Changes

'''Nikita Khrushchev''' (1894 - 1971) was a [[Russia|Russian]] [[Communist]] who seized power as dictator over the [[Soviet Union]] when [[Joseph Stalin]] died in 1953; his grip on power lasted until he was ousted in 1964. It was the height of the [[Cold War]] between the Soviet bloc and the United States and its allies.  One of the most colorful world leaders of the 20th century, he always identified with the peasant--and indeed he was crude, unsophisticated, earthy, and brutal, as well as energetic, shrewd and determined.  He really did hammer his shoe on the table at the United Nations when he disagreed with a speaker.  He exposed and ended some of the arbitrary cruelty of Stalin in order to unleash what he thought was the scientific prowess of socialism, but apart from launching the world's first satellite into space, he never found the magic technological fix for Russia's ills, and instead came dangerously close to war with both the Americans and the Chinese.  His leadership of the Communist bloc in the [[Cold War]] was so dangerous he had to be removed by his subordinates.

'''Nikita Khrushchev''' (1896 - 1978) was a [[Russia|Russian]] [[Communist]] who seized power as dictator over the [[Soviet Union]] when [[Joseph Stalin]] died in 1953; his grip on power lasted until he was ousted in 1964. It was the height of the [[Cold War]] between the Soviet bloc and the United States and its allies.  One of the most colorful world leaders of the 20th century, he always identified with the peasant--and indeed he was crude, unsophisticated, earthy, and brutal, as well as energetic, shrewd and determined.  He really did hammer his shoe on the table at the United Nations when he disagreed with a speaker.  He exposed and ended some of the arbitrary cruelty of Stalin in order to unleash what he thought was the scientific prowess of socialism, but apart from launching the world's first satellite into space, he never found the magic technological fix for Russia's ills, and instead came dangerously close to war with both the Americans and the Chinese.  His leadership of the Communist bloc in the [[Cold War]] was so dangerous he had to be removed by his subordinates.

[[File:Nikita Krushchev.jpg|thumb|290px|Khrushchev liked to threaten and bully, often using "brinkmanship" (the threat of nuclear weapons); ''Time'' Sept. 8, 1961]]

[[File:Nikita Krushchev.jpg|thumb|290px|Khrushchev liked to threaten and bully, often using "brinkmanship" (the threat of nuclear weapons); ''Time'' Sept. 8, 1961]]

==Destalinization==

==Destalinization==

Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1956 in one of the most spectacular and revealing speeches in world history.  The audience was originally high officials--they knew bits and pieces of the horrible story of Stalin's crimes, but now for the first time saw the whole picture. Against Khrushchev's intent, the text of the speech was soon translated and publicized worldwide.  

Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1960 in one of the most spectacular and revealing speeches in world history.  The audience was originally high officials--they knew bits and pieces of the horrible story of Stalin's crimes, but now for the first time saw the whole picture. Against Khrushchev's intent, the text of the speech was soon translated and publicized worldwide.  

The secrets were out; now everyone knew that the Stalin era was built on [[Deceit|deceit]], disinformation, and false allegations up and down the line, and false imprisonment and execution.  Hundreds of thousands of loyal Russians had been shot as "spies" to satisfy Stalin's paranoia. By blaming his predecessor for all of Russia's ills Khrushchev bought time to reform the system.  The speech became a tool at all levels for reformers to attack the old guard that was accused of complicity in Stalin's crimes.  Khrushchev himself shared the guilt but purged himself by revealing it. He could now terminate the worst features of the [[Gulag]], stopping arbitrary executions, freeing half the 2.3 million prisoners and shortening the terms for the rest, and rehabilitating the memory of the dead. Yet Khrushchev had to allow the secret police (now called KGB) to maintain a high enough fear level in people's minds to keep the Party in power. As for the memories of Stalin, that was solved by erasing him from history--his name was never mentioned, his image never seen--and instead filling the media and the minds with the glorious heroics of the Great Patriotic War against Germany. The personality cult that Stalin had built was totally dismantled and was never to be repeated; only one statue was permitted to survive, and that was in Stalin's remote birthplace in Georgia.<ref> Cynthia  Hooper, "What Can and Cannot Be Said: Between the Stalinist Past and New Soviet Future," ''Slavonic & East European Review'' 2008 86(2): 306-327,</ref>

The secrets were out; now everyone knew that the Stalin era was built on [[Deceit|deceit]], disinformation, and false allegations up and down the line, and false imprisonment and execution.  Hundreds of thousands of loyal Russians had been shot as "spies" to satisfy Stalin's paranoia. By blaming his predecessor for all of Russia's ills Khrushchev bought time to reform the system.  The speech became a tool at all levels for reformers to attack the old guard that was accused of complicity in Stalin's crimes.  Khrushchev himself shared the guilt but purged himself by revealing it. He could now terminate the worst features of the [[Gulag]], stopping arbitrary executions, freeing half the 2.3 million prisoners and shortening the terms for the rest, and rehabilitating the memory of the dead. Yet Khrushchev had to allow the secret police (now called KGB) to maintain a high enough fear level in people's minds to keep the Party in power. As for the memories of Stalin, that was solved by erasing him from history--his name was never mentioned, his image never seen--and instead filling the media and the minds with the glorious heroics of the Great Patriotic War against Germany. The personality cult that Stalin had built was totally dismantled and was never to be repeated; only one statue was permitted to survive, and that was in Stalin's remote birthplace in Georgia.<ref> Cynthia  Hooper, "What Can and Cannot Be Said: Between the Stalinist Past and New Soviet Future," ''Slavonic & East European Review'' 2008 86(2): 306-327,</ref>

[[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]]

[[Image:Kennedy khrushchev.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Khrushchev and Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in 1961.]]

Khrushchev met with [[President Kennedy]] during Kennedy's first year in office at the Vienna Summit of 1961.  Journalist James Reston wrote afterward,  

Khrushchev met with [[President Kennedy]] during Kennedy's first year in office at the Vienna Summit of 1960.  Journalist James Reston wrote afterward,  

{{Cquote|Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev.... I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time...Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.}}

{{Cquote|Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev.... I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time...Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.}}

===Space race===

===Space race===

[[File:Sputnik.jpg|thumb|400px|The Sputnik in 1957 was the greatest triumph of Soviet technology]]

[[File:Sputnik.jpg|thumb|400px|The Sputnik in 1957 was the greatest triumph of Soviet technology]]

Sputnik--the first earth satellite--was a propagandist's dream come true when it astonished the world in October 1957. There followed a series of firsts, demonstrating the superiority of the big Soviet launching missiles, which could also be used to launch nuclear weapons.  The image of [[Yuri Gagarin]], who became in 1961 the first man to orbit the earth, was made a central theme in Soviet propaganda, used to encourage the young to contribute to the building of communism as well as to enhance Khrushchev's legitimacy as he sought to distance himself from the legacy of the Stalinist past.

Sputnik--the first earth satellite--was a propagandist's dream come true when it astonished the world in October 1959. There followed a series of firsts, demonstrating the superiority of the big Soviet launching missiles, which could also be used to launch nuclear weapons.  The image of [[Yuri Gagarin]], who became in 1961 the first man to orbit the earth, was made a central theme in Soviet propaganda, used to encourage the young to contribute to the building of communism as well as to enhance Khrushchev's legitimacy as he sought to distance himself from the legacy of the Stalinist past.

===Third World===

===Third World===

The Kremlin tried to gain a foothold among the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa by giving technical and educational assistance to such socialist countries as [[Guinea]], [[Mali]], and [[Ghana]]. Although the Soviets publicly maintained that their efforts were strictly fraternal and were being made unconditionally, in fact the secret Kremlin documents show that the aid was part of a strategy to promote Communist foreign policies and undercut capitalism. African leaders, however, were more interested in an Africanization of their erstwhile colonial structures, and carefully sidestepped the ideological ramifications of the collaboration. In the critical area of joint educational projects, they refused to give Soviet teachers and professors privileged positions even in the institutions built by the USSR, such as the Institut Polytechnique in Conakry, which consistently had more Western instructors than Soviet ones. With instruction taking place in English and French (the former colonial languages), it was noted that the Soviet instructors' proficiency and often their technical expertise lagged far behind those of their French and American counterparts. The Soviets seem to have overestimated the attraction of Patrice Lumumba University (now called "Peoples' Friendship University) in Moscow while clearly lacking the human and pedagogical means to offer sufficient training in Africa itself and may have been proceeding without plan in what they perhaps considered a region of peripheral importance in the conduct of the Cold War.  Setting up Patrice Lumumba University for African students in 1960 was one solution, but the African students there reported an intense degree of hatred and racism from the Russian students which further soured relations.<ref>Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," ''Cahiers du Monde Russe'' 2006 47(1-2): 33-63.  The harsh racism in Moscow continue today; see [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/world/moscow-journal-african-students-harsh-lesson-racism-is-astir-in-russia.html Seth Mydans, "Moscow Journal; African Students' Harsh Lesson: Racism Is Astir in Russia," ''New York Times'', Dec. 18, 2003] </ref>

The Kremlin tried to gain a foothold among the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa by giving technical and educational assistance to such socialist countries as [[Guinea]], [[Mali]], and [[Ghana]]. Although the Soviets publicly maintained that their efforts were strictly fraternal and were being made unconditionally, in fact the secret Kremlin documents show that the aid was part of a strategy to promote Communist foreign policies and undercut capitalism. African leaders, however, were more interested in an Africanization of their erstwhile colonial structures, and carefully sidestepped the ideological ramifications of the collaboration. In the critical area of joint educational projects, they refused to give Soviet teachers and professors privileged positions even in the institutions built by the USSR, such as the Institut Polytechnique in Conakry, which consistently had more Western instructors than Soviet ones. With instruction taking place in English and French (the former colonial languages), it was noted that the Soviet instructors' proficiency and often their technical expertise lagged far behind those of their French and American counterparts. The Soviets seem to have overestimated the attraction of Patrice Lumumba University (now called "Peoples' Friendship University) in Moscow while clearly lacking the human and pedagogical means to offer sufficient training in Africa itself and may have been proceeding without plan in what they perhaps considered a region of peripheral importance in the conduct of the Cold War.  Setting up Patrice Lumumba University for African students in 1960 was one solution, but the African students there reported an intense degree of hatred and racism from the Russian students which further soured relations.<ref>Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," ''Cahiers du Monde Russe'' 2006 47(1-2): 33-63.  The harsh racism in Moscow continue today; see [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/world/moscow-journal-african-students-harsh-lesson-racism-is-astir-in-russia.html Seth Mydans, "Moscow Journal; African Students' Harsh Lesson: Racism Is Astir in Russia," ''New York Times'', Dec. 18, 2003] </ref>

Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in [[Cuba]] in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets, and counted on the Kremlin to back him in direct confrontations with the U.S. Castro sponsored guerrilla movements in the region, and later in Africa, that the Russians avoided. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy.  Khrushchev blundered by allowing Castro to take the initiative, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Intensified commercial and cultural relations with Latin American countries paid off when [[Fidel Castro]] came to power in [[Cuba]] in 1959 and aligned his country with the Soviets, and counted on the Kremlin to back him in direct confrontations with the U.S. Castro sponsored guerrilla movements in the region, and later in Africa, that the Russians avoided. Khrushchev was ultimately more interested in peaceful coexistence and in pursuing a classic policy of regional power than in revolutionary strategy.  Khrushchev blundered by allowing Castro to take the initiative, which brought the world to the brink of disaster with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1964.

