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| | The British action that irked Americans most was the Orders in Council, issued in January 1807. These orders banned U.S trade with France and its allies. Restricting trade to Britain alone would make the U.S. a dependency of Britain and restore the earlier colonial trading relationship. Both Jefferson and Madison leaned toward France and against Britain in the Napoleonic Wars. As a matter of national honor, they were determined that the U.S. would assert its right to follow a foreign policy of its own choosing. When a British warship in June 1807 attacked and disabled the [[USS Chesapeake|USS ''Chesapeake'']] and impressed several crewmen, a general wave of indignation rose in which even the maritime interests joined. This was an insult to the flag. Jefferson decided against war and instead tried to punish Britain by cutting off American trade. This annoyed the British some but outraged New England, where shipping was shut down and the economy badly hurt. | | The British action that irked Americans most was the Orders in Council, issued in January 1807. These orders banned U.S trade with France and its allies. Restricting trade to Britain alone would make the U.S. a dependency of Britain and restore the earlier colonial trading relationship. Both Jefferson and Madison leaned toward France and against Britain in the Napoleonic Wars. As a matter of national honor, they were determined that the U.S. would assert its right to follow a foreign policy of its own choosing. When a British warship in June 1807 attacked and disabled the [[USS Chesapeake|USS ''Chesapeake'']] and impressed several crewmen, a general wave of indignation rose in which even the maritime interests joined. This was an insult to the flag. Jefferson decided against war and instead tried to punish Britain by cutting off American trade. This annoyed the British some but outraged New England, where shipping was shut down and the economy badly hurt. |
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| − | Madison tried to negotiate a revocation of the ban on U.S. trade with France. Congress passed "Macon's Bill No. 2" in 1810 that promised if Britain or France allowed American shipping, the U.S. would put an embargo on the other country. [[Napoleon]] tricked the U.S. into believing, falsely, that France had dropped its restrictions. Madison then slapped an embargo on trade to Britain, which was by far the largest trading partner of the U.S. In April 1811, war was so far from the minds of America's leaders that Congress voted to reduce the size of both the army and the navy.<ref>Wood, Gordon S. ''Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815'' (Oxford History of the United States Book 4). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. p. 671.</ref> In July 1811, Madison told Congress he would call a special session in November to consider preparations for war. By the end of the November, the administration and congressional leaders had privately reached a consensus that country needed to prepare for war.<ref>Brown, Roger H., "The War Hawks of 1812: An Historical Myth", ''Indiana Magazine of History'', Vol. 60, No. 2 (June 1964), pp. 137-151.</ref> | + | Madison tried to negotiate a revocation of the ban on U.S. trade with France. Congress passed "Macon's Bill No. 2" in 1810 that promised if Britain or France allowed American shipping, the U.S. would put an embargo on the other country. [[Napoleon]] tricked the U.S. into believing, falsely, that France had dropped its restrictions. Madison then slapped an embargo on trade to Britain, which was by far the largest trading partner of the U.S. In April 1811, war was so far from the minds of America's leaders that Congress voted to reduce the size of both the army and the navy.<ref>Wood, Gordon S. ''Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815'' (Oxford History of the United States Book 4). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. p. 671.</ref> In July 1811, Madison told Congress he would call a special session in November to consider preparations for war. By the end of the November, the administration and congressional leaders had privately reached a consensus that country needed to prepare for war.<ref name="warhawk">Brown, Roger H., "The War Hawks of 1812: An Historical Myth", ''Indiana Magazine of History'', Vol. 60, No. 2 (June 1964), pp. 137-151.</ref> |
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| | A military buildup was approved in January 1812. The Republican leaders were opposed to a standing army, so this action was effectively a decision for war. In early April, a package of measures were approved that were considered preliminary to war. Madison sent a war message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against Britain and asking for a declaration of war. The House of Representative voted for war on June 4 by a vote 79 to 49. In the U.S. Senate, the outcome was in doubt for a time and the final vote was 19 to 13. With New England vehemently opposed, Congress declared war on June 18. Support for war was strongest in the West and in the South, the regions least likely to suffer from British retaliation. For New England, trade was about economics and jobs. For the rest of the country, it was a question of the nation's honor. By the time war was declared, the grievances it was based on were already outdated. In May 1812, Britain had offered to license U.S. merchant ships on the same basis that British ships were licensed. In June, it had revoked the Orders in Council altogether. The administration was fully committed to war by April, so these concessions were summarily dismissed. | | A military buildup was approved in January 1812. The Republican leaders were opposed to a standing army, so this action was effectively a decision for war. In early April, a package of measures were approved that were considered preliminary to war. Madison sent a war message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against Britain and asking for a declaration of war. The House of Representative voted for war on June 4 by a vote 79 to 49. In the U.S. Senate, the outcome was in doubt for a time and the final vote was 19 to 13. With New England vehemently opposed, Congress declared war on June 18. Support for war was strongest in the West and in the South, the regions least likely to suffer from British retaliation. For New England, trade was about economics and jobs. For the rest of the country, it was a question of the nation's honor. By the time war was declared, the grievances it was based on were already outdated. In May 1812, Britain had offered to license U.S. merchant ships on the same basis that British ships were licensed. In June, it had revoked the Orders in Council altogether. The administration was fully committed to war by April, so these concessions were summarily dismissed. |
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| | ===The myth of the War Hawks=== | | ===The myth of the War Hawks=== |
| − | There is a persistent myth that the United States was pushed into war a group of young congressman called the War Hawks. This was a group of about a dozen congressmen led by Henry Clay of Kentucky and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. As the chronology above illustrates, every step in the march toward war was initiated by Madison and the executive branch. In this era, Congress simply responded to proposals made by the executive. There was no opportunity for a minority faction to initiate policy. Since the War Hawks came from the West and South, historians who blame the War Hawks for the war have further argued that the U.S. was secretly motivated by grievances specific to these two regions. | + | There is a persistent myth that the United States was pushed into war a group of congressman called the War Hawks. This was a group of about a dozen congressmen led by [[Henry Clay]] of Kentucky and [[John C. Calhoun]] of South Carolina. Most were comparatively young and first elected in 1810. This was a year when many congressman first elected in 1788 retired, so there was a generational shift. As the chronology above illustrates, every step in the march toward war was initiated by Madison and the executive branch. In this era, congressional activity focused on responding to proposals made by the executive. There was no opportunity for a minority faction like the War Hawks to initiate policy. |
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| | + | Since the War Hawks came from the West and South, historians who blame the War Hawks for the war have further argued that they were motivated by grievances specific to these two regions. Westerners were supposedly fixated by the prospect of land in Canada, while Southerners eyed Spanish Florida. The slogan of the War Hawks was, "Free trade and sailors' rights." That is to say, neither Canada nor Florida were emphasized in public debate. The idea of a War Hawk faction comes from Federalist congressmen who listened to the fiery anti-British speeches of Clay, Calhoun, and others, and concluded, or hoped, that Republicans were divided. An analysis of private letters does not support the view that the Republican leadership was split into pro-war and pro-peace factions.<ref name="warhawk" /> |
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| | ===The myth of land hunger=== | | ===The myth of land hunger=== |