Changes

In 1943-1944 Currie ran the [[Foreign Economic Administration]] where he played a major role in recruiting or recommending economists and others throughout the Washington administration, prominent examples are [[John Kenneth Galbraith]], Richard Gilbert, [[Adlai Stevenson]], and William O’Dwyer.  [[John Carter Vincent]] is also listed as an Acting Special Assistant to the Administrator.  

In 1943-1944 Currie ran the [[Foreign Economic Administration]] where he played a major role in recruiting or recommending economists and others throughout the Washington administration, prominent examples are [[John Kenneth Galbraith]], Richard Gilbert, [[Adlai Stevenson]], and William O’Dwyer.  [[John Carter Vincent]] is also listed as an Acting Special Assistant to the Administrator.  

After the death of [[Jacob Golos]], KGB Case Officer [[Iskhak Akhmerov]] urged Silvermaster to arrange for direct KGB contact with Currie, but Silvermaster resisted. Currie sent a warning that American cryptanalysts were on the verge of breaking the Soviet diplomatic code.  An August 1943 [[Venona]] cable reports to Moscow that Currie had given [[George Silverman]] a memorandum involving the State Department. In June 1944 the New York KGB reported receipt of two items from Currie. One was information on President Roosevelt's reasons for keeping [[Charles de Gaulle]] at arm's length. The other told the Soviets that Roosevelt was willing to accept Stalin's demand that the USSR keep the half of Poland that it had received under the [[Nazi-Soviet Pact]] and that FDR would put pressure on the London Polish government-in-exile to make concessions.  President Roosevelt had personally assured Polish-Americans, prior to the 1944 election, of his support for the Polish cause. Currie's private information let Stalin know that he could disregard these public stands and need not make serious concessions to the Poles.  It was about this time Currie also met with [[Oskar R. Lange]] in Chicago.   

After the death of [[Jacob Golos]], KGB Case Officer [[Iskhak Akhmerov]] urged Silvermaster to arrange for direct KGB contact with Currie, but Silvermaster resisted. Currie sent a warning that American cryptanalysts were on the verge of breaking the Soviet diplomatic code. <ref>[https://www.cia.gov/csi/books/venona/venona.htm  Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957] </ref> An August 1943 [[Venona]] cable reports to Moscow that Currie had given [[George Silverman]] a memorandum involving the State Department. In June 1944 the New York KGB reported receipt of two items from Currie. One was information on President Roosevelt's reasons for keeping [[Charles de Gaulle]] at arm's length. The other told the Soviets that Roosevelt was willing to accept Stalin's demand that the USSR keep the half of Poland that it had received under the [[Nazi-Soviet Pact]] and that FDR would put pressure on the London Polish government-in-exile to make concessions.  President Roosevelt had personally assured Polish-Americans, prior to the 1944 election, of his support for the Polish cause. Currie's private information let Stalin know that he could disregard these public stands and need not make serious concessions to the Poles.  It was about this time Currie also met with [[Oskar R. Lange]] in Chicago.   

[[Pavel Fitin]], head of KGB foreign intelligence, told its New York office in March that it wanted more out of Currie. Fitin acknowledged that “[Currie] trusts [Silvermaster], informs him not only orally, but also by handing over documents”.  But, said Fitin, “up to now [Currie's] relations with [Silvermaster] were expressed, from our point of view, only in common feelings and personal sympathies. [unrecovered code groups] question of more profound relations and an understanding by [Currie] of [Silvermaster's] role. If [Silvermaster] does not get [Currie's] transfer to our worker, then he [unrecovered code groups] raising with [Currie] the question of [Currie's] closer complicity with [Silvermaster].”

[[Pavel Fitin]], head of KGB foreign intelligence, told its New York office in March that it wanted more out of Currie. Fitin acknowledged that “[Currie] trusts [Silvermaster], informs him not only orally, but also by handing over documents”.  But, said Fitin, “up to now [Currie's] relations with [Silvermaster] were expressed, from our point of view, only in common feelings and personal sympathies. [unrecovered code groups] question of more profound relations and an understanding by [Currie] of [Silvermaster's] role. If [Silvermaster] does not get [Currie's] transfer to our worker, then he [unrecovered code groups] raising with [Currie] the question of [Currie's] closer complicity with [Silvermaster].”