Changes

''„Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labour to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men & citizens. The mere Politican, equally with the pious man ought to respect & to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private & public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the Oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure--reason & experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. 'Tis substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force to every species of Free Government. Who that is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric.“''

''„Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labour to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men & citizens. The mere Politican, equally with the pious man ought to respect & to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private & public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the Oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure--reason & experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. 'Tis substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force to every species of Free Government. Who that is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric.“''

In contrast to official pervasive acknowledgment of God (mentioned in all 50 state constitutions<ref>http://patriotpost.us/reference/50-state-constitutions-on-god/</ref>) and  the place the Bible historically had in government, jurisprudence  <ref>[http://www.faithfacts.org/christ-and-the-culture/the-bible-and-government The Bible and Government]</ref> and in over 300 years of American education<ref>[http://www.astorehouseofknowledge.info/Education_in_the_United_States Education in the United_States]</ref><ref>[http://peacebyjesus.witnesstoday.org/CauseEffect.html CAUSE AND EFFECTS: THE BIBLE AND EDUCATION]</ref> and the status therein of Christian faith in 1962 when Engel v. Vitale case was decided, (when an estimated 75 percent of the school systems in the South had religious services and Bible readings<ref>Colliers 1961 Yearbook p. 224</ref>), are some see court decisions in the last 60 years which some see resulting in Christian faith being functionally supplanted by secularist ideology and the religion of non-theistic [[Secular Humanism]].<ref>[http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest, ''Can Public Schools Be Religiously Neutral?''] Leadership U.</ref>

In contrast to official pervasive acknowledgment of God (mentioned in all 50 state constitutions<ref>http://patriotpost.us/reference/50-state-constitutions-on-god/</ref>) and  the place the Bible historically had in government, jurisprudence  <ref>[http://www.faithfacts.org/christ-and-the-culture/the-bible-and-government The Bible and Government]</ref> and in over 300 years of American education<ref>[http://www.astorehouseofknowledge.info/Education_in_the_United_States Education in the United_States]</ref><ref>[http://peacebyjesus.witnesstoday.org/CauseEffect.html CAUSE AND EFFECTS: THE BIBLE AND EDUCATION]</ref> and the status therein of Christian faith in 1962 when [[Engel v. Vitale]] case was decided, (when an estimated 75 percent of the school systems in the South had religious services and Bible readings<ref>Colliers 1961 Yearbook p. 224</ref>), are some see court decisions in the last 60 years which some see resulting in Christian faith being functionally supplanted by secularist ideology and the religion of non-theistic [[Secular Humanism]].<ref>[http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest, ''Can Public Schools Be Religiously Neutral?''] Leadership U.</ref>

Donald Closson comments that,  

Donald Closson comments that,  

While Jefferson's terminology helped define the language of the debate, it did not constitute a precedent in law. However the Supreme Court adopted this metaphor and interpretation in the 1947 case, [[Everson v. Board of Education]]. The leader of the new interpretation was Justice [[Hugo Black]].<ref>Barbara A. Perry, "Justice Hugo Black and the 'Wall of Separation between Church and State'" ''Journal of Church and State'' 1989 31(1): 55-72. </ref>

While Jefferson's terminology helped define the language of the debate, it did not constitute a precedent in law. However the Supreme Court adopted this metaphor and interpretation in the 1947 case, [[Everson v. Board of Education]]. The leader of the new interpretation was Justice [[Hugo Black]].<ref>Barbara A. Perry, "Justice Hugo Black and the 'Wall of Separation between Church and State'" ''Journal of Church and State'' 1989 31(1): 55-72. </ref>

Jefferson and Madison insisted that a necessary condition for political freedom was religious freedom, and they insisted on the disestablishment of the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Congregational churches in the new states. That view, however, and the Jeffersonian notion that an impenetrable wall of separation must exist between church and state, has been called into question or attacked by such Supreme Court decisions as Sherbert v. Verner (1963), Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith (1990), and Boerne v. P. F. Flores (1993), which question the acceptance of religious pluralism, one of the great achievements of the American "experiment." <ref> Edwin S. Gaustad, "Thomas Jefferson, Religious Freedom, and the Supreme Court." ''Church History'' 1998 67(4): 682-694. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3169848  in JSTOR]</ref>

