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| | What is not listed in the Constitution, Congress does not have the power to do. The national (federal) government “can exercise only the powers granted to it,” as Chief Justice Marshall explained in writing for the Supreme Court in the ''McCulloch'' decision. | | What is not listed in the Constitution, Congress does not have the power to do. The national (federal) government “can exercise only the powers granted to it,” as Chief Justice Marshall explained in writing for the Supreme Court in the ''McCulloch'' decision. |
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| − | As recently as 2012, Chief Justice John Roberts emphasized these inherent limits on the power of the national government, which exist independent of the Bill of Rights, in the Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (better known as "ObamaCare"):<ref>''Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius'', 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012) (omitting the case citations).</ref> | + | As recently as 2012, Chief Justice John Roberts emphasized these inherent limits on the power of the national government, which exist independent of the Bill of Rights, in the Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (better known as "ObamaCare"):<ref>''Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius'', 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012) (omitting the case citations within the quotation).</ref> |
| | {{cquote|Today, the restrictions on government power foremost in many Americans' minds are likely to be affirmative prohibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights. These affirmative prohibitions come into play, however, only where the Government possesses authority to act in the first place. If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would not violate any of the express prohibitions in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution. | | {{cquote|Today, the restrictions on government power foremost in many Americans' minds are likely to be affirmative prohibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights. These affirmative prohibitions come into play, however, only where the Government possesses authority to act in the first place. If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would not violate any of the express prohibitions in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution. |
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| | === War Powers Clause === | | === War Powers Clause === |
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| − | Some would consider the most important enumerated power of Congress to be the War Powers Clause, which gives Congress -- and only Congress -- the power to declare war. See U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 11. | + | Some would consider the most important enumerated power of Congress to be the War Powers Clause, which gives Congress -- and only Congress -- the power to declare war. ''See'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 11. |
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| | Despite what the Constitution says is the sole responsibility of Congress, during the second half of the 1900s and the first part of the 21st century presidents have repeatedly started wars without obtaining a declaration of war by Congress. Examples include the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, the War in Afghanistan that began in 2001 (and is still continuing) and War in Iraq in 2002. | | Despite what the Constitution says is the sole responsibility of Congress, during the second half of the 1900s and the first part of the 21st century presidents have repeatedly started wars without obtaining a declaration of war by Congress. Examples include the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, the War in Afghanistan that began in 2001 (and is still continuing) and War in Iraq in 2002. |
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| | The Origination Clause is a safeguard against overreaching federal power, by ensuring that only the representatives most accountable to the people – the more frequently elected House of Representatives – would control the purse strings. | | The Origination Clause is a safeguard against overreaching federal power, by ensuring that only the representatives most accountable to the people – the more frequently elected House of Representatives – would control the purse strings. |
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| − | The Origination Clause embodies the essential principle of political accountability, which has been valued highly before, during and after the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Prior to the Constitutional Convention a majority of the states had versions of the Origination Clause in their own state constitutions, to guarantee that revenue-raising measures could originate only from representatives who are the most accountable to the people.<ref>See Priscilla H.M. Zotti and Nicholas M. Schmitz, “The Origination Clause: Meaning, Precedent and Theory from the 12th to 20th Century,” 3 BRITISH JOURNAL OF AMERICAN LEGAL STUDIES 71, 91 Table 1 (Spring 2014).</ref> Scholars have traced the history of the Origination Clause back even earlier to the British Parliament in the 1600s, where new taxes could originate only in the House of Commons and not in the House of Lords, and the roots of this basic liberty extend all the way back to the Magna Carta itself.<ref>See id. 77-78.</ref> | + | The Origination Clause embodies the essential principle of political accountability, which has been valued highly before, during and after the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Prior to the Constitutional Convention a majority of the states had versions of the Origination Clause in their own state constitutions, to guarantee that revenue-raising measures could originate only from representatives who are the most accountable to the people.<ref>''See'' Priscilla H.M. Zotti and Nicholas M. Schmitz, “The Origination Clause: Meaning, Precedent and Theory from the 12th to 20th Century,” 3 BRITISH JOURNAL OF AMERICAN LEGAL STUDIES 71, 91 Table 1 (Spring 2014).</ref> Scholars have traced the history of the Origination Clause back even earlier to the British Parliament in the 1600s, where new taxes could originate only in the House of Commons and not in the House of Lords, and the roots of this basic liberty extend all the way back to the Magna Carta itself.<ref>''See id.'' 77-78.</ref> |
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| − | Even today many state constitutions continue to have origination clauses in order to maximize political accountability for those who initiate new taxes.<ref>See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(B) (“Origin in House of Representatives. All bills for raising revenue or appropriating money shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur in amendments, as in other bills.”).</ref> | + | Even today many state constitutions continue to have origination clauses in order to maximize political accountability for those who initiate new taxes.<ref>''See, e.g.'', LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(B) (“Origin in House of Representatives. All bills for raising revenue or appropriating money shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur in amendments, as in other bills.”).</ref> |
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| | One Framer, the future Vice President Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, insisted during the Constitutional Convention on inclusion of the Origination Clause in the U.S. Constitution, in order to “restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills."<ref>James Madison, NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 35-38 (New York, Norton & Co. Inc. 1969) (May 29, 1787).</ref> The Senate is less representative and less accountable to the people than members of the House of Representatives are, and thus less restrained by the people against raising new revenue from them. | | One Framer, the future Vice President Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, insisted during the Constitutional Convention on inclusion of the Origination Clause in the U.S. Constitution, in order to “restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills."<ref>James Madison, NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 35-38 (New York, Norton & Co. Inc. 1969) (May 29, 1787).</ref> The Senate is less representative and less accountable to the people than members of the House of Representatives are, and thus less restrained by the people against raising new revenue from them. |
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| | {{cquote|The consideration which weighted with the Committee was that the 1st branch would be the immediate representatives of the people, the 2nd would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the peoples money, they might soon forget the source from whence they received it. We might soon have an Aristocracy.}} | | {{cquote|The consideration which weighted with the Committee was that the 1st branch would be the immediate representatives of the people, the 2nd would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the peoples money, they might soon forget the source from whence they received it. We might soon have an Aristocracy.}} |
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| − | Multiple delegates to the Constitutional Convention, including Elbridge Gerry, John Dickenson and Edmund Randolph, felt that ratification of the new Constitution would be in jeopardy if this essential limitation on the origination of revenue-raising bills were not included.<ref>See Zotti & Schmitz, at 97-98.</ref> By an overwhelming vote of 9-2, the appropriate Committee approved the provision that "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives," with only the small states of Maryland and Delaware in dissent.<ref>See id. at 99.</ref> | + | Multiple delegates to the Constitutional Convention, including Elbridge Gerry, John Dickenson and Edmund Randolph, felt that ratification of the new Constitution would be in jeopardy if this essential limitation on the origination of revenue-raising bills were not included.<ref>''See'' Zotti & Schmitz, at 97-98.</ref> By an overwhelming vote of 9-2, the appropriate Committee approved the provision that "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives," with only the small states of Maryland and Delaware in dissent.<ref>''See id.'' at 99.</ref> |
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| | James Madison became an enthusiastic supporter of the Origination Clause during the ratification process. As Madison wrote anonymously in Federalist No. 58 in order to promote ratification of the Constitution: | | James Madison became an enthusiastic supporter of the Origination Clause during the ratification process. As Madison wrote anonymously in Federalist No. 58 in order to promote ratification of the Constitution: |