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As an honest and deeply patriotic man von Clausewitz profoundly resented French political and cultural domination of Prussia [1], [3], [6]. His dissatisfaction with French influences culminated in the year 1812, when he defiantly refused to collaborate with France. Given no other option he left Prussia to serve in the Russian Army in accordance with the principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." However, before this forced exile von Clausewitz left the manuscript of his first major work "Principles of War" with the Prussian Crown Prince as a tutorial [1], [3]. Von Clausewitz fought bravely through the Russian Campaign. He played instrumental role in orchestrating defection of troops led by Prussian Field Marshal Hans Yorck von Wartenburg from loyal to Napoleon Prussian Army [8]. This was a turning point in the history of Prussia, which ultimately paved a road to massive insurgency against Napoleon. Subsequently, von Clausewitz became Russian liaison officer with the headquarters of Field Marshal Blücher, and ultimately was appointed chief of staff of the German-Russian legion. In the year 1814 von Clausewitz was fully reinstated with all honors in the Prussian Army. A year later he fought in the bloody Waterloo campaign serving as a chief of staff to General von Thielmann's III Prussian Army Corps [1], [3], [9]. His personal participation in the famous Battles of Ligny and Wavre had a deep influence on von Clausewitz's understanding of the strategic Arcanum [10].  In both those battles Prussian Army was greatly outnumbered and overwhelmed by French forces, and was eventually forced into the retreat. Nevertheless, those battles were hollow victories for French and major strategic victories for Prussians. Prussian Army was able to engage French forces long enough to prevent their entry into the Waterloo battlefield. This ultimately resulted in Napoleon’s defeat.

As an honest and deeply patriotic man von Clausewitz profoundly resented French political and cultural domination of Prussia [1], [3], [6]. His dissatisfaction with French influences culminated in the year 1812, when he defiantly refused to collaborate with France. Given no other option he left Prussia to serve in the Russian Army in accordance with the principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." However, before this forced exile von Clausewitz left the manuscript of his first major work "Principles of War" with the Prussian Crown Prince as a tutorial [1], [3]. Von Clausewitz fought bravely through the Russian Campaign. He played instrumental role in orchestrating defection of troops led by Prussian Field Marshal Hans Yorck von Wartenburg from loyal to Napoleon Prussian Army [8]. This was a turning point in the history of Prussia, which ultimately paved a road to massive insurgency against Napoleon. Subsequently, von Clausewitz became Russian liaison officer with the headquarters of Field Marshal Blücher, and ultimately was appointed chief of staff of the German-Russian legion. In the year 1814 von Clausewitz was fully reinstated with all honors in the Prussian Army. A year later he fought in the bloody Waterloo campaign serving as a chief of staff to General von Thielmann's III Prussian Army Corps [1], [3], [9]. His personal participation in the famous Battles of Ligny and Wavre had a deep influence on von Clausewitz's understanding of the strategic Arcanum [10].  In both those battles Prussian Army was greatly outnumbered and overwhelmed by French forces, and was eventually forced into the retreat. Nevertheless, those battles were hollow victories for French and major strategic victories for Prussians. Prussian Army was able to engage French forces long enough to prevent their entry into the Waterloo battlefield. This ultimately resulted in Napoleon’s defeat.

After the war ended von Clausewitz served for two years on staff of the beloved by Prussians military hero General August von Gneisenau. In a year 1818 von Clausewitz was promoted to Major-General and appointed as a director of the War College in Berlin. He remained at this prestigious post until year 1830 spending his time on research, teaching and writing his scholarly treatises. In 1830 he has been appointed as a Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army. This promotion coincided with an impromptu mobilization of Prussian forces which were rushed to the eastern borders of the Prussian Kingdom. The hasty mobilization and sealing-off Prussian borders was done in an anticipation of possible outbreak of violence - related to a turbulent political situation in the Russian Empire. While staying with his troops von Clausevitz contracted cholera and died in the city of Breslau on November 16, 1831. He was buried in his native city of Burg. Von Clausewitz’s modest tomb has been guarded by the Honorary Military Guard of Kingdom of Prussia, Imperial Germany, Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and communist Eastern Germany [11]. It is now attended by the Honorary Guard of the Federal Army of the United Germany. This is a true testament to the greatness of the man – whose universal thoughts transcended short-lived political fashions and trends. Major works of von Clausewitz including "On War" were published after his death by his widow in Berlin from 1832 to 1837 [12], [13], [14], [15].  

