Changes

At the [[Yalta conference]] in February 1945, victory was in sight in Europe. A [[reparations]] commission was set up to help repay Russia from German assets.  Everyone realized that the conquest of eastern Europe by the Red Army guaranteed Soviet dominance, but efforts were made to get promises of fair elections; the promises were made, but the elections were never held.  Roosevelt, despite his failing health, seemed to think that he and Stalin would personally iron out any difficulties after the war ended.  FDR persuaded Stalin to promise to enter the war against Japan 90 days after Germany surrendered;  Stalin did so.  

At the [[Yalta conference]] in February 1945, victory was in sight in Europe. A [[reparations]] commission was set up to help repay Russia from German assets.  Everyone realized that the conquest of eastern Europe by the Red Army guaranteed Soviet dominance, but efforts were made to get promises of fair elections; the promises were made, but the elections were never held.  Roosevelt, despite his failing health, seemed to think that he and Stalin would personally iron out any difficulties after the war ended.  FDR persuaded Stalin to promise to enter the war against Japan 90 days after Germany surrendered;  Stalin did so.  

==Failure of "competitive administration" ==

==Failure of "competitive administration" ==

Roosevelt used a "competitive administration" strategy to maximize presidential power at the cost of confusion, delay and inefficiency. He made sure in each policy area that several top officials had overlapping jurisdictions. They would feud and have to bring the problem to FDR, who wanted to make every final decision.  For example, in the case of the [[PWA]] relief program, the competition over the size of expenditure, the selection of the administrator, and the appointment of staff at the state level, led to delays and to the ultimate weakness of PWA as a recovery instrument. [[Harold L. Ickes]] headed the PWA (as well as the Interior Department), and FDR set it up so that Ickes had to continuously fight other top adminsitrators like [[Lewis Douglas]] (the budgest director), [[Henry A. Wallace]] (Secretary of Agriculture)  and [[Harry Hopkins]] (head of rival relief efforts). The rivalries were just as fierce for other top adminstrators, many of whom resigned in frustration and (like [[Hugh Johnson]] and [[Raymond Moley]]) even became enemies of Roosevelt.<ref> [{Dean Acheson]]  and [[Lewis Douglas]] also resigned in anger but kept quiet, allowing FDR to bring them back during the war.  The vocal ones were entered on an enemy's list and permanently barred from serving the nation.</ref>

Roosevelt used a "competitive administration" strategy to maximize presidential power at the cost of confusion, delay and inefficiency. He made sure in each policy area that several top officials had overlapping jurisdictions. They would feud and have to bring the problem to FDR, who wanted to make every final decision.  For example, in the case of the [[PWA]] relief program, the competition over the size of expenditure, the selection of the administrator, and the appointment of staff at the state level, led to delays and to the ultimate weakness of PWA as a recovery instrument. [[Harold L. Ickes]] headed the PWA (as well as the Interior Department), and FDR set it up so that Ickes had to continuously fight other top adminsitrators like [[Lewis Douglas]] (the budgest director), [[Henry A. Wallace]] (Secretary of Agriculture)  and [[Harry Hopkins]] (head of rival relief efforts). The rivalries were just as fierce for other top adminstrators, many of whom resigned in frustration and (like [[Hugh Johnson]] and [[Raymond Moley]]) even became enemies of Roosevelt.<ref> [[Dean Acheson]]  and [[Lewis Douglas]] also resigned in anger but kept quiet, allowing FDR to bring them back during the war.  The vocal ones were entered on an enemy's list and permanently barred from serving the nation.</ref>

Roosevelt kept up his divisive strategy during the war, causing enormous confusion and contradictions in economic mobilization.  It got so bad that FDR had to publicly humiliate Vice President Wallace and relieve him of all responsiblities. The Navy found a solution, as Admiral [[Ernest King]] deliberately kept FDR in the dark.  Even when his fleet was threatened by the Japanese at Midway in May 1942, and King urgently needed the help of the British Navy, he decided not to ask because the request for help would have to go through Roosevelt and King refused to allow the White House to learn what dire peril the nation faced.  Lucky for King--very lucky--he won a terrific victory at Midway.

Roosevelt kept up his divisive strategy during the war, causing enormous confusion and contradictions in economic mobilization.  It got so bad that FDR had to publicly humiliate Vice President Wallace and relieve him of all responsiblities. The Navy found a solution, as Admiral [[Ernest King]] deliberately kept FDR in the dark.  Even when his fleet was threatened by the Japanese at Midway in May 1942, and King urgently needed the help of the British Navy, he decided not to ask because the request for help would have to go through Roosevelt and King refused to allow the White House to learn what dire peril the nation faced.  Lucky for King--very lucky--he won a terrific victory at Midway.