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added some more info, but the citations are still sparse.
==Origin==
==Origin==
The writer of this [[malware]] is not known, but the complexity of it and the amount of research which went into it suggests to most that it was designed by an organization or government. It used a number or [[zero day exploits]] (vulnerabilities which had not yet been found) which implies a powerful entity was behind it. Since the [[United States]] and [[Israel]] would probably be at the greatest risk if [[Iran]] does achieve nuclear capabilities, it is generally suspected that one or both of these governments where involved.
The writer of this [[malware]] is not known, but the complexity of it and the amount of research which went into it suggests to most that it was designed by an organization or government. It uses not one or even two but a total of four [[zero day exploits]] (vulnerabilities which had not yet been found) which implies a powerful entity was behind it.<ref>http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-using-three-additional-zero-day-vulnerabilities</ref> Since the [[United States]] and [[Israel]] would probably be at the greatest risk if [[Iran]] does achieve nuclear capabilities, it is generally suspected that one or both of these governments where involved.
==Details==
==How it Works==
The Stuxnet [[computer worm|worm]] spread like all other worms, on its own without human action. It jumped from system to system, checking for [[Siemens]] [[industrial control systems]], which where used by several [[uranium]] refineries in [[Iran]]. If the systems where not detected, it would try to spread to other [[computer]]s, but not harm its new host. Only if these systems where present would it go to work, causing the equipment to malfunction while the monitors displayed false information.
The Stuxnet [[computer worm|worm]] spread like all other worms, on its own without human action. It jumped from [[Windows]] system to system, checking for [[Siemens]] [[industrial control systems]], which where used by several [[uranium]] refineries in [[Iran]]. If the systems where not detected, it would try to spread to other [[computer]]s, but not harm its new host. Only if these systems where present would it go to work, causing the equipment to malfunction while the monitors displayed false information.
The targeted refinery systems where [[air-gaped]], that is, not connected to the [[internet]]. Therefore, the [[malware]] needed to be hand delivered. In such cases, an infected [[flash drive]] is often left outside of the facility, and a curious or well-meaning individual will connect it to a computer inside to see the contents. Once connected, it will infect the computer, and begin to spread.
The targeted refinery systems where [[air-gaped]], that is, not connected to the [[internet]]. Therefore, the [[malware]] needed to be hand delivered. In such cases, an infected [[flash drive]] is often left outside of the facility, and a curious or well-meaning individual will connect it to a computer inside to see the contents. Once connected, it will infect the computer, and begin to spread.
==Results==
In all, about one fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges where destroyed. However, Stuxnet was not intended to leave the targeted facilities, since they where [[air-gaped]]. However, it did escape and is still on the loose in the [[World Wide Web]]. It is not nearly as contagious as it was at first, but even so, the Czech Republic-based security firm [[Kleissner & Associates]] reported that at least 153 unique machines were infected with Stuxnet in 2013 and 2014.<ref>http://www.securityweek.com/stuxnet-still-present-some-organizations-researchers</ref> Since it was designed to attack [[Siemens]] [[industrial control systems]], it is still a threat to some such equipment which is controlled by older or unpatched [[operating system]]s.<ref>http://www.scmagazineuk.com/stuxnet-still-a-threat-to-critical-infrastructure/article/419802</ref><br />
There have been other repercussions as well. Now malware has been proven an effective attack against country as a whole or a specific program. Meanwhile, a powerful piece of code still capable of breaking into unprotected systems is "floating" around, out of control. If the wrong party was able to gain a copy of the malware, they could theoretically decompile, edit, and release it for their own purposes.
==References==
{{reflist}}