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| | An example of the influence of England on the Constitution is the Origination Clause, which is Article I, Section 7, clause 1: | | An example of the influence of England on the Constitution is the Origination Clause, which is Article I, Section 7, clause 1: |
| | {{cquote|All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.}} | | {{cquote|All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.}} |
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| | + | The Origination Clause is a safeguard against overreaching federal power, by ensuring that only the representatives most accountable to the people – the more frequently elected House of Representatives – would control the purse strings. |
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| | + | The Origination Clause embodies the essential principle of political accountability, which has been valued highly before, during and after the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Prior to the Constitutional Convention a majority of the states had versions of the Origination Clause in their own state constitutions, to guarantee that revenue-raising measures could originate only from representatives who are the most accountable to the people.<ref>See Priscilla H.M. Zotti and Nicholas M. Schmitz, “The Origination Clause: Meaning, Precedent and Theory from the 12th to 20th Century,” 3 BRITISH JOURNAL OF AMERICAN LEGAL STUDIES 71, 91 Table 1 (Spring 2014).</ref> Scholars have traced the history of the Origination Clause back even earlier to the British Parliament in the 1600s, where new taxes could originate only in the House of Commons and not in the House of Lords, and the roots of this basic liberty extend all the way back to the Magna Carta itself.<ref>See id. 77-78.</ref> |
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| | + | Even today many state constitutions continue to have origination clauses in order to maximize political accountability for those who initiate new taxes.<ref>See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(B) (“Origin in House of Representatives. All bills for raising revenue or appropriating money shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur in amendments, as in other bills.”).</ref> |
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| | + | One Framer, the future Vice President Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts insisted during the Constitutional Convention on inclusion of the Origination Clause in the U.S. Constitution, in order to “restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills."<ref>James Madison, NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 35-38 (New York, Norton & Co. Inc. 1969) (May 29, 1787).</ref> The Senate would be (and still is) less representative and less accountable to the people than members of the House of Representatives are, and thus less restrained by the people against raising new revenue from them. |
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| | + | Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention set forth in detail the discussions about the Origination Clause, and confirm how important it was to the delegates. Madison observed that it was the view of the Framer George Mason, who was one of the strongest opponents of a powerful new federal government, that prevailed at the Convention in order to limit the power of the Senate:<ref>1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 543 (notes for July 6, 1787) (Yale University Press: 1937) (statement by George Mason).</ref> |
| | + | {{cquote|The consideration which weighted with the Committee was that the 1st branch would be the immediate representatives of the people, the 2nd would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the peoples money, they might soon forget the source from whence they received it. We might soon have an Aristocracy.}} |
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| | + | Multiple delegates to the Constitutional Convention, including Elbridge Gerry, John Dickenson and Edmund Randolph, felt that ratification of the new Constitution would be in jeopardy if this essential limitation on the origination of revenue-raising bills were not included.<ref>See Zotti & Schmitz, at 97-98.</ref> By an overwhelming vote of 9-2, the appropriate Committee approved the provision that "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives," with only the small states of Maryland and Delaware in dissent.<ref>See id. at 99.</ref> The additional caveat that the Senate would retain the power to amend was never officially recorded at the Constitutional Convention, id., an omission that underscores how the power to amend by the Senate should not be allowed to swallow the rule that was passed and recorded. |
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| | + | James Madison became an enthusiastic supporter of the Origination Clause during the ratification process. As Madison wrote anonymously in Federalist No. 58 in order to promote ratification of the Constitution: |
| | + | {{cquote|The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of the government. … This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect, ever just and salutary measure.}} |
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| | + | Today there are lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of ObamaCare (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) based on the Origination Clause. |
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| | == Overriding a Veto == | | == Overriding a Veto == |