| | The immediate coherence of the concept of omnipotence is how we even ''can'' get the sense that omnipotence is paradoxical: it's immediate coherence is (mis)interpreted as a limitation upon it. Only by allowing that it may apply its own agency upon itself, and, thus, upon the fact that things can be identified, is this supposed limitation 'remedied'. Know-ability is a function of the fact that there is a connection, or correspondence, between the knower and the knowable. But, the position that the immediate coherence of omnipotence is a limitation upon omnipotence is tantamount to the position that the possibility of knowledge constitutes an agent which is distinct from, and superior to, an omnipotent agent. In other words, this position is equivalent to the statement: "''rationality is not co-extensive with omnipotence, despite that omnipotence is known immediately to be coherent''".<ref>Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence; George I. Mavrodes[http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Modern_S10/Handouts/Mavrodes.pdf]</ref> | | The immediate coherence of the concept of omnipotence is how we even ''can'' get the sense that omnipotence is paradoxical: it's immediate coherence is (mis)interpreted as a limitation upon it. Only by allowing that it may apply its own agency upon itself, and, thus, upon the fact that things can be identified, is this supposed limitation 'remedied'. Know-ability is a function of the fact that there is a connection, or correspondence, between the knower and the knowable. But, the position that the immediate coherence of omnipotence is a limitation upon omnipotence is tantamount to the position that the possibility of knowledge constitutes an agent which is distinct from, and superior to, an omnipotent agent. In other words, this position is equivalent to the statement: "''rationality is not co-extensive with omnipotence, despite that omnipotence is known immediately to be coherent''".<ref>Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence; George I. Mavrodes[http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Modern_S10/Handouts/Mavrodes.pdf]</ref> |
| | + | The paradox of the stone is the common argument given by atheists (and some theists, such as Peter Geach)<ref>https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/mp.htm</ref> to attempt to show that the concept of Divine omnipotence is incoherent and thus non-existant. If God can create a stone too heavy for him to lift, goes the argument, then God cannot do something, namely, lift the object; if God cannot make such a stone, then there is still something He cannot perform and thus is not omnipotent. |
| | + | There are several ways to answer this paradox, but the most common is to say that omnipotence does not entail the ability to actualize logically incoherent propositions such as 1+1=3. This is not a limitation or incoherene in God's omnipotence, because 1+1=3 and a rock too heavy for an omnipotent being to lift are not ''things''. In other words, it is the propositions themselves that are incoherent, not God's omnipotence. Since these propositions don't actually describe anything, there is nothing for God to actualize. |
| | + | Another less conventional way to answer the paradox is by saying that if God wanted to, He could take on human form and zap a rock into existence above His body, thus being too heavy for Him to lift. But the problem is, of course, that the ability to make a rock too heavy to lift is not an exercise of power. It comes from a ''lack'' of power which God does not have, just as sin is an example of a lack of goodness in humans which God does not have. |