Battles of Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge

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Following Operation Rosario (Falklands/Malvinas War), the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands in April 1982, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions from the British Parachute Regiment (2 and 3 PARA) were deployed as part of 3 Commando Brigade to retake the Islands in Operation Corporate.

No Man's Land

Having landed at Port San Carlos on May 21, 3 PARA (under Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike) marched across the East Falkland via Teal Inlet to the sheep farm settlement of Estancia House from where they began to send out patrols to harass the defenders and map out the area around Mount Longdon situated to the north west of Port Stanley, the capital of the Islands.

The 7th 'La Plata' Infantry Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez, had been sent to dig in on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. More specifically, the regiment was supposed to counter a British force coming from Berkeley Sound. The garrison on Mount Longdon was made up of the 7th Regiment's 'B' Company. 34-year-old Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores (second-in-command of the 7th Regiment) had been selected to command all the Argentinian forces on Mount Longdon. He seemed an excellent choice when taking into account his aggressive nature as a parachute officer that had served as a company commander in the 17th Airborne Infantry Regiment and had seen action against the 'Ramón Rosa Jiménez Company' from the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo or ERP) operating in Catamarca Province.

Second Lieutenant Juan Domingo Baldini's 1st Platoon was positioned on the rocky outcrops running west of 'Fly Half', the western peak of Mount Longdon. To the south of 'Fly Half' Senior Lieutenant Enrique Eneas Neirotti's 3rd Platoon was placed. First Sergeant Raul Roberto Gonzalez's 2nd was placed to the north of Baldini and his platoon. The Argentinian command post and Lieutenant Hugo Aníbal Quiroga's 1st Platoon (10th Mechanized Engineer Company) which was acting as the local reserve were on 'Full Back', the eastern summit of Longdon. There was also a platoon of Marine Captain Sergio Andrés Dachary's Machine-Gun Company of 136 Marines which took an important part in nearly every major engagement until the end of the campaign. This 24-man platoon used their six Browning 12.7 mm machineguns protected by Marine riflemen, very effectively on Longdon during the night of battle. Contrary to British reports, there were no 'Buzos Tacticos', 'Comandos Anfibios' or Army snipers from the 601st Commando Company present, according to 3 PARA's intelligence officer, Captain Giles Orpen-Smellie that examined all the evidence.[1]

Major Carrizo-Salvadores would later be at special pains to explain that he did his best to arrange some measure of comfort for his men on Mount Longdon:

We took good care of the personnel. We did what we could do to set an example. Captain Eduardo López-Astore was there with the platoons, with news-updates and nougat bars. The soldiers had everything you can imagine in their kitbags, including thermos flasks and transistor radios. Some of the soldiers heard that the British had disembarked at San Carlos and captured Goose Green by tuning radios on to the BBC. In the mornings the soldiers had a mug of the green Guarani herb 'mate' which contains around the same amount of caffeine as a cup of coffee; it is stimulating and helps register a feeling of fullness. Meals were served in the open and consumed in mugs. I remember that mutton and pasta figured largely on the menu. There was a strict ration of one ratpack per man per week, eaten slowly to make it last.[2]

Sergeant Rolando Mario Spizuocco also refutes the charge that he left the 1st Platoon conscript to fend for themselves: "I saw to it that they were not cheated of their ratpacks, that they had chocolate bars, balaclavas and the best possible warm-up tents."[3]

Brigadier Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade and its supporting Parachute battalions, now had a firm footing on Mount Kent, an important position on the road to Stanley. For the 7th Regiment's 'B' Company, the initial contact came as a series of probing patrols from 3 PARA's D Company (under Captain Matt Selfridge). The Rasit ground surveillance radar operator, Sergeant Roque Antonio Nista, on the night of June 4–5, spotted a parachute patrol northwest of Longdon. The 3rd Artillery Group artillerymen on Stanley's outskirts took up position and with the forward artillery observation officer (Lieutenant Alberto Rolando Ramos) on Mount Longdon correcting the artillery fire, the British patrol abandoned the beaten zone.

On the night of June 8–9, Sergeant Nista operating the Rasit ground surveillance radar on the western end of Longdon detected the presence of 100 Paras and Royal Marine Commandos near Murrell River. Machinegun, mortar and artillery fire dispersed the British force that had planned to surprise the defenders on Mount Longdon and Two Sisters Mountain.[4][5][6][7]

On June 9, Major Carrizo-Salvadores' men suffered their first loss when Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga's 1st Engineer Platoon suffered an air attack that killed Private José Domingo Curima.[8]

The Mount Longdon defenders waited in a complex of bunkers. On the night of June 11, 3 PARA assaulted these bunkers and for the next 12 hours were involved in desperate close-quarter-combat and the Argentinians counterattacked them time and again. Instead of the hasty field fortifications that the Royal Marine Commandos faced on the 'Monte Caseros' Line (Two Sisters Mountain and Mount Harriet), they came against a strongly entrenched company.

Mount Longdon

On June 10, Lieutenant Colonel Hew Pike gave his orders in the Regimental Headquarters at Estancia House for the attack on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. They were told to expect around 300 Argentinian soldiers from Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez's 7th 'La Plata' Mechanized Infantry Regiment defending the positions who were well dug in and provided with artillery cover from 18 Argentine 105mm Oto Melara howitzers from Lieutenant-Colonel Martín Antonio Balza's 3rd Artillery Group and a further 18 Oto Melaras near Government House from Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Alberto Quevedo's 4th Airborne Artillery Group. In addition, the area had been heavily mined. British sappers later counted 1,500 frozen anti-personnel mines on the western lower slopes of Mount Longdon. Miraculously all but two mines failed to detonate.[9]

At 2015 local time on Friday June 11, 1982, 3 PARA began to advance to Mount Longdon. At the same time, 42 COMMANDO was advancing towards Mount Harriet, whilst 45 COMMANDO was heading for Two Sisters Mountain. The objective of the night attack of June 11 were three rocky peaks in the area west of Port Stanley: Mount Longdon, Two Sisters Mountain and Mount Harriet.

