Changes

'''Main ideas of von Clausewitz'''

'''Main ideas of von Clausewitz'''

Christopher Bassford - American scholar fascinated by the Prussian war philosopher - has elegantly summarized the importance of reading the actual text of von Clausewitz:

Christopher Bassford - American scholar fascinated by the Prussian war philosopher - has elegantly summarized the importance of reading the actual text of von Clausewitz:

''“Unfortunately, the annoying thing about von Clausewitz is that, in order to understand him, you actually have to read his book - rather than some convenient précis, written, most likely, by some wannabe-competitor, propagandist, special pleader, or historical hack writer. Even if it is honestly and competently done, any attempt to summarize von Clausewitz is inherently misleading. This is true in part because von Clausewitz's dialectical method is at least as important as any particular insight that he offers. But all of von Clausewitz's insights are woven together in a fascinating whole; efforts to extract particular "nuggets" are destructive to a genuine understanding.”'' [17]

''“Unfortunately, the annoying thing about von Clausewitz is that, in order to understand him, you actually have to read his book - rather than some convenient précis, written, most likely, by some wannabe-competitor, propagandist, special pleader, or historical hack writer. Even if it is honestly and competently done, any attempt to summarize von Clausewitz is inherently misleading. This is true in part because von Clausewitz's dialectical method is at least as important as any particular insight that he offers. But all of von Clausewitz's insights are woven together in a fascinating whole; efforts to extract particular "nuggets" are destructive to a genuine understanding.”'' [17]

Keeping the above in mind, and encouraging everybody to read and understand the original text “On war” the following selected principles will be discussed below:

Keeping the above in mind, and encouraging everybody to read and understand the original text “On war” the following selected principles will be discussed below:

• Dialectical method of presentation.  In addition to realistic approach Von Clausewitz employed basic dialectical method as a way of presenting his concepts. This method is based upon the introduction of two conflicting proposals - thesis and its anti-thesis - in order to achieve the synthesis [20]. Understanding of this methodology is crucial to properly interpret von Clausewitz’s work. Readers of “On War” who are unaware about the nature of dialectical method may easily misconstrue the meaning of this text.

 

•Dialectical method of presentation.  In addition to realistic approach Von Clausewitz employed basic dialectical method as a way of presenting his concepts. This method is based upon the introduction of two conflicting proposals - thesis and its anti-thesis - in order to achieve the synthesis [20]. Understanding of this methodology is crucial to properly interpret von Clausewitz’s work. Readers of “On War” who are unaware about the nature of dialectical method may easily misconstrue the meaning of this text.

• “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means." [21]. This is one of the most frequently quoted and misquoted arguments of Von Clausewitz. When taken out of context and without understanding of von Clausewitz’s dialectical method - it may be misinterpreted as a vicious advocacy for engaging in military conflicts. It is no so, however. The above quote is not a promotional phrase; it is neither a statement of the facts. In his point #24 of the Chapter One entitled “What Is War” von Clausewitz wrote: “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses.” [21] The above phrase is the dialectical antithesis to the presented before thesis that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." Introduction of those two opposing notions leads ultimately to dialectical synthesis. In the Clausevitz’s synthesis, deficiencies of both those extreme statements are elegantly resolved in one unifying conclusion. This conclusion states that war is neither only an act of brute force nor purely rational political act [17]. Von Clausewitz formulated his synthesis as the “fascinating trinity of war” which is discussed below.

•“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means." [21]. This is one of the most frequently quoted and misquoted arguments of Von Clausewitz. When taken out of context and without understanding of von Clausewitz’s dialectical method - it may be misinterpreted as a vicious advocacy for engaging in military conflicts. It is no so, however. The above quote is not a promotional phrase; it is neither a statement of the facts. In his point #24 of the Chapter One entitled “What Is War” von Clausewitz wrote: “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses.” [21] The above phrase is the dialectical antithesis to the presented before thesis that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." Introduction of those two opposing notions leads ultimately to dialectical synthesis. In the Clausevitz’s synthesis, deficiencies of both those extreme statements are elegantly resolved in one unifying conclusion. This conclusion states that war is neither only an act of brute force nor purely rational political act [17]. Von Clausewitz formulated his synthesis as the “fascinating trinity of war” which is discussed below.

