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→Hispanic evangelicalism
*[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/hispanic-evangelical-church_n_3055752.html Rise Of Hispanic Evangelical Church: Time Magazine Discusses Influence Of Latinos In America's Religion], Huffington Post, April 11, 2013
*[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/hispanic-evangelical-church_n_3055752.html Rise Of Hispanic Evangelical Church: Time Magazine Discusses Influence Of Latinos In America's Religion], Huffington Post, April 11, 2013
*[http://nation.time.com/2013/04/04/the-rise-of-evangelicos/ The Rise of Evangélicos] By Elizabeth ''Time'' magazine, April 4, 2013</ref>
*[http://nation.time.com/2013/04/04/the-rise-of-evangelicos/ The Rise of Evangélicos] By Elizabeth ''Time'' magazine, April 4, 2013</ref>
=== Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon religion/irreligion demographic projection ==
In their 2010 journal article entitled, ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043'' published in the ''Journal for the Sientific Study of Religion'' Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon wrote:
We find considerable stability of religious groups over time, but there are some important
shifts. Hispanic Catholics experience the strongest growth rates to 2043. Immigration, high
fertility, and a young age structure will enable this group to expand from 10 to 18 percent
of the American population between 2003 and 2043, despite a net loss of communicants to
secularism and Protestantism. This will power the growth of Catholics as a whole, who will
surpass Protestants by mid century within the nation’s youngest age groups. This represents a
historic moment for a country settled by anti-Catholic Puritans, whose Revolution was motivated
inpart by a desire to spread dissenting Protestantism and whose populationon the eve of revolution
was 98 percent Protestant (Huntington 2004; Kaufmann 2004). Another important development
concerns the growth of the Muslim population and decline of the Jews. High Muslim fertility and
a young Muslim age structure contrasts with low Jewish childbearing levels and a mature Jewish
age structure. Barring an unforeseen shift in the religious composition and size of the immigrant
flow, Muslims will surpass Jews in the population by 2023 and in the electorate by 2028. This
could have profound effects on the course of American foreign policy. Within the non-Hispanic
white population, we expect to see continued Liberal Protestant decline due to low fertility and
a net loss in exchanges with other groups. White Catholics will also lose due to a net outflow of
converts. Fundamentalist and Moderate Protestant denominations will hold their own within the
white population, but will decline overall as the white share of the population falls.
The finding that Protestant fundamentalism may decline in relative terms over the medium
term contrasts with a prevailing view that envisions the continued growth of “strong religion”
(Stark and Iannaccone 1994a). This is the result of an older age structure, which increases
loss through mortality, and immigration, which reduces the size of all predominantly white
denominations—all of which are poorly represented in the immigration flow. Fundamentalists’
relatively high fertility and net surplus from the religious marketplace is not sufficient to counteract the effects of immigration. Obviously ,this could change if significant immigration begins to arrivefrom more Pentecostalist source countries such as Guatemala or parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Our work also sheds light on the religious restructuring paradigm, though we do not find a
clear victor between secularism and fundamentalism. The secular population will grow substan-
tially in the decades ahead because it has a young age structure and more people leave religion
than enter it. The sharpest gains for secularism will be within the white population, where seculars
will surpass fundamentalists by 2030. On the other hand, there are important demographic limits
to secularism, demonstrating the power of religious demography. The relatively low fertility of
secular Americans and the religiosity of the immigrant inflow provide a countervailing force that
will cause the secularization process within the total population to plateau before 2043. This
represents an important theoretical point in that demography permits society to become more
religious even as individuals tend to become less religious over time.<ref>[http://www.sneps.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/jssr_15101.pdf ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043''], ''Journal for the Sientific Study of Religion'', vol. 49, no. 2 (June) 2010, Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon,</ref>}}
== Past long Term Increase in Those Who Have No Religious Identity ==
== Past long Term Increase in Those Who Have No Religious Identity ==