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Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831)

Also Known As: Carl Maria von Clausewitz, Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz, Karl von Clausewitz.

Carl von Clausewitz, a native of Prussia was a professional soldier, a master strategic theorist and a renowned military philosopher [1],[2] . He was both a valiant warrior and a brilliant intellectual. He belongs to the exclusive group of the very few extraordinary military thinkers - who have truly left the impression of their genius on the centuries to come. Even today he is unquestionably the most frequently quoted and the most revered strategist. Despite the fact that his major work was published over two centuries ago - it remains to be a very much modern treatise on military and general strategy. His major opus “On War” (original German title: “Vom Kriege”) has been translated into every major language, and it continues to have an impact on modern military, business and political strategists.

Von Clausewitz was a Prussian patriot - who had and continues to have tremendous influence on the American military and business schools of thoughts. “On War” is a required reading in all American military academies. It is also taught with an increasing frequency in civilian strategic studies and business programs in America and all over the world.

Brief Biography of Carl von Clausevitz.

Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 in Burg, Kingdom of Prussia [3]. He was born in a middle-class family [4]. Despite its quite humble origin his family had claims to noble origins which eventually have been officially recognized [5]. In the year 1792 as a 12 year old boy Carl von Clausewitz has entered Prussian army as a cadet in 34th Infantry Regiment. One year later, at a tender age of thirteen he participated in his first military campaign fighting against revolutionary French forces [6]. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant at age 15 when he stationed with his garrison at Neuruppin [4], [6]. In order to continue his military and general education he entered the Berlin War Academy at the age of 21. There he met his very influential mentor General Gerhard von Scharnhorst who at that time directed this military school. General von Scharnhorst became later a leader and a reformer of the Prussian Army and an important political figure in Prussia. In addition to being influenced by von Scharnhorst’s strategic theories, young von Clausewitz studied diligently history and philosophy – especially ideas of Immanuel Kant [7]. In year 1804 von Clausewitz graduated “summa cum laude” from the War Academy, and was appointed as a military assistant (aide-de-camp) to Prussian Prince August. In the same year he met his future wife - a prominent Berlin’s socialite Marie von Brühl [4], [6].

In 1806 he fought French invaders in the tragic Jena Campaign. He was captured by enemy forces after a defeat of the Prussian Army and spent two years as a prisoner of war in France and Switzerland. In year 1808 he was released by the French Army and came back to Prussia. After his return von Clausewitz was immediately appointed by his former mentor General von Scharnhorst as a military assistant to Prussian Army Chief of Staff. He worked with an exemplary dedication reorganizing and modernizing the Prussian Army. In year 1810, in recognition of his service he was appointed as a professor at the War Academy and assigned the prestigious task of military education of the Prussian Crown Prince [4], [5], [6]. Same year he married Marie von Brühl. Von Clausewitz spent the next two years advancing not only his military career but also advancing his scholarly studies, interacting with many prominent Berlin intellectuals.

As an honest and deeply patriotic man von Clausewitz profoundly resented French political and cultural domination of Prussia [1], [3], [6]. His dissatisfaction with French influences culminated in the year 1812, when he defiantly refused to collaborate with France. Given no other option he left Prussia to serve in the Russian Army in accordance with the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. However, before this forced exile von Clausevitz left the manuscript of his first major work “Principles of War” with the Prussian Crown Prince as a tutorial [1], [3]. Von Clausevitz fought bravely through the Russian Campaign. He played instrumental role in orchestrating defection of troops led by Prussian Field Marshal Hans Yorck von Wartenburg from loyal to Napoleon Prussian Army [8]. This was a turning point in the history of Prussia, which ultimately paved a road to massive insurgency against Napoleon. Subsequently, von Clausewitz became Russian liaison officer with the headquarters of Field Marshal Blücher, and ultimately was appointed chief of staff of the German-Russian legion. In the year 1814 von Clausewitz was fully reinstated with all honors in the Prussian Army. A year later he fought in the bloody Waterloo campaign serving as a chief of staff to General von Thielmann's III Prussian Army Corps [1], [3], [9]. His personal participation in the famous Battles of Ligny and Wavre had a deep influence on von Clausewitz’s understanding of the strategic Arcanum [10]. In both those battles Prussian Army was greatly outnumbered and overwhelmed by French forces, and was eventually forced into the retreat. Nevertheless, those battles were hollow victories for French and major strategic victories for Prussians. Prussian Army was able to engage French forces long enough to prevent their entry into the Waterloo battlefield. This ultimately resulted in Napoleon’s defeat.

