'''42 U.S.C. § 1983''', popularly known as "'''Section 1983'''," is a [[federal]] [[law]] that allows [[lawsuit]]s for violations of [[constitutional]] rights.
Section 1983 establishes a cause of action for any person who has been deprived of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the [[United States ]] by a person acting under color of state law. A [[plaintiff]] must prove that (1) the conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) that as a result of this conduct plaintiff was deprived of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
The first requirement is known as the [[state action]] requirement. Plaintiff must prove that conduct was "fairly attributable to the state," and attribution is limited because it "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial powers." ''Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.'', 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
A cause of action under Section 1983 requires four elements:
<br><br>1. # conduct by a "person"<br><br>2. # who acted under "color of law"<br><br>3. # and proximately caused<br><br>4. # a deprivation of federally protected rights.
== Defenses ==
* ''Committee of United States Citizens v. Reagan'', 859 F.2d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Because the fact of a state law violation does not resolve whether a plaintiff has been deprived of due process, the manner in which the violation occurs as well as its consequences are crucial factors to be considered.")
== History == The [[Warren Court]] reinterpreted §1983 in ''Monroe v. Pape'' (1961),<ref>https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/39</ref> which opened a floodgate to these case. Previously courts honored the plain text of §1983 as requiring proof that the official acted under color of law -- in other words, that he was acting to enforce a state law -- and the officer was being sued for actions that were entirely legal under state law such that the officer was immune to a lawsuit under state law. Before 1961, a §1983 plaintiff had to prove that the law itself was unconstitutional. You could not sue a state employee under §1983 for negligence, tortious acts, or anything that violated state law; such suits could only be brought in state courts. States, however, could not be sued because of sovereign immunity and the [[Eleventh Amendment]]. The impact of ''Monroe v. Pape'' was to redefine under "color of law" to mean merely state action, not state law. Every state and local officer is clothed with some degree of authority and engages in state action, so any state officer can be sued, even for actions that were illegal under state law as well as the U.S. Constitution. A massive flood in federal lawsuits against state and local officials resulted, and the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] began to recognize the defense of [[qualified immunity]] to dismiss most of these cases, beginning with ''Pierson v. Ray'' (1967). The next revolution in §1983 was ''Monell v. Dept. of Social Services'' (1978), a lawsuit against an agency of New York City. There the Court held, for the first time, that cities and other state-created corporations do not share the sovereign immunity of the state itself, but rather, are persons who can be sued under §1983 -- provided the plaintiff can show that his injury was caused by an ordinance, regulation, decision, policy, practice, or custom of that entity. In a lawsuit based on alleged police brutality, if the policeman acted in line with the policy and practice of his department, and how he was trained to use force under the circumstances, then he has a defense of qualified immunity. The city for which he works for may be liable for a policy, practice, and training that results in unreasonable searches and seizures that violate the [[Fourth Amendment]]. ==References=={{Reflist}} [[Category:United States lawLaw]][[categoryCategory:United States Supreme Court Cases]][[categoryCategory:Section 1983]]