Changes

Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853 [PDF 19]). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10 [PDF 15-16])</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref>

Hiss served as [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no4/alger_hiss.html aide to] Stettinius, who was considered in some quarters to be "not very bright," according to Ambassador Ellis Briggs.<ref>Ellis Briggs, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=2pflY3LYw88C Proud Public Servant: The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador]'' (Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0873385888, p. 197</ref> State Department [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/468607241.html?dids=468607241:468607241&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT chief of security and consular affairs] Samuel D. Boykin agreed that Stettinius "was not brilliant." But, he added, the Secretary had the ability to utilize [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004boy03) "other people's brains"]. Among those whose brains Stettinius had the ability to use was his [[#refFoote|aide]], the [[#refLindPump|brilliant]] Alger Hiss. According to [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/panuchja.htm J. Anthony Panuch], Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, "Hiss exercises [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/svengali Svengali]-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."<ref>Panuch to Russell, March 7, 1946 ([[#refSISS13|SISS pt. 13]]: 853 [PDF 19]). Cf. Louis Francis Budenz, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IkqboMAiCkkC The Techniques of Communism]'' (New York: Ayer Publishing, 1977) ISBN 0405099428, p. 287. Dean Acheson subsequently forced Panuch, not Hiss, out of the State Department. ([[#refSISS53|SISS 1953]]: 9-10 [PDF 15-16])</ref> Indeed, Stettinius gave Hiss control over [[FDR]]'s access to information, directing that "all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15."<ref>Rothwell to Rockefeller, January 10, 1945, [[#refFRUS45|FRUS 1945]]: [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=42&isize=XL 42], cf. [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1945&page=441&isize=XL p. 441]</ref>

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703580904574638352930354872.html withered and diminished] Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> “The President seemed placid and frail,” wrote [[Winston Churchill]]. “I felt that he had a slender contact with life.”<ref>Sir Winston Churchill, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M_6cljKX0uUC Triumph and Tragedy]'' (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986) ISBN 0395410606, p. 348</ref> "Winston is puzzled and distressed," noted Churchill's physician. "The President no longer seems to the P.M. to take an intelligent interest in the war; often he does not seem even to read the papers the P.M. gives him.<ref>This may have been due to FDR's "inability to follow the text," perhaps due to "a dysfunction in the right posterior portion of the brain." Claude R. Marx, "[http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2010/01/02/a_journalist_and_neurologist_examine_fdrs_deadly_secret/ A Second Opinion on FDR’s Condition]," ''Boston Globe'', January 2, 2010. Cf. Steven Lomazow and Eric Fettmann, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=usRaPgAACAAJ FDR's Deadly Secret]'' (PublicAffairs, 2010) ISBN 1586487442</ref> Sometimes it appears as if he has no thought-out recipe for anything beyond his troubles with Congress." He commented:

[[image:Yaltaconference.JPG|thumb|300px|right|At Yalta, a [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703580904574638352930354872.html withered and diminished] Roosevelt flanked by Stettinius (left) and Hiss (right); Churchill (foreground right, three-quarters back view); Stalin in shadows (far left). ''Courtesy [http://www.un.org/UN50/Photos/un50-016.gif United Nations Department of Public Information]'']]With less than three months to live, Roosevelt suffered "occa­sional blackouts of memory, and loss of capacity for mental concen­tration." According to one source, "At Yalta [Roosevelt] could neither think consecutively nor express himself coherently."<ref>William Henry Chamberlin, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=JGQhAAAAMAAJ&pgis=1 America's Second Crusade]'' (Regnery, 1950) ASIN 0865977070, p. 206. Cf. Rose McDermott, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=N_G-wELa3xYC Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008) ISBN 0521882729, pp. 96-110; Bert Edward Park, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=hSnUtD0-nWIC Ailing, Aging, Addicted: Studies of Compromised Leadership]'' (University Press of Kentucky, 1993) ISBN 0813118530, pp. 200, 207</ref> “The President seemed placid and frail,” wrote [[Winston Churchill]]. “I felt that he had a slender contact with life.”<ref>Sir Winston Churchill, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=M_6cljKX0uUC Triumph and Tragedy]'' (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986) ISBN 0395410606, p. 348</ref> "Winston is puzzled and distressed," noted Churchill's physician. "The President no longer seems to the P.M. to take an intelligent interest in the war; often he does not seem even to read the papers the P.M. gives him.<ref>This may have been due to FDR's "inability to follow the text," perhaps due to "a dysfunction in the right posterior portion of the brain." Claude R. Marx, "[http://www.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2010/01/02/a_journalist_and_neurologist_examine_fdrs_deadly_secret/ A Second Opinion on FDR’s Condition]," ''Boston Globe'', January 2, 2010. Cf. Steven Lomazow and Eric Fettmann, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=usRaPgAACAAJ FDR's Deadly Secret]'' (PublicAffairs, 2010) ISBN 1586487442</ref> Sometimes it appears as if he has no thought-out recipe for anything beyond his troubles with Congress." He commented:

{{cquote|To a doctor's eye, the president appears a sick man. He has all the symptoms of hardening of the arteries of the brain in an advanced stage, so that I give him only a few months to live. But men shut their eyes when they do not want to see, and the Americans here cannot bring themselves to believe that he is finished. His daughter thinks he is not really ill, and his doctor backs her up.<ref>[[#refWilson2002|Wilson 2002]]: 276-277</ref>}}

{{cquote|To a doctor's eye, the president appears a sick man. He has all the symptoms of hardening of the arteries of the brain in an advanced stage, so that I give him only a few months to live. But men shut their eyes when they do not want to see, and the Americans here cannot bring themselves to believe that he is finished. His daughter thinks he is not really ill, and his doctor backs her up.<ref>[[#refWilson2002|Wilson 2002]]: 276-277</ref>}}

