| | The Mondale and Kennedy machines wanted to do away with portions of the McGovern-Fraser (known as the "reform movement") compromise that had frozen elected government office holders out of the nomination process<ref>[http://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/01/15/Democratic-party-rule-makers-recommended.-today-that-delegates-to/3774379918800/ Democratic party rule makers], ARNOLD SAWISLAK, UPI, Jan. 15, 1982.</ref> and paved the way for an "insurgent candidate". The new rules the Democratic National Committee (DNC) adopted didn't just allow or encourage incumbents to return, it guaranteed elected officials seats outside the regular delegate selection process. The Kennedy faction wanted to cut the number of the roughly 800 reserved seats in half<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/17/democrats-and-unintended-consequences/d4741a07-05a2-47b1-bd33-b04458338005/ Democrats and Unintended Consequences], By David S. Broder, ''[[Washington Post]]'', January 17, 1982. </ref>. [[Susan Estrich]], who was to manage Michael Dukakis' 1988 presidential campaign<ref>Estrich and Dukakis are ranking members in the Massachusetts Kennedy machine which tried to resurrect the 1960 alliance and victory with Texas Democrats on the Dukakis/Bentsen ticket.</ref> strenuously objected to the plan, and derisively coined the term "super-delegate", whom she claimed would disproportionately be white males based upon the formula<ref>[https://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/news-archive/history-of-superdelegates A History of 'Super-Delegates' in the Democratic Party], Elaine Kamarck, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2016.</ref>. Nevertheless, the idea became rule, and from its initial inception has only been expanded upon since<ref>Democratic party convention rule changes, academic.regis.edu , above.</ref>. The "Old Democrats" had retaken power with a vengeance. | | The Mondale and Kennedy machines wanted to do away with portions of the McGovern-Fraser (known as the "reform movement") compromise that had frozen elected government office holders out of the nomination process<ref>[http://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/01/15/Democratic-party-rule-makers-recommended.-today-that-delegates-to/3774379918800/ Democratic party rule makers], ARNOLD SAWISLAK, UPI, Jan. 15, 1982.</ref> and paved the way for an "insurgent candidate". The new rules the Democratic National Committee (DNC) adopted didn't just allow or encourage incumbents to return, it guaranteed elected officials seats outside the regular delegate selection process. The Kennedy faction wanted to cut the number of the roughly 800 reserved seats in half<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/17/democrats-and-unintended-consequences/d4741a07-05a2-47b1-bd33-b04458338005/ Democrats and Unintended Consequences], By David S. Broder, ''[[Washington Post]]'', January 17, 1982. </ref>. [[Susan Estrich]], who was to manage Michael Dukakis' 1988 presidential campaign<ref>Estrich and Dukakis are ranking members in the Massachusetts Kennedy machine which tried to resurrect the 1960 alliance and victory with Texas Democrats on the Dukakis/Bentsen ticket.</ref> strenuously objected to the plan, and derisively coined the term "super-delegate", whom she claimed would disproportionately be white males based upon the formula<ref>[https://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/news-archive/history-of-superdelegates A History of 'Super-Delegates' in the Democratic Party], Elaine Kamarck, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2016.</ref>. Nevertheless, the idea became rule, and from its initial inception has only been expanded upon since<ref>Democratic party convention rule changes, academic.regis.edu , above.</ref>. The "Old Democrats" had retaken power with a vengeance. |
| − | The Hunt Commission (also known as the "counter-reform movement") scrapped the proportional allocation rules from the 1970s in favor of winner-take-all rules. Prior to proportional representation there was the “unit rule”, a delegation had to vote as a unit, now known as “winner-take-all”. McGovern-Fraser scraped the unit rule for [[affirmative action]], or “proportional representation”. Today’s supposed “unpledged” Superdelegates function as the local bosses whose cronies, that is, “pledged delegates”, earned their status working to elect Superdelegates to public office in previous elections. Together they function as a unit wherein the boss’s favorite carries the majority of delegates from a state. | + | The Hunt Commission (also known as the "counter-reform movement") scrapped the proportional allocation rules from the 1970s in favor of winner-take-all rules. Prior to proportional representation there was the “unit rule”, a delegation had to vote as a unit, now known as “winner-take-all”. McGovern-Fraser scraped the unit rule for [[affirmative action]], or “proportional representation”, rather than actual votes cast. Today’s supposed “unpledged” Superdelegates function as the local bosses whose cronies, that is, “pledged delegates”, earned their status working to elect Superdelegates to public office in previous elections. Together they function as a unit wherein the boss’s favorite carries the majority of delegates from a state. |
| | The winner-take-all ultimately had the unintended affect in 1984 of allowing McGovern's old campaign manager [[Gary Hart]], a challenger for whom the rules were not written, to rack up big delegate wins in late primary states<ref>Reforming the Presidential Nomination Process, Chapter 1 [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/1/1/reformingthepresidentialnominationprocess/reformingthepresidentialnominationprocess_chapter.pdf Choosing Presidential Candidates], Steven S. Smith & Melanie J. Springer, eds., Brookings Institute, 2009, pp. 4-8. www.brookings.edu . An excellent and timely synopsis.</ref>. | | The winner-take-all ultimately had the unintended affect in 1984 of allowing McGovern's old campaign manager [[Gary Hart]], a challenger for whom the rules were not written, to rack up big delegate wins in late primary states<ref>Reforming the Presidential Nomination Process, Chapter 1 [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/1/1/reformingthepresidentialnominationprocess/reformingthepresidentialnominationprocess_chapter.pdf Choosing Presidential Candidates], Steven S. Smith & Melanie J. Springer, eds., Brookings Institute, 2009, pp. 4-8. www.brookings.edu . An excellent and timely synopsis.</ref>. |