Jefferson and Madison insisted that a necessary condition for political freedom was religious freedom, and they insisted on the disestablishment of the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Congregational churches in the new states. That view, however, and the Jeffersonian notion that an impenetrable wall of separation must exist between church and state, has been called into question or attacked by such Supreme Court decisions as [[Sherbert v. Verner]] (1963), Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith (1990), and Boerne v. P. F. Flores (1993), which question the acceptance of religious pluralism, one of the great achievements of the American "experiment." <ref> Edwin S. Gaustad, "Thomas Jefferson, Religious Freedom, and the Supreme Court." ''Church History'' 1998 67(4): 682-694. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3169848  in JSTOR]</ref>

===Northwest Ordinance - importance of religion in education===

===Northwest Ordinance - importance of religion in education===

It is perceived by some that outlawing formal religion results in replacing it with a functional ideological equivalent. Secularity as a condition of a non-ecclesiastical state may be distinguished with secularism as an ideology, with key Supreme court decisions  being used to infer state favor toward the nonreligious, resulting in a "religion-free education" which "indoctrinates" the young into viewing secularism as the only frame of reference.<ref>(liberal) Warren A. Nord, ''Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma''</ref>

It is perceived by some that outlawing formal religion results in replacing it with a functional ideological equivalent. Secularity as a condition of a non-ecclesiastical state may be distinguished with secularism as an ideology, with key Supreme court decisions  being used to infer state favor toward the nonreligious, resulting in a "religion-free education" which "indoctrinates" the young into viewing secularism as the only frame of reference.<ref>(liberal) Warren A. Nord, ''Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma''</ref>

Enacting laws themselves is seen as an imposition of morality,<ref>[http://www.americanthinker.com/printpage/?url=http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/10/what_libertarians_misunderstan.html AmericanThinker.com, ''What Libertarians Misunderstand']', October 10, 2010</ref>  and Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest ask, ''Is a religiously neutral public school education an oxymoron?'', and see notable Supreme court Establishment Clause decisions (such as Engel v. Vatale, l962) as in essence creating "a legal fiction--a myth of religious neutrality." They argue that "Philosophy and religion blur when dealing with these basics, such as truth, while pointing to the ultimate questions and answers in life," and that, "Any discussion of a secular-religious distinction is self-refuting. For someone's values are always being advocated even in so called "neutral" settings."  

Enacting laws themselves is seen as an imposition of morality,<ref>[http://www.americanthinker.com/printpage/?url=http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/10/what_libertarians_misunderstan.html AmericanThinker.com, ''What Libertarians Misunderstand']', October 10, 2010</ref>  and Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest ask, ''Is a religiously neutral public school education an oxymoron?'', and see notable Supreme court Establishment Clause decisions (such as [[Engel v. Vitale]], 1962) as in essence creating "a legal fiction--a myth of religious neutrality." They argue that "Philosophy and religion blur when dealing with these basics, such as truth, while pointing to the ultimate questions and answers in life," and that, "Any discussion of a secular-religious distinction is self-refuting. For someone's values are always being advocated even in so called "neutral" settings."  

Removing formal God (and morality) based  religion from the public schools is seen to have the effect of supplanting it with [[Secular Humanism]]. This in turn  promotes pantheism, the worship of nature with its [[evolution]]ary hypothesis, and the rejection of moral absolutes (especially those of the Bible), resulting in a dangerous ever-morphing morality and decline of beneficial [[moral decline|traditional morality]].<ref>http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html</ref>  

Removing formal God (and morality) based  religion from the public schools is seen to have the effect of supplanting it with [[Secular Humanism]]. This in turn  promotes pantheism, the worship of nature with its [[evolution]]ary hypothesis, and the rejection of moral absolutes (especially those of the Bible), resulting in a dangerous ever-morphing morality and decline of beneficial [[moral decline|traditional morality]].<ref>http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html</ref>  

Kussrow and Vannest argue that "since atheism is a religion under the establishment clause, (Malnak v. Yogi, l977), given the above facts, secular humanism must be considered a religion for the purposes of the First Amendment (Gove v. Mead School District, l985)", noting that "the American Humanist Association even has a religious tax exemption status approved by the Federal government."<ref>[http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest, ''Can Public Schools Be Religiously Neutral?'']</ref> In ''United States v. Kauten'' (2d Cir. 1943), conscientious objector status was granted to Mathias Kauten, not due to his belief in God, but on the basis of his “religious conscience.”<ref>[http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest, ''Can Public Schools Be Religiously Neutral?'']</ref>

