Changes

Following the [[Eisenhower]] and [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] commitments to the Shah and to the Saudis, the [[Johnson administration]] had pressed the Iranian monarch to carry out reforms—land redistribution, greater freedoms and rights for women, rapid improvements in education.  These programs, it was felt, had to accompany Iran’s rapid drive for industrialization and military strength. The Shah’s power was known to be autocratic and at times arbitrary, nevertheless the monarch was seen as personally stable and generally enlightened if, at times, solitary and somewhat insecure.  The fact that he made all the major decisions himself—was emperor, ''de facto'' prime minister, and commander in chief of the armed forces, as well as knowledgeable and supportive of (if not directly involved in) SAVAK’s internal security activities—was taken into account. But the overall strategic value of Iran and the Shah to the United States was appreciated by every American administration from Eisenhower through [[Gerald Ford|Ford]]. [[President Nixon]] had gone farthest, encouraging the Shah to cast himself in the role of regional policeman. <ref>Grinter, Dr. Lawrence E. [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jan-feb/grinter.html ''Avoiding the Burden: The Carter Doctrine in Perspective''] Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (January-February 1983): 73-82. </ref>

Following the [[Eisenhower]] and [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] commitments to the Shah and to the Saudis, the [[Johnson administration]] had pressed the Iranian monarch to carry out reforms—land redistribution, greater freedoms and rights for women, rapid improvements in education.  These programs, it was felt, had to accompany Iran’s rapid drive for industrialization and military strength. The Shah’s power was known to be autocratic and at times arbitrary, nevertheless the monarch was seen as personally stable and generally enlightened if, at times, solitary and somewhat insecure.  The fact that he made all the major decisions himself—was emperor, ''de facto'' prime minister, and commander in chief of the armed forces, as well as knowledgeable and supportive of (if not directly involved in) SAVAK’s internal security activities—was taken into account. But the overall strategic value of Iran and the Shah to the United States was appreciated by every American administration from Eisenhower through [[Gerald Ford|Ford]]. [[President Nixon]] had gone farthest, encouraging the Shah to cast himself in the role of regional policeman. <ref>Grinter, Dr. Lawrence E. [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jan-feb/grinter.html ''Avoiding the Burden: The Carter Doctrine in Perspective''] Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (January-February 1983): 73-82. </ref>

The Shah did not participate in the Arab oil embargos of 1967 and  1973, recognized [[Israel]], provided oil for US and British Mediterranean Fleets, detereed Iraq under [[Sadam Hussein]] from playing a role in the [[Yom Kippur War]] when he moved troops to the Iraqi border and gave covert support to the [[Kurds]] in Iraq which tied diverted the Iraqi Army.

The Shah did not participate in the Arab oil embargos of 1967 and  1973, recognized [[Israel]], provided oil for US and British Mediterranean Fleets, deterred Iraq under [[Saddam Hussein]] from playing a role in the [[Yom Kippur War]] when he moved troops to the Iraqi border and gave covert support to the [[Kurds]] in Iraq which tied up the Iraqi Army.

In 1968 Great Britain announced withdrawal from "East of Suez" in 1968 and completed in 1971.  Iran under the Shah had taken [[Great Britain]]'s place as the military power that guaranteed stability in the [[Persian Gulf]].  Rather than replace the British presence “East of Suez” to secure shipping lanes with a direct American presence, the United States chose to rely on local powers, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia, to provide Persian Gulf security.  This "two-pillar policy" worked reasonably well until one of the pillar, Iran, collapsed in 1979.  The downfall of the Shah was a harbinger of stunningly ominous events.

In 1968 Great Britain announced withdrawal from "East of Suez" in 1968 and completed in 1971.  Iran under the Shah had taken [[Great Britain]]'s place as the military power that guaranteed stability in the [[Persian Gulf]].  Rather than replace the British presence “East of Suez” to secure shipping lanes with a direct American presence, the United States chose to rely on local powers, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia, to provide Persian Gulf security.  This "two-pillar policy" worked reasonably well until one of the pillar, Iran, collapsed in 1979.  The downfall of the Shah was a harbinger of stunningly ominous events.