Changes

|url=http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/12/1993-12-08-briefing-by-bentsen-and-rubin.text.html

|url=http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/12/1993-12-08-briefing-by-bentsen-and-rubin.text.html

|publisher=The White House }}</ref> with an effective starting date of January 31, 1995, were credited with substantially increasing the number and aggregate amount of loans to small businesses and to low- and moderate-income borrowers for home loans.  Massive new provisions to CRA that forced banks to issue $1 trillion dollars in bad loans and indirectly fund the work of radical left-wing organizations."<ref>[http://www.grasstopsusa.com/freemarketsolutions.html Your Blast Fax], ''GrasstopsUSA.com''</ref>

|publisher=The White House }}</ref> with an effective starting date of January 31, 1995, were credited with substantially increasing the number and aggregate amount of loans to small businesses and to low- and moderate-income borrowers for home loans.  Massive new provisions to CRA that forced banks to issue $1 trillion dollars in bad loans and indirectly fund the work of radical left-wing organizations."<ref>[http://www.grasstopsusa.com/freemarketsolutions.html Your Blast Fax], ''GrasstopsUSA.com''</ref>

Part of the increase in home loans was due to increased efficiency and the genesis of lenders, like [[Countrywide]], that do not mitigate loan risk with savings deposits as do traditional banks using the new subprime authorization.  This is known as the secondary market for mortgage loans. The revisions allowed the [[securitization]] of CRA loans containing [[subprime lending| subprime mortgages]]. The first public [[securitization]] of CRA loans started in 1997. <ref>{{cite web

Part of the increase in home loans was due to increased efficiency and the genesis of lenders, like [[Countrywide]], that do not mitigate loan risk with savings deposits as do traditional banks using the new subprime authorization.  This is known as the secondary market for mortgage loans. The revisions allowed the [[securitization]] of CRA loans containing [[subprime lending|subprime mortgages]]. The first public [[securitization]] of CRA loans started in 1997.<ref>{{cite web

|title=FIRST UNION CAPITAL MARKETS CORP., BEAR, STEARNS & CO. PRICE SECURITIES OFFERING BACKED BY AFFORDABLE MORTGAGES   

|title=FIRST UNION CAPITAL MARKETS CORP., BEAR, STEARNS & CO. PRICE SECURITIES OFFERING BACKED BY AFFORDABLE MORTGAGES   

|url=http://www.wachovia.com/inside/page/textonly/0,,134_307%5E306,00.html

|url=http://www.wachovia.com/inside/page/textonly/0,,134_307%5E306,00.html

|publisher=The New York Times}}</ref>  The change was to place two of the primary agents guaranteeing subprime loans, [[Fannie Mae]] and [[Freddie Mac]] under supervision of a new agency created within the [[United States Department of the Treasury|Department of the Treasury]].  The changes were generally opposed along Party lines and eventually failed to happen as a result of Democrat efforts in opposition.<ref>{{cite web

|publisher=The New York Times}}</ref>  The change was to place two of the primary agents guaranteeing subprime loans, [[Fannie Mae]] and [[Freddie Mac]] under supervision of a new agency created within the [[United States Department of the Treasury|Department of the Treasury]].  The changes were generally opposed along Party lines and eventually failed to happen as a result of Democrat efforts in opposition.<ref>{{cite web

|title=Congressional Hearings on Bush Administration's Efforts to Tighten Lending Regulation|url=http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:92231.wais

|title=Congressional Hearings on Bush Administration's Efforts to Tighten Lending Regulation|url=http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:92231.wais

|publisher=Government Printing Office}}</ref>Representative [[Barney Frank]](D-MA) claimed of the thrifts "These two entities -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- are not facing any kind of financial crisis, the more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing."  Representative [[Mel Watt]] (D-NC) added "I don't see much other than a shell game going on here, moving something from one agency to another and in the process weakening the bargaining power of poorer families and their ability to get affordable housing."

|publisher=Government Printing Office}}</ref> Representative [[Barney Frank]](D-MA) claimed of the thrifts "These two entities -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- are not facing any kind of financial crisis, the more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing."  Representative [[Mel Watt]] (D-NC) added "I don't see much other than a shell game going on here, moving something from one agency to another and in the process weakening the bargaining power of poorer families and their ability to get affordable housing."

==Changes of September 2005==

==Changes of September 2005==

===Equality of opportunity vs equality of result===

===Equality of opportunity vs equality of result===

'''Subprime lending'''<br>

'''Subprime lending'''<br>

Critics claim that government policy encouraged the development of the [[Subprime mortgage crisis| subprime debacle]] through legislation like the CRA, which in effect forces banks to lend to the same otherwise uncreditworthy consumers they are now being criticized for accepting.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Government-Created Subprime Mortgage Meltdown  

Critics claim that government policy encouraged the development of the [[Subprime mortgage crisis|subprime debacle]] through legislation like the CRA, which in effect forces banks to lend to the same otherwise uncreditworthy consumers they are now being criticized for accepting.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Government-Created Subprime Mortgage Meltdown  

|url=http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo125.html  

|url=http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo125.html  

|first=Thomas J. |last=DiLorenzo  

|first=Thomas J. |last=DiLorenzo  

|publisher=''[[LewRockwell.com]]''}}</ref> <ref>{{cite web  

|publisher=''[[LewRockwell.com]]''}}</ref><ref>{{cite web  

|title=The Real Scandal - How feds invited the mortgage mess  

|title=The Real Scandal - How feds invited the mortgage mess  

|url=http://www.nypost.com/seven/02052008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/the_real_scandal_243911.htm?page=0  

|url=http://www.nypost.com/seven/02052008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/the_real_scandal_243911.htm?page=0  

*Canner, G. and W. Passmore, 1997 ''The Community Reinvestment Act and the profitability of mortage-oriented banks'', Finance and economics discussion series, 1997-7

*Canner, G. and W. Passmore, 1997 ''The Community Reinvestment Act and the profitability of mortage-oriented banks'', Finance and economics discussion series, 1997-7

*Schwartz, A., 1998. ''From confrontation to collaboration? Banks, community groups, and the implementation of community reinvestment agreements'', Housing policy debate, 9, 3, pp. 631-662

*Schwartz, A., 1998. ''From confrontation to collaboration? Banks, community groups, and the implementation of community reinvestment agreements'', Housing policy debate, 9, 3, pp.&nbsp;631–662

*Seidman, E., 1999 "CRA in the 21st century," ''Mortage banking'', Washington, DC, October

*Seidman, E., 1999 "CRA in the 21st century," ''Mortage banking'', Washington, DC, October

*Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi. The Two Income Trap: Why Middle Class Parents are Going Broke 2003 (New York: Basic Books).

*Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi. The Two Income Trap: Why Middle Class Parents are Going Broke 2003 (New York: Basic Books).