Saddam had taken advantage of corruption in both the [[United Nations]] Secretariat and [[Security Council]] to revive the Iraqi economy after the 1991 [[Gulf War]] through the [[Oil for Food]] program, nevertheless few of the intended beneficiaries of these alleged UN humanitarian efforts saw the intended relief. Meanwhile, Saddam kept intact the "intellectual capital" or "know-how" to revive [[weapons of mass destruction]] (WMD) programs which were credited with ensuring the survival of the Ba'athist regime in both the 1980-1988 War with Iran, and preventing a US overthrow of the regime in 1991. As the 90s progressed and the millennium changed, Saddam's top priority was ending the sanctions, and then a full resumption of operational WMD programs. <ref>[https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf Regime Strategic Intent], Duelfer Report, 2004.</ref> | Saddam had taken advantage of corruption in both the [[United Nations]] Secretariat and [[Security Council]] to revive the Iraqi economy after the 1991 [[Gulf War]] through the [[Oil for Food]] program, nevertheless few of the intended beneficiaries of these alleged UN humanitarian efforts saw the intended relief. Meanwhile, Saddam kept intact the "intellectual capital" or "know-how" to revive [[weapons of mass destruction]] (WMD) programs which were credited with ensuring the survival of the Ba'athist regime in both the 1980-1988 War with Iran, and preventing a US overthrow of the regime in 1991. As the 90s progressed and the millennium changed, Saddam's top priority was ending the sanctions, and then a full resumption of operational WMD programs. <ref>[https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf Regime Strategic Intent], Duelfer Report, 2004.</ref> |