Pike's plan was for Major Mike Argue, commanding 'B' Company, 3 PARA to capture Mount Longdon ('Fly Half' and 'Full Back') while Major David Collett's 'A' Company seized the hill running north ('Wing Forward'). 'C' Company would attack the hill north of the Argentinian Command Post, nicknamed 'Rough Diamond'. The apparent ease with which the British Paratroopers got right up to Mount Longdon was lost when Corporal Brian Milne of 4 Platoon 'B' Company stepped on an anti-personnel mine and this alerted the Argentinian 1st and 2nd Platoons. With Corporal Gustavo Osvaldo Pedemonte from the 2nd Rifle Platoon having deployed his 1st Section with one of the 7.62mm belt-fed machineguns higher up 'Fly Half', his disciplined conscripts were able to engage the Paras, holding up the British advance. Only after an hour or two, perhaps more, a couple of Paras blasted his machine-gun out of action and overran his section in the darkness, killing six of his men (Privates Enrique Horacio Ronconi, Alberto Daniel Petrucelli, Julio Héctor Maidana, Aldo Omar Ferreryra, Luis Alberto Díaz and Miguel Ángel Pascual).[10][11]One Para nearly succeeded in bayoneting Marine Corporal Carlos Rafael Colemil, literally falling at the feet of the Argentinian NCO.[12]The fighting was that close. Lieutenant Jonathan Shaw's 6 Platoon, tasked with clearing the southern half of Mount Longdon where Senior Lieutenant Neirotti's 3rd Platoon was located, for a time was on a roll with their successful battle against the Argentinian soldiers until a navigational error in a maze of rocks in the dark, left Shaw's advance shattered. In fact, it later transpired that 6 Platoon had run into a dead end among the boulders. It was here that 6 Platoon came under fire from half-a-dozen conscripts under Captain López-Astore, armed with automatic rifles, which fatally wounded four Paras in quick succession.

The fighting had now lasted for about an hour. It appeared that the attack on Longdon might be the only action of the night and Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofré, commander of the 10th 'Nicolás Levalle' Mechanized Infantry Brigade asked Lieutenant-Colonel David Ubaldo Comini for a company from the 3rd 'La Tablada' Mechanized Infantry Regiment with a field officer to help Carrizo-Salvadores to make a major counterattack on the British. The 3rd Regiment's 'A' Company (under Captain Rubén Oscar Zunino), overlooking Eliza Cove, was ordered to move in Unimog lorries to the foot of Mount Longdon. Major Guillermo Rubén Berazay, went with the company to take charge:

We were in the Command Post when Jofre told Lieutenant-Colonel Comini to prepare A Company for a special mission and that he wanted an officer of at least 'jefe' rank to lead it. The Colonel said he could send two such officers; which one was to go? Jofre said to send the Operations Officer - that was me! I called the commander of A Company, which was our reserve company. He and I went to Stanley House where Jofre was. He showed me a map and told me that things were difficult and that he wanted me to take the company and go up to Tumbledown Mountain. A guide from the 5th Marines would then show us exactly where to place the company.

We were ready to move at about 3.00 a.m., but it was a very frosty morning, and a lot of the trucks we needed were soon in difficulties. Some found it hard to start; others were breaking down or had difficulty with the ground in the dark, and it took a long time to organize the convoy. We could hear the firing, away to the west, but could not see anything because it was too misty. The Colonel gave me his jeep, and we started to move out of Stanley on the road towards Moody Brook. But the road out of the town was steep, and the vehicles all started skidding. I told my driver to swing into the fence on the left, otherwise we would be in the sea. I heard the lorries behind us hitting each other. I ordered the men to get out of the lorries and be ready to march, but their boots were slipping as well, and that slowed us down. It was starting to get light by then, and as soon as we passed the last houses the British started shelling us. The men all took cover. That was the first time I had been under fire. After about five minutes the firing stopped, and we met the guide from the 5th Marines. I got the men moving again, and we got into position just north and north-west of Tumbledown.[13]

Despite moving in all-terrain lorries, Captain Zunino's company took about 5 hours to cover just four miles under sporadic naval fire. The 3rd Regiment had been conditioned to rely heavily on armoured personnel carriers to wage a war. Before long Sergeant Roque Antonio Nista, Corporal Óscar Oscar Carrizo and their ground-surveillance radar section were surrounded by more than 100 Paras and they asked for assistance and Major Carrizo-Salvadores soon despatched the 1st Engineer Platoon under Lieutenant Hugo Aníbal Quiroga.

Uptill 2130 local time the night of June 11 had been like many other nights for the Argentinians on Mount Longdon. Major Carlos Eduardo Carrizo-Salvadores:

I recall that, that evening, with a small reciever, we were listening to the Mass that his Holiness the Pope was saying from the Basilica of Lujan. Just as he was giving the blessing - night had already closed in - the Platoon Commanders telephoned me to let me know that, apart from the shelling, there was nothing to report.

Through all the vivid events that week we knew that even with the efforts that had been made to achieve peace, the enemy attack was imminent and it would happen at any time. I therefore ordered all personnel to get ready for action, foreseeing necessary rest periods by reason of our having had a week of permanent readiness because of the events already related, and of what happened during the 4th and 8th days respectively. At about 2030 hours I got in touch with the Commanding Officer to tell him the latest developments up to that time. An hour later Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez called me, since a somewhat confused situation had arisen due to a message sent out by Lieutenant [Alberto Rolando] Ramos, who was my artillery forward observation officer - a message which never could be cleared up, because the officer was dying moments later occasioned by enemy fire [Lieutenant Alberto Ramos was the first to raise the alarm]. To obtain the greatest detail on what had happened I established telephone contact with Second Lieutenant Baldini, the 1st Platoon Commander and responsible for the western sector. It was 2200 hours. At that very moment an anti-personnel mine exploded to the northwest of the position and that in practice, marked the beginning of the action which would last until the following day.

When this latest event happened, Second Lieutenant Baldini told me that fighting was going on in his area of responsability, and furthermore, because fighting was also going on in his position, he informed me that he would call me later to transmit more details of what was happening there. Moments later he called me, telling me, that infiltration had occurred, and that it was very difficult to appreciate the real magnitude ... and at that point communication was broken off as a consequence of the impact of an enemy shell on the telephone wire.

On an alternative line belonging to the Marines, who came under my subsector, I re-established communication with Second Lieutenant Baldini who informed that the situation was grave, that the enemy was in great strength and that, in some sectors, hand-to-hand fighting was going on; that he intended to push them back to regain command of the situation. This was the last conversation I held with Second Lieutenant Baldini, as, when trying to carry out what he had told me, he fell mortally wounded. Through a later account when I was in the continent, I learned that the brave officer was killed when he was trying to take over a machinegun whose aimer had been put out of action. This weapon was important to the defence of the position. [Baldini was stripped off his boots by the Paras] Corporal Rios had the same luck when he tried to realise what the second lieutenant intended doing.Thus in a demonstration of fearlessness and courage, both offered up their lives to their country in the execution of their duty.[14]

Kneeling, Private Victor José Bruno from 1st Platoon fired a 7.62mm machinegun steadily but found the weapon jamming. Baldini took charge and took a knife to pry out the jammed belt, but seeing a group of Paras jump appear of the darkness, and charge them, he abandoned the machinegun and drew his sidearm as he ran back to his tent. After several shots, aimed wildly, he needed to reload, but by then the Paras had him located and shot him dead.[15]

Carrizo-Salvadores made an official submission to the commander-in-chief of the Argentinian Army, Lieutenant-General Cristino Nicolaides, when the war was over recommending Baldini for the highest military decoration. He was in fact put up for the Heroic Valour Cross, the Argentinian equivalent of the British Victoria Cross and the 7th Regiment's officers and NCOs to a man believed he deserved it. But he was awarded the lesser decoration of the Gallantry in Combat Medal.

