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Eisenhower molded the giant force that on June 6, 1944, landed on the beaches of Normandy. Although meeting fierce German resistance, his command of the air meant the Germans were immobile and could not be resupplied. Eisenhower's the forces broke through at St. Lo (July 18, 1944), and landed also in southern France (August 15, 1944). The Germans rapidly retreated to Germany, many escaping through the Failaise Gap that the American field commander, General Omar Bradley, had failed to close.  The liberation of Paris on August 25, 1944, seemed to herald a quick end to the war. But a German counterattack, called the "Battle of the Bulge" in the Ardennes in mid-December 1944, caught the Allies by complete surprise. This time bad weather grounded the Allied air forces, but the Germans were stunned to discover that Allied artillery used proximity fuzes that made its barrages much more effective. Eisenhower had fought the Pentagon to get those fuzes (which Washington feared would be reverse engineered by the Germans and so should not be used.) The Battle of the Bulge was won when the skies cleared, but cost 77,000 casualties, the highest toll in U.S. military history. Finally on March 6, 1945, the Allied forces crossed the Rhine. They cleared the Ruhr Valley region and reached and bridged the Elbe River. Eisenhower declined to advance on the political target of Berlin, because the casualties would be too high and the Soviets had been assigned that task. He instead focused on destroying Nazi forces in central and southern Germany. This decision was controversial, but led to a quick collapse of Nazi Germany, which surrendered on May 8, 1945.<ref>Donald E. Shepardson, “The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth” ''Journal of Military History'' (1998) 62(1): 135-153. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199801)62%3A1%3C135%3ATFOBAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L in JSTOR] </ref>

Eisenhower molded the giant force that on June 6, 1944, landed on the beaches of Normandy. Although meeting fierce German resistance, his command of the air meant the Germans were immobile and could not be resupplied. Eisenhower's the forces broke through at St. Lo (July 18, 1944), and landed also in southern France (August 15, 1944). The Germans rapidly retreated to Germany, many escaping through the Failaise Gap that the American field commander, General Omar Bradley, had failed to close.  The liberation of Paris on August 25, 1944, seemed to herald a quick end to the war. But a German counterattack, called the "Battle of the Bulge" in the Ardennes in mid-December 1944, caught the Allies by complete surprise. This time bad weather grounded the Allied air forces, but the Germans were stunned to discover that Allied artillery used proximity fuzes that made its barrages much more effective. Eisenhower had fought the Pentagon to get those fuzes (which Washington feared would be reverse engineered by the Germans and so should not be used.) The Battle of the Bulge was won when the skies cleared, but cost 77,000 casualties, the highest toll in U.S. military history. Finally on March 6, 1945, the Allied forces crossed the Rhine. They cleared the Ruhr Valley region and reached and bridged the Elbe River. Eisenhower declined to advance on the political target of Berlin, because the casualties would be too high and the Soviets had been assigned that task. He instead focused on destroying Nazi forces in central and southern Germany. This decision was controversial, but led to a quick collapse of Nazi Germany, which surrendered on May 8, 1945.<ref>Donald E. Shepardson, “The Fall of Berlin and the Rise of a Myth” ''Journal of Military History'' (1998) 62(1): 135-153. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199801)62%3A1%3C135%3ATFOBAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L in JSTOR] </ref>

===Debate with Montgomery===

===Debate with Montgomery===

Following the breakthrough in France in August 1944 an argument broke out between the Eisenhower, and the Commanding General of the 21st British Army Group, General Sir [[Bernard L. Montgomery]]. Montgomery argued that a concentrated attack, which he would lead, on the northern line of advance was preferable to Eisenhower's two-pronged broad-front advance. When Eisenhower decided that as of 1 September 1944 he would assume command of the ground troops from Montgomery, the temporary ground forces commander, the debate widened to include command. Except for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Eisenhower did not take seriously Montgomery's single-thrust proposals.<ref>  Chester Wilmot's ''Struggle for Europe'' (1952) told Montgomery's side of the story but focused the debate narrowly on strategy, virtually excluding the arguments over command. Montgomery did not show Wilmot his papers concerning command, only strategy, so Wilmot wrote about what he knew.  Politics influenced Churchill's history of the war, published in 1953, which omitted Churchill's reservations over Eisenhower's exercise of ground command, owing to the fact that Eisenhower was now President.  See G. E. Patrick Murray, ''Eisenhower versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate'' (1996)</ref>

Following the breakthrough in France in August 1944 an argument broke out between the Eisenhower, and the Commanding General of the 21st British Army Group, General Sir [[Bernard L. Montgomery]]. Montgomery argued that a concentrated attack, which he would lead, on the northern line of advance was preferable to Eisenhower's two-pronged broad-front advance. When Eisenhower decided that as of 1 September 1944 he would assume command of the ground troops from Montgomery, the temporary ground forces commander, the debate widened to include command. Except for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Eisenhower did not take seriously Montgomery's single-thrust proposals.<ref>  Chester Wilmot's ''Struggle for Europe'' (1952) told Montgomery's side of the story but focused the debate narrowly on strategy, virtually excluding the arguments over command. Montgomery did not show Wilmot his papers concerning command, only strategy, so Wilmot wrote about what he knew.  Politics influenced Churchill's history of the war, published in 1953, which omitted Churchill's reservations over Eisenhower's exercise of ground command, owing to the fact that Eisenhower was now President.  See G. E. Patrick Murray, ''Eisenhower versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate'' (1996)</ref>