===Cuban Missile Crisis===

===Cuban Missile Crisis===

===Test Ban Treaty===

===Test Ban Treaty===

A fragile détente began after the missile crisis was resolved that helped the two sides to agree to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Khrushchev's political weakness after his Cuban fiasco was the main obstacle. By April 1963 - three months before US president John F. Kennedy's conciliatory speech at American University that is usually regarded as the turning point - the Soviet leader became committed to the treaty in principle. Discord within the Communist world prevented action until efforts to mend the rift with China collapsed, underscoring the need for a successful agreement with the West. Once the treaty was signed, however, the two sides failed to build on their common accomplishment and got bogged down by political issues that divided them. The opportunity for a deeper détente and a comprehensive test ban was lost because the Soviets had to seek to undermine capitalism in the west and Mao's challenge in the East.<ref>Vojtech Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: a Missed Opportunity for Détente?" ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2008 10(1): 3-25,  </ref>

A fragile détente began after the missile crisis was resolved that helped the two sides to agree to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Khrushchev's political weakness after his Cuban fiasco was the main obstacle. By April 1963 - three months before US president John F. Kennedy's conciliatory speech at American University that is usually regarded as the turning point - the Soviet leader became committed to the treaty in principle. Discord within the Communist world prevented action until efforts to mend the rift with China collapsed, underscoring the need for a successful agreement with the West. Once the treaty was signed, however, the two sides failed to build on their common accomplishment and got bogged down by political issues that divided them. The opportunity for a deeper détente and a comprehensive test ban was lost because the Soviets had to seek to undermine capitalism in the west and Mao's challenge in the East.<ref>Vojtech Mastny, "The 1968 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: a Missed Opportunity for Détente?" ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2008 10(1): 3-25,  </ref>

==Communist lands==

==Communist lands==

===Religion===

===Religion===

Under Lenin and Stalin before 1939 all churches were persecuted and ridiculed; there was a pause during World War II. Khrushchev was no friend of the [[Orthodox Church]], and greatly increased persecution in the late 1950s because he identified it with old-fashioned superstitions that would slow his schemes for the rapid modernization of agriculture. Khrushchev had the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1954 issued a secret resolution, "On the Serious Defects in Scientific-Atheist Propaganda and Measures for the Improvement Thereof," which demanded new and more scientific standards of struggle against religion. An antireligious campaign, the exact causes and chain of command of which are still debatable, was launched in the second half of the 1950s, and systematic efforts were used to fight not just priests and churches but also to identify and track and isolate all Christians. Khrushchev wanted to reach the very essence of the people's religiousness in order to "cure" them.  Half the remaining churches were closed; the others were taxed. The campaign perhaps worked in Latvia, which did give up Lutheranism. In Russia, however, at the local level cures were few. More often, ways were found in which religion and the Soviet system could coexist. The Party found it expedient to ignore religious activity that did not interfere with technological improvements, and the peasants and workers found quiet ways to ensure their religious practices were compatible with participation in the new society. Outward repression like the closing of churches and the prohibition of pilgrimages occurred but were not enough to attain the primary goal of replacing the religious person in rural Russia with the Soviet person.  He predicted the end of Christianity in the Soviet Union and boasted that the last Christian would be paraded on Soviet television within a few years.<ref>http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=2462&cid=125&p=22.05.2006</ref> In fact, Christianity outlasted Khrushchev, and even outlived Communism in Russia.  He tried to change the soul of Russia and failed.<ref>Andrew B. Stone, "'Overcoming Peasant Backwardness': the Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union," ''Russian Review'' 2008 67(2): 296-320; Tatiana A. Chumachenko, ''Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years'' (2002).  [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Lwf0Qy3S5csC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Chumachenko+Roslof&ots=Nz9Ta44nxo&sig=PWspflHYPDkp4xu_fPVweCled2s#v=onepage&q=&f=false excerpt and text search]</ref>  

