Clegg v. Ark. Dep't of Corr.

In Clegg v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 496 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against claims for employment discrimination under federal and Arkansas laws because it did not find any adverse action against the employee. The Court also held that non-employees were not subject to suit under the cited provisions.

The Court restated the legal test:

Discrimination claims asserted pursuant to § 1983, Title VII, and the ACRA "are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas." Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (I), 427 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2005). Using this framework, the plaintiff must first "establish a prima facie case by showing that he or she: (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was meeting the legitimate expectations of the employer; [and] (3) suffered an adverse employment action; ... (4) under circumstances permitting 'an inference of discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Zhuang v. Datacard Corp., 414 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2005)). If the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action." Id. If such a reason is proffered, then the employee must provide evidence from which a reasonable fact finder can conclude that the reason offered by the employer "is merely a pretext for [unlawful] discrimination." Id.

The Court relied on the leading precedent, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-06 (1973). The Court then held:

The district court determined that Ms. Clegg failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she failed to show she had suffered an adverse employment action, the third element. "'An adverse employment action is a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage.'" Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 528 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Wedow v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 2006)). This might include "'[t]ermination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee's future career prospects,'" as well as "'circumstances amounting to a constructive discharge.'" Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 1999)). "Minor changes in duties or working conditions, even unpalatable or unwelcome ones, which cause no materially significant disadvantage, do not" rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Id.

The district court analyzed Ms. Clegg's discrimination claims as roughly alleging that she was discriminated against by not being put back into her former position or rate of pay upon her return from military duty, that her duties were altered and reassigned, that she was denied training, that she was given a poor performance evaluation, and that she was not welcomed upon her return or provided with the tools she needed to be productive (such as keys to file cabinets or a telephone and telephone access code). After reviewing the record and the allegations, both individually and cumulatively, we agree with the district court's determination that Ms. Clegg failed to produce evidence showing she suffered an adverse employment action.