The Gallantry in Combat Medal also went to Sergeant Rolando Mario Spizuocco who displayed great heroism by rescuing most of the 1st Platoon wounded conscripts in the forward tents and carrying them back through a nightmare of shot and shell to a place of safety.[16]

Major Carrizo-Salvadores could hear shots where 1st Platoon was fighting but around his command bunker it was quiet. But as dawn arrived his command platoon was firing like mad. The local Argentinian reserve in the form of a platoon of engineers under Lieutenant Quiroga had reinforced 3rd Platoon and were all the time shooting at any one that moved forward.[17]Lance-Corporal James Murdoch was mortally wounded, and Private Stewart Laing went forward to drag him into safety, he in turn also being mortally wounded by the engineers using head-mounted nightsights. Under increasing pressure from Quiroga, the British in the southern sector pulled back.

On the northern sector, a marine heavy machinegun position (comprising Marine Privates Jorge Inchauspe, Sergio Giuseppetti, Jorge Maciel and Luis Fernández[18]was causing considerable problems for Lieutenant Ian Bickerdicke's No. 4 Platoon who took the brunt of the enemy fire, with several killed and wounded, including the platoon commander and platoon sergeant Ian McKay after running into the 1st Section of Corporal Gustavo Pedemonte from the 2nd Platoon. It was whilst attempting to destroy this position with a hand grenade that McKay was killed in action. Sergeant-Major Sammy ­Dougherty, was first to reach Ian. In 2012, he revealed: "Ian’s right hand had­ ­practically gone. He must have had a grenade in his hand and been shot and killed before releasing it."[19] For his act Sergeant McKay was awarded the Victoria Cross. Sergeant Des Fuller, therefore, took command of the remnants of 4 Platoon and moved forward to attack the Marine heavy machine gun position on the northern slopes. Unfortunately the enemy heavy machine-gun wasn't knocked out.

A heavy bombardment now fell on 1st Platoon, and shortly before 0130 on June 12, 4 and 5 Platoons had forced their way between 2d Lieutenant Baldini's men and the Marine Corps machine-gunners and riflemen present.

As Major Mike Argue's 4 and 5 Platoons moved over the top of 'Fly Half' on to more open ground sloping away to 'Full Back', however, they were counterattacked by Lieutenant Raúl Fernando Castañeda's 1st Platoon of 'C' Company 7th Regiment, which had just arrived to reinforce the positions there. Back in the main 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters, Brigadier Julian Thompson, could see it was going to be a very long night. Meanwhile, 'A' Company commanded by Major David Collett, was on 'Wing Forward', the subsidiary hill north of 'Fly Half', and came under accurate rifle and automatic fire as it advanced along a series of peat banks. One member of the company, Private Timothy Jenkins was killed and Corporal Stephen Hope was seriously wounded, and would die many hours later. It later transpired that Castañeda's platoon had had head-mounted night sights issued when ordered to move up Mount Longdon. Castañeda―later promoted to full colonel in the 1990s―found Private Leonardo Rondi a most inspiring soldier. Private Leonardo Hector Rondi seeing the radio operator shot and killed in the course of his duties, jumped into the middle of the fray and began organizing the defences of the platoon, running to the rifle sections, dodging enemy groups, to report to the section commanders on the fighting. Rondi seemed to be everywhere, using his rifle and hand grenades at close quarters and caring for the wounded. For his bravery he was awarded a Gallantry in Combat Medal.[20]

The reservists in Castañeda's platoon all knew each other well. Having been conscripted from the Lanus and Bandfield suburbs of Buenos Aires, many of the conscripts indulged a taste for Hollywood action movies and American swearing. This 46-man platoon, came in at the critical moment and showed themselves to be willing to fight at close quarters. The platoon fought bitterly on the northern sector of Mount Longdon and not altogether without success. Castañeda's men made grenade and bayonet attacks on the advancing British Paratroopers, compelling them to eventually withdraw after 2 hours of brutal boulder-to-boulder fighting.[21]

It was almost 0530 local time before the fighting resumed. Major Argue now dispatched the remnants of 4 and 5 Platoons commanded by Lieutenant Mark Cox, to carry out a flanking attack from the north, but this proved unsuccessful as Castañeda's platoon in the form of the rifle sections under Corporals Jorge Daniel Arribas and Julio Nardielo Mamani had the approach well covered.[22]As soon as Private Horacio Alejandro Cañeque saw the remnants of 4 and 5 Platoons advancing towards Major Carrizo-Salvadores' command bunker he was out in a flash firing like mad and started to shout insults to the Paras in perfect American English[23]with Private Anibal Javier Bemba from Castañeda's platoon leaping to his feet and shouting "Hey Hombre" before firing like mad a 7.62mm belt-fed machine-gun from the hip at the startled Paras. The Argentinian fire was very accurate and Private John Crow was killed and others wounded or injured in the mad scramble to take cover among the rocks after coming under sudden and intense machine-gun fire from Private Bemba.[24]

At that point Lieutenant-Colonel Pike, on learning of the situation ordered 'A' Company to take 'Full Back'. Major David Collett soon encountered strong opposition from the Argentinians, particularly at the command post of Carrizo-Salvadores where the second-in-command of the 7th Regiment was asking for reinforcements.

The battle was now approaching its closing stages. Major Carrizo-Salvadores told Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre in Stanley House that he wished to arrange a truce with the British for the evacuation of all the wounded, but despite this the conscripts around him vowed that that they would rather shoot it out to the bitter end.

By now Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike had brought Sergeant Graham Colbeck, the man in charge of the Anti-Tank Platoon to the western summit of Longdon. It was here at the Argentinian command post that Private Horacio Alejandro Cañeque had a lucky escape. Suddenly there was a blast that sent him tumbling spreadeagled into the ground. "Best guess was that it was a Milan", said Cañeque, remembering. Private Fernando Gabriel Magno could see through his night sight 3 PARA's Machine-Gun Platoon in position. He began spotting targets and relaying the position to Private Mario Alejandro Rosas and Corporal Oscar Rafael Mussi and they grabbed a machinegun and opened fire on the summit.[25]

On the summit was Lance-Corporal Vincent Bramley, firing. The Paras' Milan teams on 'Fly Half' were bringing down fire on the Argentinian command post and Castañeda called up Corporal Manuel Adan Medina to deal with the Milan platoon. Medina of Castañeda's platoon, who was later awarded the Gallantry in Combat Medal, personally hunted down an anti-tank gun operated by Marine Corporal José Ramón Roldán and he and Roldán knocked out one Milan team with a direct hit at approximately 0600 local time.[26][27]

At the time another rifle platoon from the 7th Regiment's 'A' Company (under Captain Jorge Ricardo Calvo) on 'Apple Pie' was on standby in reserve. There was no evidence of hesitancy or lack of aggression when they were called into the fight. But Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofré, in a decision that has been argued ever since, cancelled the move.[28]This fresh platoon could have made such a difference, and even turned the battle. It later emerged that this reinforced rifle platoon bravely moved forward through the thick morning mist despite confusing orders from Regimental Headquarters only to find Major Carrizo-Salvadores and his men had already abandoned 'Fly Half'.[29]

In the first glimmer of dawn Major Collett's company resumed its advance. The Paras got very close to the Argentine command post and the second-in-command of the 7th Regiment was ordered to conduct a fighting withdrawal, but despite this Major Carrizo-Salvadores refused to give in with Captain Eduardo López-Astore even instructing Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga to be prepared to launch another counterattack with the remnants of his 1st Engineer Platoon,[30]and it was not until 0632[31]that morning that he abandoned the command post and the surviving defenders escaped under cover of mist.

As A Company was clearing the final positions, Corporal Stewart McLaughlin was wounded by a Czekalski recoilless rifle round fired from the 7th Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon under 2d Lt Francisco Ramón Galíndez-Matienzo on 'Rough Diamond', McLaughlin was subsequently killed by a mortar bomb fired from Senior Sergeant Mario Ricardo Alcaide's Mortar Platoon from the 7th Regiment's Company on Wireless Ridge as he made his way to the British aid post.

Mount Longdon was secure by 09.30 am on June 12. By this time, 3 PARA had been fighting for 12 hours and they would remain under heavy fire for a further 48 hours from Marine Artillery Observation Officers and Mortar Fire Controllers (MFCs) on Mount Tumbledown. During this period an additional four British Paratroopers were killed in action and several more wounded or injured.

The Argentinians lost thirty-one dead, 120 wounded and fifty prisoners. The night battle, previous patrol actions and retaliatory artillery bombardment cost 3 PARA, and attached units, 23 killed and about 70 wounded or injured[32][33]with Private Mick Southall estimating that only 30 British Paratroopers in 'B' Company escaped death or some type of injury in the fierce night action:

The enemy soldiers were resolute to say the least ... That's why my company suffered 60 or 70 percent casualties ... My company was down to 30 blokes ... They were as patriotic and keen on their cause as we were on ours. They firmly believed they were fighting for the right thing and so did we ... They didn't run off, I'm sure that some did but a lot of them didn't.[34]

The failure on the part of 3 PARA's C Company to secure the nearby 'Rough Diamond' strongpoint, was not considered too serious. Brigadier Julian Thompson has written that:

A feature north-east of Longdon thought to be held by 3 Para seemed to be occupied by the enemy. A short altercation took place between 2 and 3 Para about who did hold the feature and was settled by 2 Para having it comprehensively shelled without complaint from 3 Para.[35]

Several Paras, unwilling to believe that the Argentinian conscripts could be capable of being good shots and fighting so fiercely, thought the Argentinians might have hired American mercenaries in the form of Vietnam Veterans. Some British officers claimed Argentinian Army Green Beret snipers had been present in the fighting. According to the Intelligence Officer (Captain Giles Orpen-Smellie) of 3 PARA, who examined all the evidence, no Argentinian Army Special Forces took part in the battle:

However, notwithstanding the mention in 3 PARA's Post Operational Report that 7 Infantry Regiment had been 'reinforced by specialist elements and snipers from 601 Commando Company', I have found no evidence to substantiate the suggestion that Argentine special forces were deployed on Mount Longdon ... Carrizo-Salvadores also denies that Argentine special forces were present ...My reading suggests that that much of the damage done to 3 PARA was inflicted by a small number of Argentine marine conscripts ... A number of 3 PARA's casualties were inflicted by Argentine snipers, although Carrizo-Salvadores claims that some of this 'devilishly accurate aiming I have read about in British accounts was achieved as a result of the markmanship training on the rifle ranges and the good aim of the riflemen, nothing more'.[36]

19-year-old Private Grant Grinham, badly wounded in the action, in an interview with the 'Leicester Mercury' in 2017, reported that the Argentinian conscripts had indeed fought very hard:

Those Argentinian lads on Mount Longdon fought their hearts out. They were determined defenders. The battle was in the balance. We fought for every inch of ground. The Heavy Machine Gunners were regular Marines and their confidence was high. They were armed with .50-cal machine guns which would stop a car, and were well up for the fight. They're a big heavy weapon, mostly used in an anti-aircraft role. It was a formidable defensive weapon for us to engage. They also had snipers all along Mount Longdon who were very accurate. They had night sights and were far superior to anything we had - contrary to reports. It was a very difficult battle.[37]

Kenneth M. Pollack, former CIA intelligence officer and expert on military affairs, in his research of the Falklands War concluded:

Despite the unfavorable force ratio, the Argentine defenders were clever and active and had fortified their positions well. They forced the British to advance through a narrow killing zone, ambushing and counterattacking the Paras repeatedly, and inflicting heavy casualties on them. Eventually, the British took the position only by employing Milans, LAWs, artillery and mortars.[38]

In a fine soldier's tribute to the men he commanded in the Falklands, Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores wrote:

I can say that I have seen young men of 20 carry out their duty beyond the call of duty, exposing their lives regardless of the cold, the rain or the gunfire. And that was general among those who occupied the frontlines, just as it was among the stretcher bearers, medics and medical orderlies who ran into the middle of the explosions in order to save the life of a wounded comrade, and among the soldiers of the Command Platoon [Private Horacio Cañeque, Private Carlos Mario Connell, Private Fernando Gabriel Magno, Private Luis Alberto Cunningham, Private Gabriel Crespo, Private Daniel Cesar Maltagliatti and Private Mario Alejandro Rosas] who in the middle of the bombardment, went out to repair the telephone lines so that my Command Post could keep in touch with the frontline troops whenever an artillery shell cut those wires.[39]

Wireless Ridge

Briefly under command of Brigadier Tony Wilon's 5 Infantry Brigade, elements of 2 PARA conducted a helicopter insertion deep behind forward Argentinian Army Special Forces patrols and Argentinian Air Force's Observation Posts (OPs) on June 2. They liberated the settlements of Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, opening a southern flank of operations.

On the morning of June 12, it became clear that the attacks on Mount Longdon had been successful. 2 PARA marched around the back of Longdon to take up their positions for the assault on Wireless Ridge. As the action was expected to be concluded quickly, they took only their weapons and as much ammunition as possible, leaving most other gear behind in the camp. On Bluff Cove Peak, the 2 PARA's mortars and heavy machine guns were attacked by Argentinian A-4 Skyhawks, which delayed their planned move forward, although the British paratroopers suffered no casualties.

On the night of June 13/14, 2 PARA deployed 3 PARA and, supported by British light tanks and Royal Navy warships, attacked Wireless Ridge. During the attack British artillery fired 6,000 rounds with their 105 mm guns and as the British Paratroopers began their final push, they were further backed by naval fire and the 76mm and 30mm guns mounted on the light tanks.[40]After their heavy losses at Goose Green, the Paras were taking no chances.

By the time 2 PARA reached their first objective, 'Rough Diamond', the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's C Company survivors under Company Sergeant-Major Raúl Esteban Ibáñez ('El Urco')[41] had withdrawn. As a result, A and B Companies were convinced the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's A Company on the 'Apple Pie' objective had been defeated, and began to advance confidently, but they encountered heavy fire when they left their trenches. It later emerged that Private Roberto Arturo Sañisky had been instrumental in rousing the exhausted conscripts sheltering from the British bombardment.[42] With the Argentinian conscripts manning the defences on 'Apple Pie', the British Paratroopers retreated back to their positions in Furze Bush Pass[43]and ordered massive retaliation from the British machine-gunners and the guns of the 'Blues and Royals' light tanks. As a result, 'A' and 'B' Companies were able to advance again and this time take 'Apple Pie'.

Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company then began the final assault from the western end of Wireless Ridge, under the cover of heavy fire from the British warship HMS 'Ambuscade', the light tanks, twelve 105 mm artillery pieces, several mortars and anti-tank rockets.

In spite of the British Artillery's sustained barrage the remaining Argentinians put up resistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez had now barely 100 men left, including a signals platoon under the wounded Senior Lieutenant Jorge Alberto Guidobono. The signallers were ordered to prepare for hand-to-hand combat. Guidobono shouted encouragement to his men. The signallers fought in little groups from boulders, shooting at enemy flashes.

'D' Company took the first half of the objective after a hard fight with Guidobono's signallers and 30 Argentinian paratroopers (armed with ten 7.62 mm belt-fed machine-guns) under 2d Lieutenant Gustavo Alberto Aimar (wounded in action) from the Córdoba-based 2nd 'General Balcarce' Airborne Infantry Regiment[44]that had arrived in a Hercules C-130 transport on the night of June 11-12th[45]with ex-Para Tony Banks later writing about the engagement:

The word was given to advance and we scrambled through peat bogs and what we later learned was a minefield. We reached the first enemy trenches, but there was nobody there. They’d bolted. But as we started out along the ridge, a scene from Star Wars erupted with tracer rounds flying everywhere. We were up against well armed, well disciplined and highly motivated enemy soldiers in good positions.[46]

Private Guillermo Alberto Vélez recalls:

They were guys from Córdoba, they had just arrived in the islands from Comodoro Rivadavia ... they had never heard a bomb, and they had been put there, in the middle of hell. We, theoretically, were going to receive, by radio, the orders. There were two signals, one to attack, and another to retreat, but in the middle of that mess we never received any order. We could not hear anything other than the bombs ... The A, B and C companies of the 7th had already retreated and we, as a result, ended up being the front line ... We were doing what we could; We could barely protect ourselves and occasionally answer the fire. We joined together in groups, and in front of us placed a defence line of MAG machine guns."[47]

At about 06.00 local time on June 14, Guidobono's signallers and Aimar's paratroopers were hit by a company-sized attack. The Argentinian paratroopers communicated to he signallers that the British were about to get up and charge. Then with a hallow roar of a football crowd they were on the Argentinian defenders. The rest was confusion. The British Paras were moving as close as possible to the Argentinians to avoid the Argentinian Artillery fire. Preceded by a field artillery and naval bombardment, Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company, after suffering its ninth and last dead (Private Francis Slough) in the Falklands War, broke the ring of steel around Lieutenant-Colonel Giménez's command bunker. The Argentinian platoon of paratroopers, although nearly having lost half its strength wounded or injured, moved back grudgingly.

Soon there was a lot of action going above and around Moody Brook. Major Oscar Ramón Jaimet's 'B' Company, from the 6th 'Mercedes' Mechanized Infantry Regiment, on the northern slopes of Tumbledown Mountain, were busy shooting at Major Philip Neame's men, and them too, shooting back at the Argentinians.

Argentinian artillery responded vigorously and the Argentinian Land Forces Commander, Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofré sent Major Guillermo Rubén Berazay's A Company 3rd 'La Tablada' Regiment west of Stanley Racecourse to counterattack. Private Horacio Javier Benítez:

I was behind a rock. They were shooting at me. Under the light of the star-shell I saw this guy and I shot at him. He must have been hit because I poured a whole magazine into him and he fell. But others were coming at me. I kept on shooting but they kept coming. Some who fell got up again and kept charging on, shooting at us. By this time they were all around me ... A sergeant was wounded. He shouted that he had been hit in the stomach. Another soldier was crying out for help but you couldn't help him. A grenade fell near him and it lifted him up in the air and he fell down again. He stood up and shouted: I'm hit, and he was swearing but he was still walking. He went round several soldiers and to one he said: I'm leaving you my rifle and to another: I'm leaving you my magazine, and then he started shouting: I'm leaving, I'm leaving, I'm leaving as if it was all over. As he was walking away he was hit by a phosphorus grenade; his clothes caught fire and he started screaming. But he was also lighting up our positions because he was like a human torch and we were waving him away so that he wouldn't show up our positions in the dark. At that moment we were not really interested whether he died or not. I had eight magazines with me but I had just run out of ammunition and had used all my grenades. I wasn't thinking straight any longer. The only thought in my head was to grab more ammunition and continue fighting. Something was forcing me to do it. Perhaps deep down I was even enjoying it because that's a primal instinct. I found more ammunition but as I was reloading I saw an English soldier in front of me. As I lifted my rifle I was shot in the head. I seemed to fall in slow motion. I was left there. The shot had been deflected by the helmet and had hit me in the neck. I couldn't move my head but I could still think. I can remember wondering whether I still had my arms. I tried to move my legs and I realised I had all my limbs. I thought: I'm alive. I tried to crawl back. I couldn't stand ... Finally I passed out because I had lost so much blood. I couldn't move but I could still think. When we reached the command post they told the captain: Here's Benitez - he's dead. They wrapped me up in a blanket and put me on top of a pile of corpses. A sergeant came along, he was writing down the names of the dead. He was crying. I must have blinked or moved or something because he realised I was still alive. He pulled me out, they gave me some morphine and took me to hospital.[48]