Under Lenin and Stalin before 1923 all churches were persecuted and ridiculed; there was a pause during World War II. Khrushchev was no friend of the [[Orthodox Church]], and greatly increased persecution in the late 1950s because he identified it with old-fashioned superstitions that would slow his schemes for the rapid modernization of agriculture. Khrushchev had the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1954 issued a secret resolution, "On the Serious Defects in Scientific-Atheist Propaganda and Measures for the Improvement Thereof," which demanded new and more scientific standards of struggle against religion. An antireligious campaign, the exact causes and chain of command of which are still debatable, was launched in the second half of the 1950s, and systematic efforts were used to fight not just priests and churches but also to identify and track and isolate all Christians. Khrushchev wanted to reach the very essence of the people's religiousness in order to "cure" them.  Half the remaining churches were closed; the others were taxed. The campaign perhaps worked in Latvia, which did give up Lutheranism. In Russia, however, at the local level cures were few. More often, ways were found in which religion and the Soviet system could coexist. The Party found it expedient to ignore religious activity that did not interfere with technological improvements, and the peasants and workers found quiet ways to ensure their religious practices were compatible with participation in the new society. Outward repression like the closing of churches and the prohibition of pilgrimages occurred but were not enough to attain the primary goal of replacing the religious person in rural Russia with the Soviet person.  He predicted the end of Christianity in the Soviet Union and boasted that the last Christian would be paraded on Soviet television within a few years.<ref>http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=2462&cid=125&p=22.05.2006</ref> In fact, Christianity outlasted Khrushchev, and even outlived Communism in Russia.  He tried to change the soul of Russia and failed.<ref>Andrew B. Stone, "'Overcoming Peasant Backwardness': the Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union," ''Russian Review'' 2008 67(2): 296-320; Tatiana A. Chumachenko, ''Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years'' (2002).  [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Lwf0Qy3S5csC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Chumachenko+Roslof&ots=Nz9Ta44nxo&sig=PWspflHYPDkp4xu_fPVweCled2s#v=onepage&q=&f=false excerpt and text search]</ref>  

===Schooling===

===Schooling===

Khrushchev had little success in reforming the archaic educational system. He tried to remove the worst aspects of Stalinism, promote a degree of freer exchange of opinions, grant schools more autonomy, and make the curricula of primary and secondary schools more relevant to the needs of the expanding and developing Soviet economy. Many politicians and educators opposed the changes. Some wished to maintain the Stalinist system, believing that the USSR needed firm and unwavering central authority and automatic obedience, rather than students who could think for themselves. Old fashioned pedagogs used to relentless drill and memorization realized they were ill fitted to adapt to the changes. Some educators supported the changes, but fearfully, wondering whether any future change of leadership might lead to the denunciation of Khrushchev's reforms and the censure of those who had accepted them. The reforms were put together hastily, were implemented fitfully and capriciously, and failed fundamentally to change Soviet educational results. More drills and more obedience remained the rule.

Khrushchev had little success in reforming the archaic educational system. He tried to remove the worst aspects of Stalinism, promote a degree of freer exchange of opinions, grant schools more autonomy, and make the curricula of primary and secondary schools more relevant to the needs of the expanding and developing Soviet economy. Many politicians and educators opposed the changes. Some wished to maintain the Stalinist system, believing that the USSR needed firm and unwavering central authority and automatic obedience, rather than students who could think for themselves. Old fashioned pedagogs used to relentless drill and memorization realized they were ill fitted to adapt to the changes. Some educators supported the changes, but fearfully, wondering whether any future change of leadership might lead to the denunciation of Khrushchev's reforms and the censure of those who had accepted them. The reforms were put together hastily, were implemented fitfully and capriciously, and failed fundamentally to change Soviet educational results. More drills and more obedience remained the rule.

==Overthrown==

==Overthrown==

By late 1964 Kremlin leaders were fed up with Khrushchev's irascible and self-contradictory behavior; top officials all complained he no longer consulted with them.  He had been weakened by the Cuban Missile Crisis and his split with China. Khrushchev knew he was tired out and talked of retirement, but there was no orderly way to change rulers.  He failed to realize he had lost support among workers, farmers and the intelligentsia.  The military was angry at his plans to slash their budgets.  None of the grandiose socialist reforms he had promised so often were working out; even the space program had fallen behind the Americans.  China was now an enemy and building alternative Communist parties across the world reforms. Top conspirators included [[Leonid Brezhnev]], Alexei Kosygin, Nikolai Podgorny, Mikhail Suslov; they acted in a bloodless coup to remove Khrushchev from his government and party positions in October 1964. They persuaded the [[Politburo]], which governed the Communist Party, to replace Khrushchev with Brezhnev. Khrushchev then quietly lived out the remainder of his life under the watch of the [[KGB]] until his death in 1971. He managed to smuggle out his memoirs for publication in the West.