Privately, Roosevelt's cardiologist was more candid: At the conference, Roosevelt “was obviously greatly fatigued,” he noted. “His color was very poor (gray).”<ref>Edward Shorter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3scUP7B_R7kC Doctors and Their Patients: A Social History]'', 3rd Ed. (Transaction Publishers, 1991) ISBN 088738871X, p. 100</ref> Dr. Roger Lee, then president of the American Medical Association, wrote during Yalta that Roosevelt “was irascible and became very irritable if he had to concentrate his mind for long. If anything was brought up that wanted thinking out he would change the subject.”<ref>[[#refWilson2002|Wilson 2002]]: 276</ref>

Privately, Roosevelt's cardiologist was more candid: At the conference, Roosevelt “was obviously greatly fatigued,” he noted. “His color was very poor (gray).”<ref>Edward Shorter, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=3scUP7B_R7kC Doctors and Their Patients: A Social History]'', 3rd Ed. (Transaction Publishers, 1991) ISBN 088738871X, p. 100</ref> Dr. Roger Lee, then president of the American Medical Association, wrote during Yalta that Roosevelt “was irascible and became very irritable if he had to concentrate his mind for long. If anything was brought up that wanted thinking out he would change the subject.”<ref>[[#refWilson2002|Wilson 2002]]: 276</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest, alleging the existence of a "[http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/service/chinahands.php Communist conspiracy] within the [State] Department." Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

Ultimately, [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] made a secret agreement with [[Stalin]] ([[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] was [http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/the-conferences.html#Argonaut2 not informed]), giving [[Moscow]] rights to the main Manchurian railroad and territory in northern China.<ref>Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=XjW49VTRhxQC The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals]'' (Stanford University Press, 2007) ISBN 0804754276, p. 156</ref> U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley resigned in protest, alleging the existence of a "[http://www.usdiplomacy.org/history/service/chinahands.php Communist conspiracy] within the [State] Department." Hiss would later deny under oath any role in China policy at Yalta, or in the subsequent State Department proclamation calling for "peace and unity with the Communists in China," saying "It was not in my area of activity at all." Hiss admitted that he "had been connected with far eastern affairs before," but protested that after "about February 1944, [a year before he "stressed the importance" of unity with the Communists] I was assigned to United Nations work and specialized entirely in that field thereafter."<ref>[[#refHUAC48|HUAC 1948]]: 657 (PDF 167)</ref>

The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly]. On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes," write [http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Robert Louis Benson] and [[#refBenson95|Cecil Phillips]], "through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: 13</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

The Soviets bugged the U.S. quarters, and [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FDR_Teheran_12.htm listened avidly].<ref>At Teheran, Roosevelt actually chose to stay in the Soviet embassy, because it had [[#refBlack06|larger quarters]].</ref> On [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php?action=chrono February 4, 1945], Hiss accompanied [[FDR]] to his meeting with [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] and [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]]. "The Russians came to the table with ample knowledge of our purposes and attitudes," write [http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/SYMP_2009_agenda.pdf Robert Louis Benson] and [[#refBenson95|Cecil Phillips]], "through information provided to them by traitors whose deeds ultimately were revealed in [[Venona project|Venona]]."<ref>[[#refBP95|Benson, Phillips 1995]]: 13</ref> According to Sudoplatov, "One of the officials [at Yalta] we had established confidential relations with was Alger Hiss," who was "highly sympathetic to the interests of the Soviet Union."<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref> According to confidential [[GRU]] sources, during the conference, Hiss gave daily briefings to Stalin's military adviser, General Mikhail Abramovich Milshtein (deputy director of the GRU), revealing not only the American negotiating strategy but insights into the attitudes of the American negotiators.<ref>[[#refSchecter02|Schecter 2002]]: 130</ref> Sudoplatov added:

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

{{cquote|In conversation, Hiss disclosed to [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,851866,00.html Oumansky], and then Litvinov,<ref>Hugh D. Phillips, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=qjWPAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov]'' (New York: Westview Press, 1992) ISBN 0813310385</ref> official U.S. attitudes and plans; he was also very close to our sources who were cooperating with Soviet intelligence and to our active intelligence operators in the United States. Within this framework of exchange of confidential information were references to Hiss as the source who told us the Americans were prepared to make a deal in Europe.<ref>[[#refSudoplatov95|Sudoplatov 1995]]: 227</ref>}}

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>

When [[Franklin Roosevelt|Roosevelt]] asked the [[Secretary of State]] "to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement," wrote Stettinius, "I called Alger Hiss."<ref>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=IjhQ_gsiCzwC Roosevelt and the Russians]'' (Whitefish, Mont.: Kettinger Publishing, 2005) ISBN 1419103105, p. 270</ref> The U.S. ended up ceding eastern Poland to the Soviet Union,<ref>[[#refDallas05|Dallas 2005]]: 557</ref> [http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9140-17.cfm essentially ratifying] what Eden called [[#refBlack06|the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line]], the deal [[Stalin]] had made with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the "[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E8A8-96B6-175C-955B60FB1DA40BCC&sort=Coverage&item=Soviet%20Union secret protocols]" of the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]]. It was agreed to keep these plans [[#refBlack06|entirely secret]]. U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane resigned in protest, writing, "As I glanced over [[#refYalta45|the document]], I could not believe my eyes: To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."<ref>Arthur Bliss Lane, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=SzQrAAAAIAAJ&pgis=1 I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People]'' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948) ASIN B000NWTIF8, p. 56. When Truman became President and saw the secret codicils, he was "amazed the Polish agreement 'wasn't more clear cut'." Wilson D. Miscamble, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=QWc58mXB5uUC From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War]'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007) ISBN 0521862442, p. 112</ref>