After the war ended von Clausewitz served for two years on staff of the beloved by Prussians military hero General August von Gneisenau. In a year 1818 von Clausewitz was promoted to Major-General and appointed as a director of the War College in Berlin. He remained at this prestigious post until year 1830 spending his time on research, teaching and writing his scholarly treatises. In 1830 he has been appointed as a Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army. This promotion coincided with an impromptu mobilization of Prussian forces which were rushed to the eastern borders of the Prussian Kingdom. The hasty mobilization and sealing-off Prussian borders was done in an anticipation of possible outbreak of violence - related to a turbulent political situation in the Russian Empire. While staying with his troops von Clausewitz contracted cholera and died in the city of Breslau on November 16, 1831. He was buried in his native city of Burg. Von Clausewitz’s modest tomb has been guarded by the Honorary Military Guard of Kingdom of Prussia, Imperial Germany, Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and communist Eastern Germany [11]. It is now attended by the Honorary Guard of the Federal Army of the United Germany. This is a true testament to the greatness of the man – whose universal thoughts transcended short-lived political fashions and trends. Major works of von Clausewitz including "On War" were published after his death by his widow in Berlin from 1832 to 1837 [12], [13], [14], [15].  

• '''Dialectical method of presentation.'''  In addition to realistic approach Von Clausewitz employed basic dialectical method as a way of presenting his concepts. This method is based upon the introduction of two conflicting proposals - thesis and its anti-thesis - in order to achieve the synthesis [20]. Understanding of this methodology is crucial to properly interpret von Clausewitz’s work. Readers of "On War" who are unaware about the nature of dialectical method may easily misconstrue the meaning of this text.

• '''Dialectical method of presentation.'''  In addition to realistic approach Von Clausewitz employed basic dialectical method as a way of presenting his concepts. This method is based upon the introduction of two conflicting proposals - thesis and its anti-thesis - in order to achieve the synthesis [20]. Understanding of this methodology is crucial to properly interpret von Clausewitz’s work. Readers of "On War" who are unaware about the nature of dialectical method may easily misconstrue the meaning of this text.

• '''“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means."''' [21]. This is one of the most frequently quoted and misquoted arguments of Von Clausewitz. When taken out of context and without understanding of von Clausewitz's dialectical method - it may be misinterpreted as a vicious advocacy for engaging in military conflicts. It is no so, however. The above quote is not a promotional phrase; it is neither a statement of the facts. In his point #24 of the Chapter One entitled "What Is War" von Clausewitz wrote: "war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses." [21] The above phrase is the dialectical antithesis to the presented before thesis that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." Introduction of those two opposing notions leads ultimately to dialectical synthesis. In the Clausevitz’s synthesis, deficiencies of both those extreme statements are elegantly resolved in one unifying conclusion. This conclusion states that war is neither only an act of brute force nor purely rational political act [17]. Von Clausewitz formulated his synthesis as the "fascinating trinity of war" which is discussed below.

• '''"War is a mere continuation of policy by other means."''' [21]. This is one of the most frequently quoted and misquoted arguments of Von Clausewitz. When taken out of context and without understanding of von Clausewitz's dialectical method - it may be misinterpreted as a vicious advocacy for engaging in military conflicts. It is no so, however. The above quote is not a promotional phrase; it is neither a statement of the facts. In his point #24 of the Chapter One entitled "What Is War" von Clausewitz wrote: "war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses." [21] The above phrase is the dialectical antithesis to the presented before thesis that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." Introduction of those two opposing notions leads ultimately to dialectical synthesis. In the Clausewitz’s synthesis, deficiencies of both those extreme statements are elegantly resolved in one unifying conclusion. This conclusion states that war is neither only an act of brute force nor purely rational political act [17]. Von Clausewitz formulated his synthesis as the "fascinating trinity of war" which is discussed below.

• '''Fascinating Trinity of War.''' Literary in German wunderliche dreifaltigkeit - where word wunderliche is used to denote "fascinating" rather  than "wonderful" character of the trinity. As discussed above fascinating trinity was a dialectical synthesis of the nature of war. Von Clausewitz defined this fascinating trinity as dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation [17].  "Trinity of War" is sometimes misinterpreted as notion that a war is simply a triumvirate of people, military and government. This is however oversimplification of the actual point made by von Clausewitz [22]. Let us examine his original text:

• '''Fascinating Trinity of War.''' Literary in German wunderliche dreifaltigkeit - where word wunderliche is used to denote "fascinating" rather  than "wonderful" character of the trinity. As discussed above fascinating trinity was a dialectical synthesis of the nature of war. Von Clausewitz defined this fascinating trinity as dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation [17].  "Trinity of War" is sometimes misinterpreted as notion that a war is simply a triumvirate of people, military and government. This is however oversimplification of the actual point made by von Clausewitz [22]. Let us examine his original text: