Changes

==Insurgency==

==Insurgency==

After the removal of Saddam, Iraq saw the rise of sectarian violence initiated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's [[Sunni]] dominated al-Qaeda in Iraq faction and the majority [[Shia]] population. The strategy was to disrupt Iraq's economy and make the new democratic state ungovernable as long as the U.S. presence continued. Many Iraqis remain grateful to the United States for freeing them from Saddam's dictatorship. The de-Ba'athification process excluded many Sunnis from leadership in the new Iraq. To many Sunnis, the US was viewed suspiciously for supporting the democratically elected Shia majority. Though a minority, the Sunni have traditionally ruled Iraq and view themselves entitled to continue the privilege of doing so. There are also some intractable Sunni whose interpretation of Muslim law says that the Shia are considered heretics, and thus not fit to lead the nation.  

After the removal of Saddam, Iraq saw the rise of sectarian violence initiated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's [[Sunni]] dominated al-Qaeda in Iraq faction and the majority [[Shia]] population. The strategy was to disrupt Iraq's economy and make the new democratic state ungovernable as long as the U.S. presence continued. The de-Ba'athification process excluded many Sunnis from leadership in the new Iraq. Some Sunnis viewed the U.S. suspiciously for supporting the Shia majority. Though a minority, the Sunni have traditionally ruled Iraq since 1922 and view themselves entitled to continue the privilege of doing so. There are also some intractable Sunni whose interpretation of Muslim law says that the Shia are considered heretics, and thus not fit to lead the nation.  

The Shia majority, notably the [[Jaysh Al-Madhi]], have had militant factions who not only attacked Sunni Muslims but also American and other coalition troops even while the coalition was protecting the democratically elected Shia from Sunni attacks. Other Shia groups that have not attacked coalition forces have pursued their own factional aims while relying on the US to ensure Shia majority rule, instead of seeking unity and a cohesive representatively fair national political structure, which hampered progress and reconciliation efforts. <ref> Testimony of Edward N. Luttwak, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate , Hearings on [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts070123luttwak.pdf Securing America's Interest in Iraq], retrieved March 21, 2007</ref>   

Among the Shia majority, notably the [[Jaysh Al-Madhi]], is a militant faction who not only attacked Sunni Muslims but also American and other coalition troops even while the coalition was protecting the democratically elected Shia. Other Shia groups that have not attacked coalition forces have pursued their own factional aims while relying on the US to ensure Shia majority rule, instead of seeking unity and a cohesive representatively fair national political structure, which hampered progress and reconciliation efforts. <ref> Testimony of Edward N. Luttwak, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate , Hearings on [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts070123luttwak.pdf Securing America's Interest in Iraq], retrieved March 21, 2007</ref>   

However, as reported on May 31, 2007, in the article "US Eyes Cease-Fires End Violence in Iraq" the No. 2 American commander, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, said he thought 80 percent of Iraqis — including Sunni insurgents and Shia militants — can reach reconciliation. "We are talking about cease-fires, and maybe signing some things that say they won't conduct operations against the government of Iraq or against coalition forces. I believe there are elements that are irreconcilable, but I believe the large majority are. I believe about 80 percent are reconcilable, both [[Jaysh Al-Madhi]] as well as Sunni insurgents." <ref> http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/05/31/national/w114445D86.DTL </ref>  

However, as reported on May 31, 2007, in the article "US Eyes Cease-Fires End Violence in Iraq" the No. 2 American commander, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, said he thought 80 percent of Iraqis — including Sunni insurgents and Shia militants — can reach reconciliation. "We are talking about cease-fires, and maybe signing some things that say they won't conduct operations against the government of Iraq or against coalition forces. I believe there are elements that are irreconcilable, but I believe the large majority are. I believe about 80 percent are reconcilable, both [[Jaysh Al-Madhi]] as well as Sunni insurgents." <ref> http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/05/31/national/w114445D86.DTL </ref>