After the war ended von Clausewitz served for two years on staff of the beloved by Prussians military hero General August von Gneisenau. In a year 1818 von Clausewitz was promoted to Major-General and appointed as a director of the War College in Berlin. He remained at this prestigious post until year 1830 spending his time on research, teaching and writing his scholarly treatises. In 1830 he has been appointed as a Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army. This promotion coincided with an impromptu mobilization of Prussian forces which were rushed to the eastern borders of the Prussian Kingdom. The hasty mobilization and sealing-off Prussian borders was done in an anticipation of possible outbreak of violence - related to a turbulent political situation in the Russian Empire. While staying with his troops von Clausevitz contracted cholera and died in the city of Breslau on November 16, 1831. He was buried in his native city of Burg. Von Clausewitz’s modest tomb has been guarded by the Honorary Military Guard of Kingdom of Prussia, Imperial Germany, Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and communist Eastern Germany [11]. It is now attended by the Honorary Guard of the Federal Army of the United Germany. This is a true testament to the greatness of the man – whose universal thoughts transcended short-lived political fashions and trends. Major works of von Clausewitz including “On War” were published after his death by his widow in Berlin from 1832 to 1837 [12], [13], [14], [15].

Importance of ideas of von Clausewitz.

Some historians due to their political bias describe ideas conceived by von Clausewitz as a direct product of the “Napoleonic era”. The objective scholar, however, has to question such a notion. One of the most amazing features of von Clausewitz’s philosophy was the ability to transcend his contemporary political and historical reality. This is the reason that his works were not forgotten, nor they are perceived as outmoded today. Von Clausewitz‘s most enlightening discovery was that one universal element unifying all existence is a constant and unpredictable struggle. This discovery was as brilliant, as it was simple. Von Clausewitz’ books were written in a specific political and historical setting, therefore, he had to use examples and analogies which would be understood by his contemporary readers. However, those analogies and examples were illustrating ideas and concepts of the most universal and fundamental nature.

There were countless attempts to summarize knowledge related to issues of human conflict in the form of studious treatise. A vast majority of those discourses became obsolete soon after they were written, and as such have been forgotten. There are, however, at least three books that have survived the passage of time. Those are Sun-tzu’s “The Art of War” (written probably 500 B.C.), Thucydides’: “The Peloponnesian War” (written about 400 B.C.), and von Clausevitz’s “On War” (published 1832 A.D.). Even among this distinct trio von Clausewitz’s masterpiece is easily distinguished by it universalistic and astonishingly modern character. Recently, some authors noticed many similarities between von Clauzewitz’s theses and modern theories of nonlinearity and complexity [16].

Von Clausewitz did not recommend any detailed strategic program nor did he advise any specific tactical solutions. He had a keen understanding that future readers of his books had to live in a world distinctively different from his own. Von Clausewitz knew this future world would be unpredictable for him due to unimaginable changes in technology, social structure and political status. Therefore, he has chosen to use a descriptive theoretical approach suitable for analysis of any conflict, at any time. A descriptive nature of his theory allows readers to develop their own strategic way of thinking, which may be practically applied to solve, strategic problems in virtually any environment [17], [18].

Von Clausewitz was by all means a modern scientist. Yet, his own discussion of war theory is not rigorously dry or pretentiously “mathematical”. In fact, he himself ridiculed the popular in the XIX century thesis that one can create a "science of war” or “science of all things” for that matter [17]. As an objective scientist he was way ahead of his times. In a contrast to his contemporaries he understood limitations of science and its inherent deficiencies.