According to Private Patricio Gustavo Pérez:

I was carrying two rifles and I noticed that there was a sniper who was pinning me down. I wanted to come out of the rock and kill him but I couldn't because the firing was so intense. At that moment I heard somebody shout that he had seen the sniper. I came out, saw that he was leaning over the rock and shot at him and his gun fell silent. I saw him fall but I don't know whether he was wounded or dead. That kind of combat among the rocks is like a Western, but it all happens so fast that you don't quite realise what is going on ... What I felt at that moment was mostly hatred. I wanted revenge. I had forgotten fear by then, what sort of risk I was taking; the only thing I wanted to do, my obsession, was to avenge my fallen comrades. Whenever I saw one of my friends hit it was worse, it just made me want to continue fighting, it didn't matter for how long or at what cost. I didn't care about death at that time, the main thing was revenge ... We sent the wounded down and returned to the battle and fought on for four hours. Luckily after the surrender I found out that Horacio had survived. People greeted the surrender with relief. They were all crying. That wasn't how I reacted. I had been fighting for many hours and I was not prepared to give up my rifle until forced to do so. It's different for those who had been in actual combat. I couldn't give my rifle back until they took it away from me, and when I did give it back I made sure it was completely unusable.[49]

During the counterattack, some British paratroopers reported hearing the Argentinian conscripts use the 'wise-guy' talk adopted from 1930s Hollywood gangster movies.[50]

The forty conscripts and NCOs involved[51](under Senior Lieutenant Victor Hugo Rodriguez-Pérez) shot very accurately. There was considerable confusion in 'D' Company 2 PARA and Private Graham Carter was forced to throw himself on the snow-stained ground and to remain largely lain, pressing himself into the ground to avoid the attention of the Argentinian riflemen:

We were out in the open on limb, and it looked like 10 and 11 Platoons were shooting at us. (Several conscripts under Corporal Ugo Rene Domínguez[52]from 'A' Company 3rd Regiment) managed to sneak into the rocks through which Neame's 'D' Company had come through earlier) We asked the OC (Major Neame) to come over and check our position. He bimbled across seeming oblivious to tracer all around him, then wondered back. We thought, 'silly bugger'. Then our platoon commander (Lieutenant Jonathan Page) stood up, shouted to everyone to keep down and was knocked over himself, hit in the leg. He was screaming and shouting, but when the medic stripped him off there was no wound, just massive bruising where the round had hit his ammunition pouch.[53]

Private Graham Carter of 'D' Company, 2 PARA, came within a whisker of death in fighting off this Argentinian force:

I had a bullet bounce off my helmet, then when our artillery shells came in on us, one landed 15 feet away-but thankfully was a dud. It could have killed at least three of us.[54]

Major Neame's officers and NCOs rallied the exhausted Paras to capture the final part of their objective and in the face of heavy fire, the rifle platoons of 2d Lieutenant Carlos Javier Aristegui (wounded in action) and Lieutenant Víctor Hugo Rodriguez-Pérez (wounded in action), having run out of ammunition, broke and retreated, covered by supporting machine gun fire from the rifle platoon of Lieutenant Horacio Alejandro Mones-Ruiz.

At dawn, another platoon of Argentinian conscripts under Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores, comprising survivors of the 7th 'La Plata' Regiment, attacked 2 PARA's 'D' Company, but were driven off with the help of mortars and British Artillery. Private Gabriel Ricardo Sagastume from the 7th Regiment's A Company recalls:

Coming down from Moody Brook we found Carrizo, who wanted to recover that position. We had walked through the ruins of the barracks, bombarded by the English, and we knew that it was impossible to take it again. In those circumstances, Carrizo grouped us, asked what weapons we had and in what conditions they were in and ordered us to follow him to climb the hill. A few meters from the start-line projectiles of all caliber were raining all around us. We fell back, almost in complete disorder.[55]

2 PARA had suffered three dead and 11 wounded. Four of the paratroopers on the mortar line also required CASEVAC (evacuation of casualties by air), having broken their ankles after having fired supercharge rounds for extra range in order to repel the Argentinian counterattacks from Moody Brook. The Argentinians suffered approximately 25 dead and about 125 wounded, about 50 were taken prisoner. In the final stages of the battle, the Argentinian commander, Brigadier-General Jofré had been offered the use of Skyhawks to bomb Wireless Ridge with napalm but he declined, believing that the British response would be equally violent and the chances of a surrender being accepted, non-existent.

Cortley Ridge

The Special Air Service, along with men from the Special Boat Squadron, attempted to carry out a diversionary amphibious raid on Cortley Ridge on the night of June 13. The plan was, as 2 PARA attacked Wireless Ridge, 4 rigid raiders, piloted by Royal Marines and carrying SAS soldiers (15 men from D Squadron) and 6 SBS men (No. 3 Section) would speed across Stanley Harbour and attack the oil storage facilities. The assault force was illuminated by a spotlight on the Argentinian hospital ship 'Almirante Irizar' before it could reach its objective. A massive volley of fire from the 101st Anti Aircraft Artillery Regiment's B Company (under Major Jorge Alberto Monge) and 3rd Rifle Platoon (Lieutenant Héctor Edgardo Gazzolo) from Delta Company 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion and 3rd Rifle Platoon (Lieutenant Alfredo José Imboden) from Hotel Company 3rd Marine Infantry Battalion arced down onto the SAS/SBS force from positions along the shore, causing the raiding party to withdraw. The Rigid Raiders were badly shot up and abandoned, but miraculously none of the men involved had been killed although 3 of the British attackers had been wounded.

The wisdom of this attack was later questioned as it was seen by some as a reckless operation with little strategic benefit.