• Fascinating Trinity of War. Literary in German wunderliche dreifaltigkeit - where word wunderliche is used to denote “fascinating” rather  than “wonderful” character of the trinity. As discussed above fascinating trinity was a dialectical synthesis of the nature of war. Von Clausewitz defined this fascinating trinity as dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation [17].  “Trinity of War” is sometimes misinterpreted as notion that a war is simply a triumvirate of people, military and government. This is however oversimplification of the actual point made by von Clausewitz [22]. Let us examine his original text:

•Fascinating Trinity of War. Literary in German wunderliche dreifaltigkeit - where word wunderliche is used to denote “fascinating” rather  than “wonderful” character of the trinity. As discussed above fascinating trinity was a dialectical synthesis of the nature of war. Von Clausewitz defined this fascinating trinity as dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation [17].  “Trinity of War” is sometimes misinterpreted as notion that a war is simply a triumvirate of people, military and government. This is however oversimplification of the actual point made by von Clausewitz [22]. Let us examine his original text:

o Von Clausewitz wrote: “War is (…) a wonderful trinity, composed of;

Von Clausewitz wrote: ''“War is (…) a wonderful trinity, composed of;

 of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct;  

- of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct;  

 of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and  

- of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and  

 of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.  

- of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.  

o The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second more the general and his army; the third more the Government. “ [21]

The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second more the general and his army; the third more the Government. “'' [21]

• Center of gravity.  Von Clausewitz introduced a concept of a “center of gravity” to illustrate his points about prioritization of choices in selection of military objectives. This concept became one of the most crucial elements of a current American war doctrine. It is considered to be a cornerstone of an American operational art; and it occupies a common place in a vocabulary of American military strategists [23]. Von Clausewitz’s definition of a “center of gravity” follows principles of Mechanics in the context of his metaphor comparing a war to a wrestling match. In Mechanics, center of gravity represents a point where forces of gravity converge within an object. Striking at the object’s center of gravity with sufficient force will cause the object to lose its balance and fall. In von Clausewitz’s wrestling metaphor center of gravity is a factor of balance of the wrestling opponent, rather than his source of strength. If one knows his opponent’s center of gravity, one can defeat his enemy faster and with less force by concentrating one’s decisive blow on the opponent’s center of gravity.

•Center of gravity.  Von Clausewitz introduced a concept of a “center of gravity” to illustrate his points about prioritization of choices in selection of military objectives. This concept became one of the most crucial elements of a current American war doctrine. It is considered to be a cornerstone of an American operational art; and it occupies a common place in a vocabulary of American military strategists [23]. Von Clausewitz’s definition of a “center of gravity” follows principles of Mechanics in the context of his metaphor comparing a war to a wrestling match. In Mechanics, center of gravity represents a point where forces of gravity converge within an object. Striking at the object’s center of gravity with sufficient force will cause the object to lose its balance and fall. In von Clausewitz’s wrestling metaphor center of gravity is a factor of balance of the wrestling opponent, rather than his source of strength. If one knows his opponent’s center of gravity, one can defeat his enemy faster and with less force by concentrating one’s decisive blow on the opponent’s center of gravity.

• Fog of war. While discussing peculiarities of war von Clausewitz pointed out the uncertainty of all data as one of major peculiarities of combat in progress. He wrote:  “(…) the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must discover, or must be left to chance.” [21] The fog of war is a very important concept with applications beyond a wartime battlefield. In fact, it applies to all adversarial actions such as business competition, lawsuits, etc. A party to the adversarial process has to act upon more or less uncertain data about an opponent. Even in the discovery process of a legal action there will be instances when access to critical information may be blocked despite an underlying legal theory. Such a party should also understand that opponent’s actions may be based upon erroneous data. The possibilities of misjudging a true nature and capabilities of one’s adversary due to the war fog phenomenon are endless.  