Main ideas of von Clausewitz

Christopher Bassford - American scholar fascinated by the Prussian war philosopher - has elegantly summarized the importance of reading the actual text of von Clausewitz:

“Unfortunately, the annoying thing about von Clausewitz is that, in order to understand him, you actually have to read his book - rather than some convenient précis, written, most likely, by some wannabe-competitor, propagandist, special pleader, or historical hack writer. Even if it is honestly and competently done, any attempt to summarize von Clausewitz is inherently misleading. This is true in part because von Clausewitz's dialectical method is at least as important as any particular insight that he offers. But all of von Clausewitz's insights are woven together in a fascinating whole; efforts to extract particular "nuggets" are destructive to a genuine understanding.” [17] Keeping the above in mind, and encouraging everybody to read and understand the original text “On war” the following selected principles will be discussed below:

• Realistic approach. Von Clausewitz elected to use a realistic as opposed to idealistic approach in his analysis of war [17], [19]. His treatise is a pragmatic description of an intricate and volatile matrix of never-ending struggle. In a systematic but not overly pedantic way he provides an account of complex interactions between unquantifiable human psyche and harsh realities of physical world in the process of armed conflict.

• Dialectical method of presentation. In addition to realistic approach Von Clausewitz employed basic dialectical method as a way of presenting his concepts. This method is based upon the introduction of two conflicting proposals - thesis and its anti-thesis - in order to achieve the synthesis [20]. Understanding of this methodology is crucial to properly interpret von Clausewitz’s work. Readers of “On War” who are unaware about the nature of dialectical method may easily misconstrue the meaning of this text.

• “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means." [21]. This is one of the most frequently quoted and misquoted arguments of Von Clausewitz. When taken out of context and without understanding of von Clausewitz’s dialectical method - it may be misinterpreted as a vicious advocacy for engaging in military conflicts. It is no so, however. The above quote is not a promotional phrase; it is neither a statement of the facts. In his point #24 of the Chapter One entitled “What Is War” von Clausewitz wrote: “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses.” [21] The above phrase is the dialectical antithesis to the presented before thesis that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." Introduction of those two opposing notions leads ultimately to dialectical synthesis. In the Clausevitz’s synthesis, deficiencies of both those extreme statements are elegantly resolved in one unifying conclusion. This conclusion states that war is neither only an act of brute force nor purely rational political act [17]. Von Clausewitz formulated his synthesis as the “fascinating trinity of war” which is discussed below.

• Fascinating Trinity of War. Literary in German wunderliche dreifaltigkeit - where word wunderliche is used to denote “fascinating” rather than “wonderful” character of the trinity. As discussed above fascinating trinity was a dialectical synthesis of the nature of war. Von Clausewitz defined this fascinating trinity as dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation [17]. “Trinity of War” is sometimes misinterpreted as notion that a war is simply a triumvirate of people, military and government. This is however oversimplification of the actual point made by von Clausewitz [22]. Let us examine his original text: Von Clausewitz wrote: “War is (…) a wonderful trinity, composed of; - of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; - of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and - of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second more the general and his army; the third more the Government. “ [21]

• Center of gravity. Von Clausewitz introduced a concept of a “center of gravity” to illustrate his points about prioritization of choices in selection of military objectives. This concept became one of the most crucial elements of a current American war doctrine. It is considered to be a cornerstone of an American operational art; and it occupies a common place in a vocabulary of American military strategists [23]. Von Clausewitz’s definition of a “center of gravity” follows principles of Mechanics in the context of his metaphor comparing a war to a wrestling match. In Mechanics, center of gravity represents a point where forces of gravity converge within an object. Striking at the object’s center of gravity with sufficient force will cause the object to lose its balance and fall. In von Clausewitz’s wrestling metaphor center of gravity is a factor of balance of the wrestling opponent, rather than his source of strength. If one knows his opponent’s center of gravity, one can defeat his enemy faster and with less force by concentrating one’s decisive blow on the opponent’s center of gravity.

• Fog of war. While discussing peculiarities of war von Clausewitz pointed out the uncertainty of all data as one of major peculiarities of combat in progress. He wrote: “(…) the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must discover, or must be left to chance.” [21] The fog of war is a very important concept with applications beyond a wartime battlefield. In fact, it applies to all adversarial actions such as business competition, lawsuits, etc. A party to the adversarial process has to act upon more or less uncertain data about an opponent. Even in the discovery process of a legal action there will be instances when access to critical information may be blocked despite an underlying legal theory. Such a party should also understand that opponent’s actions may be based upon erroneous data. The possibilities of misjudging a true nature and capabilities of one’s adversary due to the war fog phenomenon are endless.

