| | + | <div style="padding-left:40px;">— [[G.K. Chesterton]]<ref>{{cite book |title=The Book of Job, with an Introduction by G.K. Chesterton |chapter=An introduction |publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing |year=1907, 2010 |isbn=9781152628328 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=kzNHQwAACAAJ}}</ref> </div> |
| | In physical realms the '''singularity''' is an event that due to its nature is assumed to only happened once<ref name="LENNOX">{{cite book | | In physical realms the '''singularity''' is an event that due to its nature is assumed to only happened once<ref name="LENNOX">{{cite book |
| − | }}</ref>|group=note}} He identified it with God, because at least in one respect, a first cause exhibits an important property of the divine: It is ''uncaused''. According to David Berlinski this is a weak (Aquinas's conclusion might not be definitively confirmed as true or false){{#tag:ref|cf."The riddles of God are more satisfying than the solutions of man." ''The Book of Job: An introduction'' ([[G.K. Chesterton]], 1907)|group=note}} but not absurd argument that is frequently met with inept objections.<ref name="Devils"/> Berlinski also argues that the concept of singularity belongs ''essentially'' to mathematics and singularities are not ''experimentally'' accessible objects that could be weighted, measured, assessed, replicated, balanced, or seen by any modality of the senses.<ref name="DeniableDarwin">{{cite book | + | }}</ref>|group=note}} He identified it with God, because at least in one respect, a first cause exhibits an important property of the divine: It is ''uncaused''. According to David Berlinski this is a weak (Aquinas's conclusion might not be definitively confirmed as true or false) but not absurd argument that is frequently met with inept objections.<ref name="Devils"/> Berlinski also argues that the concept of singularity belongs ''essentially'' to mathematics and singularities are not ''experimentally'' accessible objects that could be weighted, measured, assessed, replicated, balanced, or seen by any modality of the senses.<ref name="DeniableDarwin">{{cite book |