Kussrow and Vannest argue that "since atheism is a religion under the establishment clause, (Malnak v. Yogi, l977), given the above facts, secular humanism must be considered a religion for the purposes of the First Amendment (Gove v. Mead School District, l985)", noting that "the American Humanist Association even has a religious tax exemption status approved by the Federal government."<ref>[http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest, ''Can Public Schools Be Religiously Neutral?'']</ref> In ''United States v. Kauten'' (2d Cir. 1943), conscientious objector status was granted to Mathias Kauten, not due to his belief in God, but on the basis of his “religious conscience.”<ref>[http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/neutral.html Paul G. Kussrow and Loren Vannest, ''Can Public Schools Be Religiously Neutral?'']</ref>

Other evidence indicates that U.S. courts have moved from a generally substantive definition of religion, in which the religion affirms a transcendent deity, to a functional definition of religion, which Secular Humanism has been defined by some courts to be. In the ''Torcaso v. Watkins'' case in 1961, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a  Maryland notary public who was disqualified from office because he would not declare a belief in God. The Court argued that theistic religions could not be favored by the Court over non-theistic religions.  

Other evidence indicates that U.S. courts have moved from a generally substantive definition of religion, in which the religion affirms a transcendent deity, to a functional definition of religion, which Secular Humanism has been defined by some courts to be. In the ''[[Torcaso v. Watkins]]'' case in 1961, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a  Maryland notary public who was disqualified from office because he would not declare a belief in God. The Court argued that theistic religions could not be favored by the Court over non-theistic religions.  

In the light of such, James Davison Hunter argues that,  

In the light of such, James Davison Hunter argues that,  

What constitutes government establishment of religion,, as forbidden by the First Amendment has been a difficult and somewhat inconsistent matter, especially in the modern era. In ''Walz v. Tax Commissioner''  (1970), the Court noted that for "the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'' It would later state that the "Court has long held that the First Amendment reaches more than classic, 18th century establishments."<ref>Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494 (1994)</ref> <ref>http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment01/02.html#fsupp.3</ref>

What constitutes government establishment of religion,, as forbidden by the First Amendment has been a difficult and somewhat inconsistent matter, especially in the modern era. In ''Walz v. Tax Commissioner''  (1970), the Court noted that for "the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'' It would later state that the "Court has long held that the First Amendment reaches more than classic, 18th century establishments."<ref>Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494 (1994)</ref> <ref>http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment01/02.html#fsupp.3</ref>

* In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the  Court rejected state statutes which provided state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools, judging "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes involves excessive entanglement between government and religion." In so doing, it conceded that "total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable." It then proposed that the constitutionality of such religious programs could be met if they met all of three conditions:  

* In [[Lemon v. Kurtzman]] (1971), the  Court rejected state statutes which provided state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools, judging "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes involves excessive entanglement between government and religion." In so doing, it conceded that "total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable." It then proposed that the constitutionality of such religious programs could be met if they met all of three conditions:  

# It has a secular purpose

# It has a secular purpose

However, the Court appears not to have always bound itself to all 3 prongs of this test in future Establishment cases, with the second aspect being more stressed.  

However, the Court appears not to have always bound itself to all 3 prongs of this test in future Establishment cases, with the second aspect being more stressed.  

* In ''Everson v. Board of Education'' (1947), the [[Supreme court]] ruled that it was not unconstitutional for tax money to fund a bus fare program to get students to and from religious schools, which met the secular educational requirements which the state has power to impose. It noted that "parents might refuse to risk their children to the serious danger of traffic accidents going to and from parochial schools, the approaches to which were not protected by policemen. Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit their children to attend schools which the state had cut off from such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal.."

* In ''[[Everson v. Board of Education]]'' (1947), the [[Supreme court]] ruled that it was not unconstitutional for tax money to fund a bus fare program to get students to and from religious schools, which met the secular educational requirements which the state has power to impose. It noted that "parents might refuse to risk their children to the serious danger of traffic accidents going to and from parochial schools, the approaches to which were not protected by policemen. Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit their children to attend schools which the state had cut off from such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal.."

