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Wilhelm pursued an aggressive foreign policy known as ''Weltpolitik,'' literally "world policy." This strategy is to be distinguished from Bismarck's ''Realpolitik'', which emphasized the "balance of power" concept. Wilhelm hoped to persuade Britain to withdraw from European affairs. If he could accomplish this, he imagined that Germany's economic and military power would dominate both France and Russia, allowing him to emerge with a "Napoleanic supremacy."<ref name=rohl18 /> Mindful of the role the British played in Napolean's downfall, he built up the German navy hoping that this would intimidate Britain. The British countered with a naval buildup of their own and by forming a "Triple Entente" (1907) with France and Russia. Thus the German buildup had an effect opposite to what was intended.

Wilhelm pursued an aggressive foreign policy known as ''Weltpolitik,'' literally "world policy." This strategy is to be distinguished from Bismarck's ''Realpolitik'', which emphasized the "balance of power" concept. Wilhelm hoped to persuade Britain to withdraw from European affairs. If he could accomplish this, he imagined that Germany's economic and military power would dominate both France and Russia, allowing him to emerge with a "Napoleanic supremacy."<ref name=rohl18 /> Mindful of the role the British played in Napolean's downfall, he built up the German navy hoping that this would intimidate Britain. The British countered with a naval buildup of their own and by forming a "Triple Entente" (1907) with France and Russia. Thus the German buildup had an effect opposite to what was intended.

===Role in launching World War I===

===A place in the sun (1905-1912)===

The collapse of the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 allowed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisors.<ref name=rohl18 />

The collapse of the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 allowed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisers.<ref name=rohl18 />

 

German public opinion was generally opposed to war until 1911, when Britain's intervention in the Agadir crisis triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> Many Germans argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." During the Haldane Mission of February 1912, the British offered to partition the Portuguese and Belgian colonies with Germany. Wilhelm's focus was always on European supremacy. To him, offers of colonies were a British trick, designed to divide the German fleet.<ref>Röhl, p. 842.</ref>

The Haldane Mission of February 1912 proposed that Portuguese and Belgian colonies be partitioned between Britain and Germany. The Germans would get the central African empire they had demanded at the time of Agadir. It turned out that Wilhelm wasn't interested. His focus was European supremacy. He denounced Haldane's proposal as a British trick designed to divide the German fleet.<ref>Röhl, p. 842.</ref> It was just as well. The proposal was no better received in London than it was in Berlin.

The idea that war with Britain was inevitable became conventional wisdom, and the Kaiser's reluctance began to look quaint, even to his own advisors.<ref>Röhl, p. 875. A few weeks after Agadir, Falkenhayen wrote, "Outwardly, our political situation has improved...but internally nothing has changed, in so far as H.M. is as determined as before to avoid a war."</ref> In response to the increasing militarism of the conservative parties, many voters switched to the anti-militarist Social Democratic Party. In the Reichstag election in January 1912, the party went from 43 seats to 110 (out of a total of 397). This election also gave the left-of-center parties a majority in the parliament.<ref>This refers to the combined total of the Social Democrats, Zentrum, and Progressives. The Zentrum, or Center Party, is the precursor of Germany's post-World War II conservative movement.</ref>

The idea that war with Britain was inevitable became conventional wisdom, and the Kaiser's reluctance began to look quaint, even to his own advisors.<ref>Röhl, p. 875. A few weeks after Agadir, Falkenhayen wrote, "Outwardly, our political situation has improved...but internally nothing has changed, in so far as H.M. is as determined as before to avoid a war."</ref> In response to the increasing militarism of the conservative parties, many voters switched to the anti-militarist Social Democratic Party. In the Reichstag election in January 1912, the party went from 43 seats to 110 (out of a total of 397). This election also gave the left-of-center parties a majority in the parliament.<ref>This refers to the combined total of the Social Democrats, Zentrum, and Progressives. The Zentrum, or Center Party, is the precursor of Germany's post-World War II conservative movement.</ref>