• Attack versus defense. The von Clausewitz’s opinion about the asymmetry of offense and defense has been vulgarized in the attributed to him saying that “the attack is the best form of the defense”. In reality von Clausewitz wrote: "if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows. (…) Thus a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles (…) The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows." [21] Contrary to conventional wisdom von Clausewitz simply considered the defense as the easiest (and therefore - not necessary - most proper) form of waging a war. He stated: “The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, defense is easier than attack. But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest (…) If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object." [21]

Conclusion

Carl von Clausevitz was a Prussian patriot, professional soldier, military educator and erudite doctrine writer. The importance of his major work “On War” goes beyond description of the intricacies of the military conflict. This stellar work provides a solid framework for understanding the nature of life itself – which is based upon ever-lasting and never predicable struggle.

References:

1. Blaschke, R., Carl von Clausewitz, der soldat und kriegsphilosoph. 1936, Leipzig,: P. Reclam jun. 78 p.

2. Aron, R., Clausewitz, philosopher of war. 1st Touchstone ed. 1986, New York: Simon & Schuster. xi, 418 p.

3. Heyck, H., Clausewitz; ein Lebens- und Zeitbild. 1968, Leoni am Starnberger See,: Druffel-Verlag. 976 p.

4. Parkinson, R., Clausewitz : a biography. 1st Cooper Square Press ed. 2002, New York: Cooper Square Press. 352 p.

5. Hahlweg, W., Carl von Clausewitz. 1957, Göttingen,: Musterschmidt-Verlag. 111 p.

6. Scholtz, G., et al., Carl von Clausewitz : Bildnis eines deutschen Soldaten. 1936, Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag. 143, [1] p.

7. Schössler, D., Carl von Clausewitz : mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Rowohlts Monographien ;. 1991, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 160 p.

8. Rose, O., Carl von Clausewitz : Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes in Russland. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte ;. 1995, München: R. Oldenbourg. vi, 275 p.

9. Clausewitz, K.v. and W.M. Schering, Carl von Clausewitz: Geist und Tat. 1941, Stuttgart,: A. Kröner. xxxv, 382 p.

10. Blaschke, R. and C.v. Clausewitz, Carl von Clausewitz, ein Leben im Kampf. 1934, Berlin,: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 313 p.

11. Förster, G., Carl von Clausewitz : Lebensbild eines patriotischen Militärs und fortschrittlichen Militärtheoretikers. 1. Aufl. ed. Militärgeschichtliche Skizzen. 1983, Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 55 p.

12. Clausewitz, C.v., Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung. 1832, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 10 v.

13. Clausewitz, K.v., Vom kriege. 1832, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 3 v. in 1.

14. Clausewitz, K.v., Der feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. 2. aufl. ed. 1862, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. vi, 194 p.

15. Schwartz, K., Leben des generals Carl von Clausewitz und der frau Marie von Clausewitz geb. gräfin von Brühl. 1878, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 2 v.

16. Alberts, D.S., et al., Complexity, global politics, and national security. 1997, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. xvi, 381 p.

17. Bassford, C., Clausewitz Homepage. www.clausewitz.com, 2006.

18. Buschmann, K., Motivation und Menschenführung bei Carl von Clausewitz. 1980, [Bonn]: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte I 4. 48 p.

19. Howard, M.E., Clausewitz : a very short introduction. Very short introductions ;. 2002, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 84 p.

20. Young, W., Hegel's dialectical method : its origins and religious significance. 1972, [Nutley, N.J.]: Craig Press. vii, 135 p.

21. Clausewitz, C.v. and J.J. Graham, On war. 1873, London,: N. Trübner & Co. 3 v. in 1.

22. Villacres E.J. and Bassford C., Reclaiming The Clausewitzian Trinity Parameters. The journal of the U.S. Army War College., 1995.

23. Echevarria, A.J., Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again! Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph., 2002.