•Fog of war. While discussing peculiarities of war von Clausewitz pointed out the uncertainty of all data as one of major peculiarities of combat in progress. He wrote:  “(…) the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must discover, or must be left to chance.” [21] The fog of war is a very important concept with applications beyond a wartime battlefield. In fact, it applies to all adversarial actions such as business competition, lawsuits, etc. A party to the adversarial process has to act upon more or less uncertain data about an opponent. Even in the discovery process of a legal action there will be instances when access to critical information may be blocked despite an underlying legal theory. Such a party should also understand that opponent’s actions may be based upon erroneous data. The possibilities of misjudging a true nature and capabilities of one’s adversary due to the war fog phenomenon are endless.  

• Attack versus defense. The von Clausewitz’s opinion about the asymmetry of offense and defense has been vulgarized in the attributed to him saying that “the attack is the best form of the defense”. In reality von Clausewitz wrote: "if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows. (…) Thus a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles (…) The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows." [21] Contrary to conventional wisdom von Clausewitz simply considered the defense as the easiest (and therefore - not necessary - most proper) form of waging a war. He stated: “The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, defense is easier than attack. But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest (…) If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object." [21]

•Attack versus defense. The von Clausewitz’s opinion about the asymmetry of offense and defense has been vulgarized in the attributed to him saying that “the attack is the best form of the defense”. In reality von Clausewitz wrote: "if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows. (…) Thus a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles (…) The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows." [21] Contrary to conventional wisdom von Clausewitz simply considered the defense as the easiest (and therefore - not necessary - most proper) form of waging a war. He stated: “The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, defense is easier than attack. But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest (…) If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object." [21]

Conclusion

'''Conclusion'''

 

Carl von Clausevitz was a Prussian patriot, professional soldier, military educator and erudite doctrine writer. The importance of his major work “On War” goes beyond description of the intricacies of the military conflict. This stellar work provides a solid framework for understanding the nature of life itself – which is based upon ever-lasting and never predicable struggle.

Carl von Clausevitz was a Prussian patriot, professional soldier, military educator and erudite doctrine writer. The importance of his major work “On War” goes beyond description of the intricacies of the military conflict. This stellar work provides a solid framework for understanding the nature of life itself – which is based upon ever-lasting and never predicable struggle.

1. Blaschke, R., Carl von Clausewitz, der soldat und kriegsphilosoph. 1936, Leipzig,: P. Reclam jun. 78 p.

1. Blaschke, R., Carl von Clausewitz, der soldat und kriegsphilosoph. 1936, Leipzig,: P. Reclam jun. 78 p.

2. Aron, R., Clausewitz, philosopher of war. 1st Touchstone ed. 1986, New York: Simon & Schuster. xi, 418 p.

2. Aron, R., Clausewitz, philosopher of war. 1st Touchstone ed. 1986, New York: Simon & Schuster. xi, 418 p.

3. Heyck, H., Clausewitz; ein Lebens- und Zeitbild. 1968, Leoni am Starnberger See,: Druffel-Verlag. 976 p.

3. Heyck, H., Clausewitz; ein Lebens- und Zeitbild. 1968, Leoni am Starnberger See,: Druffel-Verlag. 976 p.

4. Parkinson, R., Clausewitz : a biography. 1st Cooper Square Press ed. 2002, New York: Cooper Square Press. 352 p.

4. Parkinson, R., Clausewitz : a biography. 1st Cooper Square Press ed. 2002, New York: Cooper Square Press. 352 p.

5. Hahlweg, W., Carl von Clausewitz. 1957, Göttingen,: Musterschmidt-Verlag. 111 p.

5. Hahlweg, W., Carl von Clausewitz. 1957, Göttingen,: Musterschmidt-Verlag. 111 p.

6. Scholtz, G., et al., Carl von Clausewitz : Bildnis eines deutschen Soldaten. 1936, Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag. 143, [1] p.

6. Scholtz, G., et al., Carl von Clausewitz : Bildnis eines deutschen Soldaten. 1936, Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag. 143, [1] p.

7. Schössler, D., Carl von Clausewitz : mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Rowohlts Monographien ;. 1991, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 160 p.

7. Schössler, D., Carl von Clausewitz : mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Rowohlts Monographien ;. 1991, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 160 p.