However, the case was also notable for its statement by Chief Justice Black, who, writing the majority opinion, invoked the metaphor which Thomas Jefferson used in writing to the Danbury Baptists, declaring,  

However, the case was also notable for its statement by Chief Justice Black, who, writing the majority opinion, invoked the metaphor which Thomas Jefferson used in writing to the Danbury Baptists, declaring,  

Justice Black also stated,  

Justice Black also stated,  

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

“Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another....In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’”<ref>Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S at 15-16 (1947)</ref><ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=330&invol=1#63</ref>

“Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another....In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’”<ref>[[Everson v. Board of Education]], 330 U.S at 15-16 (1947)</ref><ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=330&invol=1#63</ref>

</blockquote>  

</blockquote>  

* The next year (1948), in ''McCollum v. Board of Education'', the Court disallowed a public school program under which religious instruction was provided during the last period of the school day instead of secular subjects.<ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=333&invol=203</ref>

* The next year (1948), in ''McCollum v. Board of Education'', the Court disallowed a public school program under which religious instruction was provided during the last period of the school day instead of secular subjects.<ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=333&invol=203</ref>

* The most significant challenge to the predominate historical understanding of the Establishment Clause occurred in 1962, almost 170 years after the adoption of the First Amendment (Dec. 15, 1701). In ''Engel v. Vitale''  the Supreme Court dealt with a required practice of a local New York school which began each school day by reading aloud the following prayer in the presence of the teacher: ''Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.'  

* The most significant challenge to the predominate historical understanding of the Establishment Clause occurred in 1962, almost 170 years after the adoption of the First Amendment (Dec. 15, 1701). In ''[[Engel v. Vitale]]''  the Supreme Court dealt with a required practice of a local New York school which began each school day by reading aloud the following prayer in the presence of the teacher: ''Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.'  

Many other schools also did likewise, as such had been a historical practice since the beginning  of schooling in America. However, the Court outlawed any government sanctioned prayer in schools,  declared that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.''

Many other schools also did likewise, as such had been a historical practice since the beginning  of schooling in America. However, the Court outlawed any government sanctioned prayer in schools,  declared that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.''

Justice Black stated that "The Establishment Clause . . .  is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." Justice Stewart was alone in dissenting, contending that, "to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation.''

Justice Black stated that "The Establishment Clause . . .  is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." Justice Stewart was alone in dissenting, contending that, "to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation.''

* In 1963, in ''Abington School Dist. v. Schempp'',  the Supreme Court outlawed public school requirements that each school day begin with selections readings from the Bible.   

* In 1963, in ''[[Abington School District v. Schempp]]'',  the Supreme Court outlawed public school requirements that each school day begin with selections readings from the Bible.   

In this case the State argued that the object of the programs was the promotion of secular purposes, such as the expounding of moral values, the contradiction of the materialistic trends of the times, and the promotion of traditional institutions. The State also rightly contended that by forbidding Bible reading a ''religion of secularism'' would supplant it. However, the Court rejected all these contentions, stating that it was not preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.

In this case the State argued that the object of the programs was the promotion of secular purposes, such as the expounding of moral values, the contradiction of the materialistic trends of the times, and the promotion of traditional institutions. The State also rightly contended that by forbidding Bible reading a ''religion of secularism'' would supplant it. However, the Court rejected all these contentions, stating that it was not preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.

* In ''Epperson v. Arkansas'' (1968), the Court rejected an Arkansas state statute which made it unlawful for any teacher in any state-supported educational institution "to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals," or "to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches" the evolutionary theory.

* In ''[[Epperson v. Arkansas]]'' (1968), the Court rejected an Arkansas state statute which made it unlawful for any teacher in any state-supported educational institution "to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals," or "to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches" the evolutionary theory.

* A notable exception to the trend of outlawing government sanction of religion occurred in Marsh v. Chambers (1983). In this case a clergyman who opened each session of the Nebraska state legislature with a prayer was paid by public funds. [[Atheist]] Senator Earnest Chambers found this intolerable and went to court to outlaw the practice.  The District Court judged it was wrong to use public money to pay the preacher's salary, while the Appellate Court saw the prayer being offered as not permissible.  

* A notable exception to the trend of outlawing government sanction of religion occurred in [[Marsh v. Chambers]] (1983). In this case a clergyman who opened each session of the Nebraska state legislature with a prayer was paid by public funds. [[Atheist]] Senator Earnest Chambers found this intolerable and went to court to outlaw the practice.  The District Court judged it was wrong to use public money to pay the preacher's salary, while the Appellate Court saw the prayer being offered as not permissible.  

However, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the practice of beginning the legislative session with a prayer by a publicly funded chaplain was indeed constitutional. The Court's basis was the almost 200 year historicity of the use of chaplains in government, "ever since the First Congress drafted the First Amendment", a practice without adverse effect. In addition, it was stated that "because of the principles upon which the nation has developed, religion has become part of the fabric of society. The offering of the prayer is a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."<ref>http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/court/mars_v_cham.html</ref>  

However, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the practice of beginning the legislative session with a prayer by a publicly funded chaplain was indeed constitutional. The Court's basis was the almost 200 year historicity of the use of chaplains in government, "ever since the First Congress drafted the First Amendment", a practice without adverse effect. In addition, it was stated that "because of the principles upon which the nation has developed, religion has become part of the fabric of society. The offering of the prayer is a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."<ref>http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/court/mars_v_cham.html</ref>  

The age of the participants was also a deciding factor, as it judged that state legislators, being adults, are ''presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' or 'peer pressure'''. Justice Brennan dissented, objecting that the all three aspects of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test had been violated.<ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=463&invol=783</ref>  

The age of the participants was also a deciding factor, as it judged that state legislators, being adults, are ''presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' or 'peer pressure'''. Justice Brennan dissented, objecting that the all three aspects of the [[Lemon v. Kurtzman]] test had been violated.<ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=463&invol=783</ref>  

   

   

* In ''Wallace v. Jaffree'' (1985), the Court disallowed an Alabama statute authorizing a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools ''for meditation or prayer''. This was rejected on the basis that the purpose of the legislation was to restore prayer to schools. Justice Rehnquist dissented, rejecting the interpretation that the First Amendment required strict  neutrality between religion and ''irreligion,'' and instead confined the scope to a prohibition on establishing a national church, or otherwise favoring one particular religious group over another.  Some other justices indicated that other state statutes which had simply authorized moments of silence would be constitutional.

* In ''[[Wallace v. Jaffree]]'' (1985), the Court disallowed an Alabama statute authorizing a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools ''for meditation or prayer''. This was rejected on the basis that the purpose of the legislation was to restore prayer to schools. Justice Rehnquist dissented, rejecting the interpretation that the First Amendment required strict  neutrality between religion and ''irreligion,'' and instead confined the scope to a prohibition on establishing a national church, or otherwise favoring one particular religious group over another.  Some other justices indicated that other state statutes which had simply authorized moments of silence would be constitutional.

* In 1987, the Court decided in ''Edwards v. Aguillard'',  that a Louisiana statute mandating balanced treatment of ''creation-science'' and ''evolution-science'' in the public schools was unconstitutional, as the Legislators viewpoint that a supernatural created humankind was one that was religious, and thus it sought to discredit evolution "by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creation science.''

* In 1987, the Court decided in ''[[Edwards v. Aguillard]]'',  that a Louisiana statute mandating balanced treatment of ''creation-science'' and ''evolution-science'' in the public schools was unconstitutional, as the Legislators viewpoint that a supernatural created humankind was one that was religious, and thus it sought to discredit evolution "by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creation science.''

* In ''Lee v. Weisman'' (1992), the Court decided that school-sponsored, state-directed religious  prayer (invocation), even if nonsectarian, at a high school commencement also violated the Establishment Clause.

* In ''[[Lee v. Weisman]]'' (1992), the Court decided that school-sponsored, state-directed religious  prayer (invocation), even if nonsectarian, at a high school commencement also violated the Establishment Clause.

* In 1981, in ''Widmar v. Vincent'' the Court ruled that religious groups were to have the same equal access to a public college's facilities as other ''noncurriculum'' related student groups, as this would further a secular purpose, would not constitute an impermissible benefit to religion. Later, in ''Westside Community Board of Educational v. Mergens'' (1990), these principles were also applied to public secondary schools as well, as it judged students were able to understand the school was accommodating, not affirming (as it effectively did for secularism), religious belief. Likewise, in ''Rosenberger v. University of Virginia'' (1995), the Court judged that student religious organizations were not to be excluded by public colleges from receiving benefits otherwise provided to a full range of student civic-type groups.  