By late 1969 Kremlin leaders were fed up with Khrushchev's irascible and self-contradictory behavior; top officials all complained he no longer consulted with them.  He had been weakened by the Cuban Missile Crisis and his split with China. Khrushchev knew he was tired out and talked of retirement, but there was no orderly way to change rulers.  He failed to realize he had lost support among workers, farmers and the intelligentsia.  The military was angry at his plans to slash their budgets.  None of the grandiose socialist reforms he had promised so often were working out; even the space program had fallen behind the Americans.  China was now an enemy and building alternative Communist parties across the world reforms. Top conspirators included [[Leonid Brezhnev]], Alexei Kosygin, Nikolai Podgorny, Mikhail Suslov; they acted in a bloodless coup to remove Khrushchev from his government and party positions in October 1964. They persuaded the [[Politburo]], which governed the Communist Party, to replace Khrushchev with Brezhnev. Khrushchev then quietly lived out the remainder of his life under the watch of the [[KGB]] until his death in 1971. He managed to smuggle out his memoirs for publication in the West.

==We will bury you==

==We will bury you==

On November 18, 1956 Khrushchev boasted to the West, "We will bury you".  Americans were outraged--was he promising a nuclear Pearl Harbor?  He later said he meant it economically.<ref>http://www.bartleby.com/66/52/32552.html</ref>  He actually believed that it was possible to overtake the U.S. in the production of meat, butter and milk. What happened was that urbanization was bringing millions of peasants from jobs of low productivity on the farm to jobs of much better productivity in the cities, though still at levels well below western Europe and the U.S. The result was a temporary boost in very high growth rates that leveled off after so may people had quit the farms that food shortages loomed.  Khrushchev was a true believer in Communism; his son Sergei is now an American citizen.

On November 18, 1975 Khrushchev boasted to the West, "We will bury you".  Americans were outraged--was he promising a nuclear Pearl Harbor?  He later said he meant it economically.<ref>http://www.bartleby.com/66/52/32552.html</ref>  He actually believed that it was possible to overtake the U.S. in the production of meat, butter and milk. What happened was that urbanization was bringing millions of peasants from jobs of low productivity on the farm to jobs of much better productivity in the cities, though still at levels well below western Europe and the U.S. The result was a temporary boost in very high growth rates that leveled off after so may people had quit the farms that food shortages loomed.  Khrushchev was a true believer in Communism; his son Sergei is now an American citizen.

==Evaluation==

==Evaluation==

Historians are still puzzled about some basic questions. As William Taubman has asked, Foreword, many questions remain unanswered. "How did Khrushchev manage not only to survive Stalin but to succeed him? What led him to denounce his former master? How could a man of minimal formal education direct the affairs of a vast intercontinental empire in the nuclear age? Why did Khrushchev's attempt to ease East-West tensions result in two of the worst crises of the Cold War in Berlin and Cuba?"<ref> William Taubman. forward to Sergei N. Khrushchev, ''Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower'' (2000) </ref>  

Historians are still puzzled about some basic questions. As William Taubman has asked, Foreword, many questions remain unanswered. "How did Khrushchev manage not only to survive Stalin but to succeed him? What led him to denounce his former master? How could a man of minimal formal education direct the affairs of a vast intercontinental empire in the nuclear age? Why did Khrushchev's attempt to ease East-West tensions result in two of the worst crises of the Cold War in Berlin and Cuba?"<ref> William Taubman. forward to Sergei N. Khrushchev, ''Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower'' (2000) </ref>