8. Rose, O., Carl von Clausewitz : Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes in Russland. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte ;. 1995, München: R. Oldenbourg. vi, 275 p.

8. Rose, O., Carl von Clausewitz : Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes in Russland. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte ;. 1995, München: R. Oldenbourg. vi, 275 p.

9. Clausewitz, K.v. and W.M. Schering, Carl von Clausewitz: Geist und Tat. 1941, Stuttgart,: A. Kröner. xxxv, 382 p.

9. Clausewitz, K.v. and W.M. Schering, Carl von Clausewitz: Geist und Tat. 1941, Stuttgart,: A. Kröner. xxxv, 382 p.

10. Blaschke, R. and C.v. Clausewitz, Carl von Clausewitz, ein Leben im Kampf. 1934, Berlin,: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 313 p.

10. Blaschke, R. and C.v. Clausewitz, Carl von Clausewitz, ein Leben im Kampf. 1934, Berlin,: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 313 p.

11. Förster, G., Carl von Clausewitz : Lebensbild eines patriotischen Militärs und fortschrittlichen Militärtheoretikers. 1. Aufl. ed. Militärgeschichtliche Skizzen. 1983, Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 55 p.

11. Förster, G., Carl von Clausewitz : Lebensbild eines patriotischen Militärs und fortschrittlichen Militärtheoretikers. 1. Aufl. ed. Militärgeschichtliche Skizzen. 1983, Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 55 p.

12. Clausewitz, C.v., Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung. 1832, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 10 v.

12. Clausewitz, C.v., Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung. 1832, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 10 v.

13. Clausewitz, K.v., Vom kriege. 1832, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 3 v. in 1.

13. Clausewitz, K.v., Vom kriege. 1832, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 3 v. in 1.

14. Clausewitz, K.v., Der feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. 2. aufl. ed. 1862, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. vi, 194 p.

14. Clausewitz, K.v., Der feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. 2. aufl. ed. 1862, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. vi, 194 p.

15. Schwartz, K., Leben des generals Carl von Clausewitz und der frau Marie von Clausewitz geb. gräfin von Brühl. 1878, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 2 v.

15. Schwartz, K., Leben des generals Carl von Clausewitz und der frau Marie von Clausewitz geb. gräfin von Brühl. 1878, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 2 v.

16. Alberts, D.S., et al., Complexity, global politics, and national security. 1997, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. xvi, 381 p.

16. Alberts, D.S., et al., Complexity, global politics, and national security. 1997, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. xvi, 381 p.

17. Bassford, C., Clausewitz Homepage. www.clausewitz.com, 2006.

17. Bassford, C., Clausewitz Homepage. www.clausewitz.com, 2006.

18. Buschmann, K., Motivation und Menschenführung bei Carl von Clausewitz. 1980, [Bonn]: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte I 4. 48 p.

18. Buschmann, K., Motivation und Menschenführung bei Carl von Clausewitz. 1980, [Bonn]: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte I 4. 48 p.

19. Howard, M.E., Clausewitz : a very short introduction. Very short introductions ;. 2002, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 84 p.

19. Howard, M.E., Clausewitz : a very short introduction. Very short introductions ;. 2002, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 84 p.

20. Young, W., Hegel's dialectical method : its origins and religious significance. 1972, [Nutley, N.J.]: Craig Press. vii, 135 p.

20. Young, W., Hegel's dialectical method : its origins and religious significance. 1972, [Nutley, N.J.]: Craig Press. vii, 135 p.

21. Clausewitz, C.v. and J.J. Graham, On war. 1873, London,: N. Trübner & Co. 3 v. in 1.

21. Clausewitz, C.v. and J.J. Graham, On war. 1873, London,: N. Trübner & Co. 3 v. in 1.

22. Villacres E.J. and Bassford C., Reclaiming The Clausewitzian Trinity Parameters. The journal of the U.S. Army War College., 1995.

22. Villacres E.J. and Bassford C., Reclaiming The Clausewitzian Trinity Parameters. The journal of the U.S. Army War College., 1995.

23. Echevarria, A.J., Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again! Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph., 2002.

23. Echevarria, A.J., Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again! Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph., 2002.