Aftermath

The Battles of Mount Longdon, Wireless Ridge and Cortley Ridge cost the British 1st Parachute Regiment and supporting Royal Marines[56]Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Squadron (SBS) 26 dead and 85 wounded. Argentinean casualties were fifty-six killed, 245 wounded a 100 taken prisoner.

On the night of June 16, a riot broke out involving the 7th Regiment when British paratroopers and local civilians sent a Panhard armoured car careering into a group of 7th Regiment prisoners awaiting repatriation[57]which ended with the Argentinians setting fire to the Globe Store. However a company from 2 PARA soon rushed to the area and order was restored.[58]

A book ('Excursion to Hell') written by a member (Corporal Vincent Bramley) of 3 PARA that was published in 1991, alleged that several members of the 7th Regiment had been shot after they had been captured. Private Santiago Dionel Mambrin from B Company claimed to have witnessed two British Paratroopers disarm and shoot Corporal José Oscar Carrizo in the daylight hours on Mount Longdon, "I could see Corporal Carrizo ... two English soldiers took him prisoner. I could see the three of them clearly. They made signs telling him to take off his webbing and hand over his weapons. Then they ordered him to take off his anorak. He was left standing in his vest. The English soldiers began talking to each other. Suddenly, they stared at him and one of them passed his hand across his throat, as if they were going to kill him. One of the soldiers fired four shots into his head."[59]A Scotland Yard investigation investigated the claims but proved inconclusive and the Argentinian authorities distanced themselves from the investigations.

