governance to Afghanistan--creating an interim government and establishing a process to move toward a permanent government. Under the "Bonn Agreement," an Afghan Interim Authority was formed and took office in Kabul on December 22, 2001 with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The Interim Authority held power for approximately 6 months while preparing for a nationwide "Loya Jirga" (Grand Council) in mid-June 2002 that decided on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional Authority, headed by President [[Hamid Karzai]], renamed the government as the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). One of the TISA's primary achievements was the drafting of a constitution that was ratified by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004 | | Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban met at a United Nations-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 and agreed to restore stability and governance to Afghanistan--creating an interim government and establishing a process to move toward a permanent government. Under the "Bonn Agreement," an Afghan Interim Authority was formed and took office in Kabul on December 22, 2001 with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The Interim Authority held power for approximately 6 months while preparing for a nationwide "Loya Jirga" (Grand Council) in mid-June 2002 that decided on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional Authority, headed by President [[Hamid Karzai]], renamed the government as the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). One of the TISA's primary achievements was the drafting of a constitution that was ratified by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004 |
| − | [[File:Afg-canada.jpg|thumb|280px|Canadian forces in Afghanistan]]
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| | ==Insurgency== | | ==Insurgency== |
| | There are in 2009 three entirely separate insurgencies; they operate independently. | | There are in 2009 three entirely separate insurgencies; they operate independently. |
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| − | The strongest is the "Quetta Shura Taliban" ('''QST''') headed by Mullah Omar. They fled Afghanistan after 2001, and operate from a sanctuary in the Pakistani city of Quetta. It has created an elaborate shadow government known as the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," which capitalizes on the Afghan government's weaknesses. They install 'shari'a' [Islamic law] courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment. The QST has been working with considerable success to control Kandahar and its approaches. | + | The strongest is the "Quetta Shura Taliban" ('''QST''') headed by Mullah Omar. They fled Afghanistan after 2001, and operate from a sanctuary in the Pakistani city of Quetta. It has created an elaborate shadow government known as the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," which capitalizes on the Afghan government's weaknesses. They install 'shari'a' [Islamic law] courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment. The QST has been working with considerable success to control Kandahar and its approaches. |
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| | Second is the "Haqqani network" ('''HQN'''), active in southeastern Afghanistan. It draws money and manpower from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups. Al Qaeda's links with HQN have grown, raising fears that expanded HQN control could allow extremist movements to re-establish safe-havens inside Afghanistan. | | Second is the "Haqqani network" ('''HQN'''), active in southeastern Afghanistan. It draws money and manpower from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups. Al Qaeda's links with HQN have grown, raising fears that expanded HQN control could allow extremist movements to re-establish safe-havens inside Afghanistan. |
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| | The [[Obama Administration]] has made the war a high priority; indeed Obama sharply criticized the war in Iraq because for so long, he said, it diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan. In September 2009, the Pentagon pushed back against liberal Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time. Washington is debating the new report by Gen. McChrystal, the senior American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, who believes a properly resourced counterinsurgency war means more forces, more time and more commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the development of a strong Afghan government capable of defending its own country.<ref> Thom Shanker, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/world/asia/16mullen.html?_r=1&th&emc=th "Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge U.S. Afghan Force," ''New York Times'' Sept. 16, 2009]</ref> Some 4,000 more American trainers will arrive by November, bringing the American troop level to 68,000. | | The [[Obama Administration]] has made the war a high priority; indeed Obama sharply criticized the war in Iraq because for so long, he said, it diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan. In September 2009, the Pentagon pushed back against liberal Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time. Washington is debating the new report by Gen. McChrystal, the senior American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, who believes a properly resourced counterinsurgency war means more forces, more time and more commitment to the protection of the Afghan people and to the development of a strong Afghan government capable of defending its own country.<ref> Thom Shanker, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/world/asia/16mullen.html?_r=1&th&emc=th "Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge U.S. Afghan Force," ''New York Times'' Sept. 16, 2009]</ref> Some 4,000 more American trainers will arrive by November, bringing the American troop level to 68,000. |
| | ===International role=== | | ===International role=== |
| | + | [[File:Afg-canada.jpg|thumb|280px|Canadian forces in Afghanistan]] |
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| | More than 108,000 NATO troops are serving in Afghanistan in September 2009: 64,500 from the United States, 9,000 from Britain and 34,500 from other nations. In all, 1,386 troops have been killed. NATO deaths include 830 Americans, 214 British, and 130 Canadians; 22 other countries that have sent forces to Afghanistan have suffered deaths among their troops. | | More than 108,000 NATO troops are serving in Afghanistan in September 2009: 64,500 from the United States, 9,000 from Britain and 34,500 from other nations. In all, 1,386 troops have been killed. NATO deaths include 830 Americans, 214 British, and 130 Canadians; 22 other countries that have sent forces to Afghanistan have suffered deaths among their troops. |
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