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'''Roe v. Wade''' (410 U.S. 113) was a landmark Supreme Court ruling legalizing [[abortion]] in limited circumstances in 1973.

'''Roe v. Wade''' (410 U.S. 113) was a landmark Supreme Court ruling legalizing [[abortion]] in limited circumstances in 1973.

The opinion was written by Justice [[Harry Blackmun]], and divided a pregnancy into sections. Up until the [[fetus]] was viable, at the "quickening," the State could not regulate [[abortion]].   

The opinion written by Justice [[Harry Blackmun]].  Notable for its definition of [[fundamental rights]], the opinion is an expansion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the [[Fourteenth Amendment]], which, along with [[Griswold v. Connecticut]], sets up spheres of personal activity which the state cannot regulate without good cause.<ref>See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479</ref>  Specifically, the Court held that the [[Fourteenth Amendment]] protects implicit rights enumerated in its [[penumbra]], if not the text itself, which includes the [[right to privacy]].<ref>See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113</ref>  The holding of the Court has become a foundation of fundamental rights jurisprudence, and has been heavily relied upon since it was decided, and underpins many other famous cases, such as [[Lawrence v. Texas]].<ref>See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558</ref>  

Notable for its definition of [[fundamental rights]], the opinion is an expansion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the [[Fourteenth Amendment]], which, along with [[Griswold v. Connecticut]], sets up spheres of personal activity which the state cannot regulate without good cause.<ref>See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479</ref>  Specifically, the Court held that the [[Fourteenth Amendment]] protects implicit rights enumerated in its [[penumbra]], if not the text itself, which includes the [[right to privacy]].<ref>See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113</ref> The holding of the Court has become a foundation of fundamental rights jurisprudence, and has been heavily relied upon since it was decided, and underpins many other famous cases, such as [[Lawrence v. Texas]].<ref>See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558</ref>

Specifically, Blackmun argued that the right to terminate a pregnancy is in the penumbra of privacy rights protected by [[substantive due process]], since pregnancy can occasion life-changing events for women, changes not to be taken lightly.  However, he noted that the woman's interest in her own privacy is counterbalanced, obviously, by the fetus' interest in life, and the state's interest in protecting life.  The question, then, is when each interest trumps the other, and what that means at law.  Blackmun set up this framework specifically:

#In the first trimester, the right of the fetus is negligible.<ref>Blackmun rejects the idea that life begins at conception in a footnote, referencing Texas' argument in this case that it did, as not compatible with the law of almost all states at the time that a fetus can be aborted in the case of the mother's health.  Blackmun argued that, if life began at conception, Texas and other states would not allow this exception.</ref>  However, the mother's interest is great, as during the first trimester, the health risks of an abortion are significantly less than the health risks posed by pregnancy.  Therefore, during this period, the state cannot regulate abortion.

#The fetus' interest in life, and the state's interest in protecting that life, comes into being at the moment of [[viability]] - when a fetus can live on its own.  After this moment, the balancing of the mother's interests ''vis a vis'' the fetus should be done by the states, not the Court, but if a state chose to forbid abortions after [[viability]], it would be ''allowed''.<ref>Parts VIII - IX of the Opinion of the Court.</ref>

 

Several cases, up for decision at the Supreme Court in the 2007 term, may whittle away at the holding of the case.  Specifically, a South Dakota law banning nearly all abortions is seen as a deliberate attempt to force a [[test case]], where "pro-life" activists will have a chance to ask the Supreme Court to reconsider ''Roe''.<ref>The Economist, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_VVJRJTN</ref>  However, while ''Roe'' may be highly distinguished in these cases, the fact that the central holding of ''Roe v. Wade'' is so important to modern [[civil rights]] jurisprudence suggests that the whole case is unlikely to be overturned in its entirety, based on the United States concept of [[stare decisis]], or respect for legal precedent.  Under this outlook, losing ''Roe'''s holding would be fatal to an entire constitutional structure, which the Court disfavors.<ref>See Lawrence v. Texas, supra (relying strongly on Roe v. Wade)</ref>

 

Some commentators suggest that limitations of Roe may actually be good for the "pro-choice" movement, as it would allow "pro-life" activists to vent their animosity against [[judicial activism]], while forcing the public to create a more moderate legislative solution to the problem.  These commentators perceive the American public as more moderate than either the "pro-life" or "pro-choice" movements.<ref>The Economist, http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_VNSRJQV</ref>

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