References

  1. “However, notwithstanding the mention in 3 PARA's Post Operational Report that 7 Infantry Regiment had been 'reinforced by specialist elements and snipers from 601 Commando Company', I have found no evidence to substantiate the suggestion that Argentine special forces were deployed on Mount Longdon ... Carrizo-Salvadores also denies that Argentine special forces were present ...My reading suggests that that much of the damage done to 3 PARA was inflicted by a small number of Argentine marine conscripts ... A number of 3 PARA's casualties were inflicted by Argentine snipers, although Carrizo-Salvadores claims that some of this 'devilishly accurate aiming I have read about in British accounts was achieved as a result of the markmanship training on the rifle ranges and the good aim of the riflemen, nothing more'.” Jigsaw Puzzles: Tactical Intelligence in the Falklands Campaign, Giles Orpen-Smellie, Amberley Publishing Limited, 2022
  2. Mount Longdon: The Argentinian Story
  3. Mount Longdon: The Argentinian Story
  4. El mayor Carlos Carrizo Salvadores en Longdon dice: «La noche del 8 al 9, nuevamente el Sargento Nista (operador del radar) me informó sobre la presencia del enemigo, quien estaba ubicado en el mismo lugar que la vez anterior, pero ahora, separados en grupos: a 1.500 m el primero, 2.000 m el segundo, 3.000 m el tercero y 4.000 m el cuarto, tomadas estas distancias desde la posición del radar. Martín Antonio Balza, Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, p. 80, Círculo Militar, 1986
  5. It was unfortunate that the previous night's patrol carried out by two troops, one each from Z and Y Companies, had been forced back by a heavy artillery barrage. The Falklands War: The Day by Day Record from Invasion to Victory, p. 314, Marshall Cavendish Limited, 1983
  6. On the evening of 8 June 3 PARA dispatched three large fighting patrols to Mount Longdon. Each comprised a half-platoon; one was accompanied by a guide from D (Patrols) Company and the other two by Falklands islanders Terry Peck and Vernon Steen. The patrols' mission was to locate suitable approaches to the objective and to test enemy reactions to probing. Unfortunately, however, the combination of a fine night and bright moonlight prevented them from penetrating enemy positions." Task Force: The Illustrated History of the Falklands War, David Reynolds, p. 179, Sutton, 2002
  7. But perhaps his greatest single asset was the RASIT radar set, with which he could scan the countryside at night to reveal any hostile troop movement within several thousand metres. It proved extremely effective in pinpointing Para patrols as they probed the defences during the nights prior to the attack." The Last Eleven: Winners of the Victoria Cross since the Second World War, Mark Adkin, p. 196, Pen & Sword, 1991
  8. Esta fue la primera baja de combate en la posición Monte Longdon. Pasado el ataque pusimos al soldado Curima en una camilla , y antes de enviarlo a retaguardia , rezamos ante su cuerpo por el eterno descanso de su alma , rindiéndole así , con sencillez , los honores que dadas las circunstancias. Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, Martín Antonio Balza, p. 81, Círculo Militar, 1986
  9. Sunderland Falklands veterans remember the Battle of Mount Longdon
  10. 3 Days in June: 3 PARA's Battle for Mt. Longdon, James O'Connell, Octopus Publishing Group, 2021
  11. GUSTAVO PEDEMONTE - EX COMBATIENTE DE MALVINAS (available on YouTube)
  12. 3 Days in June: 3 PARA's Battle for Mt. Longdon, James O'Connell, Octopus Publishing Group, 2021
  13. The Fight for the Malvinas: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War, Martin Middlebrook, pp. 244-245, Viking, 1989
  14. The Other Side of the Hill, Hew Pike, p. 141, Pegasus: Journal of the Parachute Regiment, April 1988 Issue
  15. "Mingo"
  16. Falleció por coronavirus un excombatiente de Malvinas condecorado
  17. Hasta el último hombre – Combate de Monte Longdon
  18. Últimos combates: El heroísmo del BIM 5 en Malvinas)
  19. McKay VC: Untold story of the hero Para who sacrificed his life to help free the Falklands... and earned the last Victoria Cross of the 20th Century
  20. "Participar de un contraataque nocturno en el Monte Longdon que ejecutó una sección de Infantería, en condiciones meteorológicas desfavorables, en terreno abrupto y bajo intenso fuego enemigo de armas automáticas y de artillería. En dichas circunstancias combatir durante casi 4 horas a las distancias próximas y cuerpo a cuerpo asumiendo el puesto de estafeta a pie ante la muerte del titular' que operaba una radio. En dicha situación desempeñarse con arrojo, a decisión y gran espíritu de combate, arriesgando su vida en repetidas oportunidades, al desplazarse entre los grupos y soldados, para transmitir las órdenes que impertía el Jefe de la Sección." Armas y Geoestrategia, p. 116, Editorial CLIO S.A., 1983
  21. "Under covering fire, Numbers 4 and 5 Platoons, withdrew, but another man was killed and others wounded in the process." Para!: Fifty Years of the Parachute Regiment, Peter Harclerode, p. 354, Brian Trodd, Arms & Armour Press, 1992
  22. Malvinas | El audaz ataque de Castañeda (available on YouTube)
  23. Así Peleamos: Malvinas, Martín Antonio Balza, p 100, Fundación Soldados, 1999
  24. Malvinas | El audaz ataque de Castañeda (available on YouTube)
  25. Así Peleamos: Malvinas, Martín Antonio Balza, p 102, Fundación Soldados, 1999
  26. One three-man missile team was wiped out by a direct hit from a recoilless rifle. Max Hastings, Simon Jenkins, p. 298, The Battle for the Falklands, Joseph, 1983
  27. The wounded Corporal Manuel Medina of Castañeda's platoon took over a Recoilless Rifle detachment and fired along the ridge at Support Company killing three paras. Nine Battles to Stanley, Nicholas Van der Bijl, p.177, Leo Cooper, 1999
  28. Argentine Fight for the Falklands, Martin Middlebrook, p. 236, Pen & Sword, 2003
  29. According to Private Domingo Morel: "We then moved to the positions of B Company of the 7th Regiment to reinforce a sector that had been taken by the English but we couldn't recover it. When we arrived, B Company had gone. We couldn't reinforce anything because we were groups of fourteen blokes, you see. B Company had withdrawn, leaving us practically nothing, and no back-up. The sub-officer had no idea what to do because he was going under the orders of the second chief of the regiment who also knew nothing." Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, Hugh McManners, p. 399, Random House, 2008
  30. ENTREVISTA al SUBOF VGM GUSTAVO OSVALDO PEDEMONTE (available on YouTube)
  31. Men of 3 Parachute Regiment outside a captured Argentine command post after the Battle of Mount Longdon. The post had finally been abandoned by the second in command of the Argentine 7th Infantry Regiment, Major Carrizo-Salvadores, after fierce fighting and the deployment of the Regiment's Milan Anti Tank Missile Section at 6.32 am on 12 June. THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT, APRIL - JUNE 1982
  32. "We'd lost something like twenty-two guys up to that point, dead, but three times more than that were wounded." Bloody Hell: The Price Soldiers Pay, Daniel Hallock, pg. 60, Plough Publishing House, 1999
  33. "Our battalion had lost twenty-three men there, with more than sixty wounded." Forward Into Hell, Vincent Bramley, John Blake Publishing
  34. Private Southall, 3 Para - Memories of the Falklands War (available on YouTube)
  35. Ready for Anything: The Parachute Regiment at War, Julian Thompson, p. 452, Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited, 1989
  36. Jigsaw Puzzles: Tactical Intelligence in the Falklands Campaign, Giles Orpen-Smellie, Amberley Publishing Limited, 2022
  37. The Falklands War: Paratrooper 'lost a leg and saw friends killed but would do it all again'
  38. Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness, By Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 212, Oxford University Press, 2019
  39. The Other Side of the Hill, Hew Pike, p. 141, Pegasus: Journal of the Parachute Regiment, April 1988 Issue
  40. «During the course of the battle British field artillery pumped 6,000 105mm shells onto Wireless Ridge, while two frigates lobbed about 600 4.5in shells on to the eastern slopes.» The Falklands War 1982, Duncan Anderson, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014
  41. Intimidades de la batalla final
  42. Malvinas: La guerra íntima (2005 TV Documentary directed by Ricardo Kon)
  43. Razor's Edge, Hugh Bicheno, Orion Publishing Group, 2007
  44. «...habian llegado la noche anterior. Una sección de ametralladoras no es un elemento que figure en las organizaciones comunes, fue constituido a propósito para esta oportunidad: eran 30 hombres con diez ametralladoras. La puse a disposición de Jofre para reforzar el 7.» Malvinas: Testimonio de Su Gobernador, Mario Benjamín Menéndez, Carlos M. Túrolo, p. 278, Editorial Sudamericana, 1983
  45. «In believing that Menendez could hold out for at least ten days and since the Air Bridge was still open, the Joint Operations Group authorized the continued piecemeal reinforcement of Army Group Falklands with the despatch of 2nd Airborne Infantry Regiment. The weather and the speed of the British advance prevented its full deployment and only a platoon arrived in time to join 7th Infantry Regiment on Wireless Ridge.» Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick van der Bijl, p. 224, Leo Cooper, 1999
  46. An ex-Para tells of the horrors of the Falklands
  47. Crónica Documental de las Malvinas: Testimonios y Documentos de la Guerra, Hugo Gambini, P. 885, Biblioteca de Redacción, 1982
  48. Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton, Peter Kosminsky, p. 189, Andre Deutsch, 1989
  49. Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton, Peter Kosminsky, p. 192, Andre Deutsch, 1989
  50. "During the Battles of Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge, some paras reported the enemy using the language of 1930s Hollywood gangster movies." My Friends, The Enemy: Life in Military Intelligence During the Falklands War, Nick Van Der Bijl, Amberley Publishing Limited, 2020
  51. Malvinas | Contraataque en Wireless Ridge Nicolas Kasanzew (available on YouTube)
  52. Malvinas y sus protagonistas, En esta ocasión, Matías entrevistó al Suboficial Principal (R) VGM Ugo Rene Domínguez (available online)
  53. The Scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 186, HarperCollinsPublishers, 1993
  54. The scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 325, HarperCollins, 1993
  55. El cobarde Carrizo
  56. The other companies had skirted one minefield on their approach and Staff Sergeant Pete Thorpe of Condor Troop Royal Engineers was later to lose his foot on a mine while trying to extract a damaged vehicle with injured gunners, near Murrell Bridge. The Yompers: With 45 Commando in the Falklands War, Ian Gardiner, p. 161, Pen & Sword, 2012
  57. "The Fligh-Sergeant told me that some civilians and soldiers, apparently 3 Para, drinking in the Globe Hotel had decided to sort out Argentinians waiting to be screened, but the prisoners they chose were mainly from the 7th Infantry Regiment, which was largely recruited from tough working class neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires ... A tense situation escalted when several smoke grenades were thrown and the handbrake of a Panhard armoured car was released and directed at the prisoners." My Friends, The Enemy: Life in Military Intelligence During the Falklands War, Nick Van Der Bijl, Amberley Publishing Limited, 2020
  58. "On the night of 16 June , with too few servicemen to guard too many prisoners, a riot broke out which ended in the prisoners setting fire to the Globe Store where, ironically, all their clothing, cigarettes and other goodies were stored. However a company group from 2 PARA were soon deployed to the area and order was restored." The British Army in the Falklands, John W. Stanier, H.M. Stationery Office, 1983
  59. Veiled Valour, Tom Frame, UNSW Press, 2022