Changes

After 1900 the United States became concerned with [[Manchuria]] as well as in China proper.  Both Russia and Japan wanted control there, and they went to war in 1905. At first anti-Russian in Manchuria and intent on extending American railroad, mining, and commercial privileges there, the United States then became anti-Japanese after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, although it was not able to make a definitive commitment of national resources and energy. Influenced by the caution of President [[Theodore Roosevelt]] (1901-1909), in the [[Taft-Katsura]] Agreement of 1905 and the [[Root-Takahira Agreement]] of 1908, the United States recognized Japan's growing power in eastern Asia in return for stated Open Door principles and respect for American territorial legitimacy in the Far East. During the administration of President [[William Howard Taft]] (1909-1913), the United States attempted to move into Manchuria and China proper via Open Door proposals on behalf of American railroad and banking investment interests in 1909 and 1913, and in so doing made overtures of cooperation with the European powers as well as with Russia and Japan, but nothing developed.

After 1900 the United States became concerned with [[Manchuria]] as well as in China proper.  Both Russia and Japan wanted control there, and they went to war in 1905. At first anti-Russian in Manchuria and intent on extending American railroad, mining, and commercial privileges there, the United States then became anti-Japanese after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, although it was not able to make a definitive commitment of national resources and energy. Influenced by the caution of President [[Theodore Roosevelt]] (1901-1909), in the [[Taft-Katsura]] Agreement of 1905 and the [[Root-Takahira Agreement]] of 1908, the United States recognized Japan's growing power in eastern Asia in return for stated Open Door principles and respect for American territorial legitimacy in the Far East. During the administration of President [[William Howard Taft]] (1909-1913), the United States attempted to move into Manchuria and China proper via Open Door proposals on behalf of American railroad and banking investment interests in 1909 and 1913, and in so doing made overtures of cooperation with the European powers as well as with Russia and Japan, but nothing developed.

During President [[Woodrow Wilson]]'s administration (1913-1921) the United States veered from side to side: it attempted to protect its stake in China by opposing Japan's [[21 Demands]] on China in 1915, and then it attempted to appease Japan's ambitions in Manchuria by recognizing the Japanese stake there in the [[Lansing-Ishii Agreement]] of 1917. During the [[Warren G., Harding]] administration (1921-23), in 1922 at the [[Washington Armament Conference]] negotiations, the Open Door outlook was embedded in the details of the [[Nine-Power Treaty]], which called for the territorial and administrative integrity of China and equality of trade opportunity without special privileges for any nation; there also began plans for the abolition of "extrality" (the system of legal rights and privileges that international merchants enjoyed in Chinese ports, which placed them under control of foreign consuls and beyond the reach of the Chinese courts.) At the conference China formally recognized the Open Door principle for the first time.  

During President [[Woodrow Wilson]]'s administration (1913-1921) the United States veered from side to side: it attempted to protect its stake in China by opposing Japan's [[21 Demands]] on China in 1915, and then it attempted to appease Japan's ambitions in Manchuria by recognizing the Japanese stake there in the [[Lansing-Ishii Agreement]] of 1917. During the [[Warren G. Harding]] administration (1921-23), in 1922 at the [[Washington Armament Conference]] negotiations, the Open Door outlook was embedded in the details of the [[Nine-Power Treaty]], which called for the territorial and administrative integrity of China and equality of trade opportunity without special privileges for any nation; there also began plans for the abolition of "extrality" (the system of legal rights and privileges that international merchants enjoyed in Chinese ports, which placed them under control of foreign consuls and beyond the reach of the Chinese courts.) At the conference China formally recognized the Open Door principle for the first time.  

==1929-45==

==1929-45==

During the period 1929-33, Manchuria came to the forefront of American Open Door concerns, with the invocation in 1931 of the [[Kellogg-Briand Pact]] of 1927 against Japan's use of force in Manchuria. By 1931, President [[Herbert Hoover]]'s Secretary of State [[Henry L. Stimson]] had established the continuity of American policy by linking the principles of the Kellogg-Briand Pact with those expressed in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. In 1932, Stimson made history by articulating his non-recognition doctrine, regarding Japan's conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. From that point onward, throughout the administration of President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] (1933-45) the United States, led by Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]], maintained growing opposition to Japan's aggrandizement in the sphere of China and the enlargement of Japan's ambitions throughout Southeast Asia. The goals of the Roosevelt administration were to build up Chinese state power as a counterweight to Japan, and to end Japanese control of Manchuria.  The coming to power of [[Mao Zedong]] and the Communists in 1949 abruptly turned China into a hostile power, and U.S. forms were not allowed to trade with it until President [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Henry Kissinger]] opened détente with China in 1972.

During the period 1929-33, Manchuria came to the forefront of American Open Door concerns, with the invocation in 1931 of the [[Kellogg-Briand Pact]] of 1927 against Japan's use of force in Manchuria. By 1931, President [[Herbert Hoover]]'s Secretary of State [[Henry L. Stimson]] had established the continuity of American policy by linking the principles of the Kellogg-Briand Pact with those expressed in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. In 1932, Stimson made history by articulating his non-recognition doctrine, regarding Japan's conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. From that point onward, throughout the administration of President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] (1933-45) the United States, led by Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]], maintained growing opposition to Japan's aggrandizement in the sphere of China and the enlargement of Japan's ambitions throughout Southeast Asia. The goals of the Roosevelt administration were to build up Chinese state power as a counterweight to Japan, and to end Japanese control of Manchuria.  The coming to power of [[Mao Zedong]] and the Communists in 1949 abruptly turned China into a hostile power, and U.S. forms were not allowed to trade with it until President [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Henry Kissinger]] opened détente with China in 1972.