== Relation to International Affairs: Nuclear Detente ==
<div style=float:right; padding: 20px">
{|style="border-collapse:collapse"
|
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!colspan=2 style="padding:10px"|''B''
|-
|
|
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|defect
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|cooperate
|-
!rowspan=2 style="padding:10px"|''A''
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|defect
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|A: +1
B: +1
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|A: +0
B: +5
|-
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|cooperate
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|A: +5
B: +0
|style="border-style:solid; border-width:1px; padding:10px"|A: +3
B: +3
|}
</div>
The Prisoner's Dilemma can be used to explain the awkward situation of exact nuclear parity. So long as a first-strike is possible, and the first-strike would eliminate the chance of retaliation, the players are in a "Prisoner's Dilemma," and, as noted above, are incentivized to defect.
Nuclear "escalation" could destabilize such parity. For example, the development of MIRV ('''M'''ultiple '''R'''e-entry '''V'''ehicle) warheads placed Russia briefly ahead of the US. Similarly, American development of an effective nuclear shield would have "won" the game, and was greatly feared by Russia, and contemplated as a reason for a first-strike were its completion imminent.
The "game" as studied by political scientists is displayed to the right, with the traditional values.
[[category:mathematics]]
[[category:philosophy]]