* In 1981, in ''[[Widmar v. Vincent]]'' the Court ruled that religious groups were to have the same equal access to a public college's facilities as other ''noncurriculum'' related student groups, as this would further a secular purpose, would not constitute an impermissible benefit to religion. Later, in ''[[Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens|Westside Community Board of Educational v. Mergens]]'' (1990), these principles were also applied to public secondary schools as well, as it judged students were able to understand the school was accommodating, not affirming (as it effectively did for secularism), religious belief. Likewise, in ''Rosenberger v. University of Virginia'' (1995), the Court judged that student religious organizations were not to be excluded by public colleges from receiving benefits otherwise provided to a full range of student civic-type groups.  

* In related equal access rulings, in ''Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District'' (1993), the Court determined that public schools may not exclude, on First Amendment grounds, religious groups from being given permission for after-hours use of school property which were otherwise available for non-religious social, civic, and recreational purposes. This was also seen to apply to Town Halls, etc. In 1995 the Court similarly ruled in ''Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette'', that the government  cannot deny access for non-government funded religious displays or gatherings in a traditional public forum on government property which was used for citizen speeches and unattended displays.<ref>http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment01/03.html</ref>

* In related equal access rulings, in ''Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District'' (1993), the Court determined that public schools may not exclude, on First Amendment grounds, religious groups from being given permission for after-hours use of school property which were otherwise available for non-religious social, civic, and recreational purposes. This was also seen to apply to Town Halls, etc. In 1995 the Court similarly ruled in ''Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette'', that the government  cannot deny access for non-government funded religious displays or gatherings in a traditional public forum on government property which was used for citizen speeches and unattended displays.<ref>http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendment01/03.html</ref>

* In the 1995 decision in ''Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia'', the Court required the University of Virginia  to fund a Christian student newspaper as it also funded secular student newspapers, with liberal justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting.<ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=U10270</ref>

* In the 1995 decision in ''Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia'', the Court required the University of Virginia  to fund a Christian student newspaper as it also funded secular student newspapers, with liberal justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting.<ref>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=U10270</ref>

* In ''Good News Club v. Milford Central School'' (2001), the Court majority ruled that a public school district violated the free speech rights of an [[Evangelical Christian]] group by preventing them  from using school facilities after classes were over.<ref>http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20010711.html </ref><ref>http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/99-2036.html</ref>  

* In ''[[Good News Club v. Milford Central School]]'' (2001), the Court majority ruled that a public school district violated the free speech rights of an [[Evangelical Christian]] group by preventing them  from using school facilities after classes were over.<ref>http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20010711.html </ref><ref>http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/99-2036.html</ref>  

===Pledge of Allegiance===

===Pledge of Allegiance===

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

In a recent ruling<ref>Newdow vs Rio Linda Union School District</ref>  concerning the phrase, the usually liberal [[California Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals]], ruled 2-1 that the use of the phrase "under God" in the [[Pledge of Allegiance]] was constitutional, reversing its 2002 decision.  The Court stated (in part) that,  

In a recent ruling<ref>Newdow vs Rio Linda Union School District</ref>  concerning the phrase, the usually liberal [[Ninth Circuit|California Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals]], ruled 2-1 that the use of the phrase "under God" in the [[Pledge of Allegiance]] was constitutional, reversing its 2002 decision.  The Court stated (in part) that,  

The phrase “under God” is a recognition of our Founder’s political philosophy that a power greater than the government gives the people their inalienable rights. Thus, the Pledge is an endorsement of our form of government, not of religion or any particular sect...The Framers referred to the source of the people’s rights as the ‘Creator,’ the ‘Supreme Judge,’ and ‘Nature’s God.’ The Declaration of Independence, 1 U.S.C. § XLIII (1776). The name given to this unknowable, varied source was not crucial, but the source was a necessary prerequisite to the concept of limited government that formed the basis of our nation’s founding.” <ref>http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2010/03/11/05-17257.pdf pp. 52, 37</ref>

The phrase “under God” is a recognition of our Founder’s political philosophy that a power greater than the government gives the people their inalienable rights. Thus, the Pledge is an endorsement of our form of government, not of religion or any particular sect...The Framers referred to the source of the people’s rights as the ‘Creator,’ the ‘Supreme Judge,’ and ‘Nature’s God.’ The Declaration of Independence, 1 U.S.C. § XLIII (1776). The name given to this unknowable, varied source was not crucial, but the source was a necessary prerequisite to the concept of limited government that formed the basis of our nation’s founding.” <ref>http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2010/03/11/05-17257.pdf pp. 52, 37</ref>